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 This dissertation looks into the work of St. Thomas Aquinas and addresses his 
theology of grace through the lens of the postmodern concern for the other.  The first 
chapter sets up the postmodern view using Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida to 
draw out the fundamental grounding for the concern for the other. In chapters two and 
three, St. Thomas‘ theology of nature and then grace are examined focusing on his 
particular focus on the other. In his work we find that there is a concern for the other and 
a structure to the human person that supports this concern. Using Clarkeian interpretation 
of St. Thomas along with unique analysis both a nature and a grace that is for the self and 
for the other is discovered. In the fourth chapter this structure is put in dialogue with the 
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INTRODUCTION: THE DIALOGUE OF ―OTHERNESS‖ 
 
When looking at much of contemporary theology, one sees a serious concern for 
the ―other‖ pervading the work.  This comes as no surprise considering the postmodern 
context marking the present age.  An unfortunate mark, though, is the rejection of much 
of what has come before the modern/postmodern debate.   In Roman Catholic theology 
there is an intimate connection not only with the theology of the medieval period but also 
that of the patristic period.  Catholic theology is marked by a desire to keep the theology 
of the past and integrate it with that of the present and future.  To this end I propose a 
dialogue between the present postmodern concern for the other and the medieval 
understanding of the other as found in a theology of grace. 
In an attempt to find an appropriate postmodern theology with which to dialogue 
medieval thought, one will find that many of the theological questions are being asked 
and answered by philosophers either wholly unconnected or tenuously connected with the 
Christian tradition, especially the Roman Catholic tradition, and few, if any, theologians.
1
  
For the Roman Catholic theologian this can become problematic especially when the 
outcomes of philosophy come into conflict with the theological Tradition of the Church.  
This conflict does not necessarily have to happen. The dialogue between Roman Catholic 
theology and postmodern philosophy can and must take place but to do so, there must be 
                                                 
1
 There are beginning to be some exceptions to this, most notably the Catholic 
University of Leuven with its particular section devoted to this dialogue.  They are still 
situated in the postmodern addressing the medieval but have not yet begun from the 
medieval to approach the postmodern. 
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some common ground on which to build; otherwise nothing particularly edifying will 
result.     
With each conversation there must be some point of shared understanding.  This 
dissertation will focus on ―otherness‖ as found in both postmodern philosophy and the 
general cultural situation of postmodernity. Otherness has great resonance with the 
postmodern project and many connections within the Catholic theological Tradition, 
especially for this dissertation, represented by St. Thomas Aquinas.
2
 Once this theme of 
―otherness‖ is linked to the theological tradition, a dialogue of development can begin 
and a more conversant Roman Catholic systematic theology can evolve using the gifts 
and admonishments that come with the postmodern philosophical project. 
Has this dialogue not already begun? No, I do not believe so or at best it is just 
beginning.  Much of the discussion revolving around postmodern themes remains within 
the realm of philosophy.
3
  Those discussing theology in the context of otherness have 
been doing so from within a particular philosophical system. This creates a certain 
restraint within the work distinguishing it from the theological project which is 
                                                 
2
 The reason St. Thomas is chosen is because of his foundational position within 
Catholic Systematic Theology. No other theologian has had the support of the Magisterial 
and Ecclesial body as he.  Consider that he is the only theologian that has been the 
subject, supportively, of more than one Magisterial documents especially papal 
encyclicals. Cf. Aeterni Patris, Non Multo Post, Studiorum Ducem, Mirabilis Deus, Fides 
et Ratio, Veritatis Splendor, etc.  In the papal bull ordering St. Thomas‘ canonization, 
Pope John XXII said "His doctrine was not other than miraculous…He has enlightened 
the Church more than all other Doctors, and more profit can be gained in a single year by 
the study of his works, than by devoting a lifetime to that of other theologians. He has 
wrought as many miracles as he has written Articles."  
3
 The possible exceptions are L.-M. Chauvet and Leven Boeve but most of the 
known names dealing with these questions are primarily in the field of philosophy as 
trained philosophers.  
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constrained not by any single philosophical system but by articles of faith.  Those 
working on philosophical projects dealing with theological themes begin and end within 
their particular philosophical system.  A review of the theological system of the medieval 
and even modern theologians shows a desire to stay within a philosophical system but not 
as a boundary beyond which they cannot go.
4
  The rule of faith is the boundary beyond 
which a theologian cannot go and this may or may not mean that a particular 
philosophical system will or can be used exclusively; more than likely it will not.
5
 
Due to time and space constraints a single aspect of the theological tradition will 
be used as a focal point: otherness or concern for the other or other-oriented-ness in the 
theology of grace in St. Thomas Aquinas.  This offers an exceptional starting point for 
this discussion since a cursory review of St. Thomas‘ theology of grace shows that there 
are affinities in his theology and philosophy with the postmodern ―concern for the other.‖  
This leaves the door open to a deeper dialogue and research concerning how these themes 
connect and interconnect in Thomistic and postmodern theology and philosophy as well 
as Roman Catholic theology as a whole. 
The history of the Catholic theological Tradition has indicated that it must 
consider the theological and philosophical developments of the time—read the ―signs of 
the times.‖  This reading or simple interaction can come as adversarial or complementary 
                                                 
4
 Consider, most recently, the work of Pope John Paul II and his use of 
phenomenology as well as the system of Karl Rahner who utilized the philosophical 
systems of Heidegger and Aquinas. 
5
 The most recent case is that of the theology of John Paul II where he uses 
phenomenology as a tool for his particular theology but did not consider himself, nor did 
others consider him, a phenomenologist. 
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as seen in various documents throughout the Tradition.  Most especially in mind is the 
encyclical letter Fides et Ratio of the late Pope John Paul II.  The charge to put theology 
in dialogue with philosophy and the desire to dip the theological tradition in the acid bath 
of reason is a reaffirmation of a long tradition in Roman Catholic theology.
6
 As of yet we 
are only seeing the beginnings of this dialogue with Postmodernity. The hope is that by 
making these connections, the dialogue will have a framework around which to build a 
much larger discussion.  
Concern for the Other 
The emphasis on the ‗other‘ in postmodernity/ism is in reaction to a perceived 
self-centeredness found in much of the modern philosophical project. This is also found 
in much of the theological projects of the contemporary era. The ―turn to the subject‖
7
 
has left its mark on much of the early twentieth century philosophico-theological work as 
can be readily seen the literature.  As a counterpoint to this movement, Emmanuel 
Levinas has played a major part in the philosophical underpinning of otherness as a key 
postmodern concern, others have continued the development throughout the mid- to late- 
twentieth century.  Levinas‘ status as having put otherness at the forefront makes him an 
important dialogue partner.  Jacques Derrida builds off of the project started by Levinas 
and develops it further.  On the popular level, Lyotard opened up the philosophical 
                                                 
6
 Cf. Augustine‘s De doctrina christiana. 
7
 See, for example, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke and Hume as they try to establish 
the subject as primary. They also shift the concerns from transcendental to 
epistemological as the flourishing of nominalism in the late scholastic and early modern 
period posed problems about the knowability of anything.  
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discussion of otherness as it relates to the culture of the present age in the 1980s by 
showing how far the themes of postmodernity have penetrated western culture.  
The concern for the other in Levinas comes in the form of the ―here I am‖ and the 
pre-conditional, pre-thematic, and pre-intentional responsibility for the other, his idea of 
substitution.  The ―here I am‖ is Levinas‘ notion of a testimony of God and is saying that 
there is a god that gives to us, in an unthematizable fashion, the exigency of ethical 
subjectivity exclusively for the other.  In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas describes the idea of 
the ―me voici,‖ the ―here I am‖ as a testimony to the Infinite or God.  When confronted 
by the face of the other one encounters an exigency that drives him to present himself for 
the other in a relationship to the Infinite that is not one of disclosure but of nondisclosure.  
The other contains the trace of the Infinite in the face and this testimony, ―here I am,‖ is 
the subject‘s preintentional answer to the command of the face of the other and saying 
"here I am" unconditionally not to a someone but to an unknowable unknown.  
The ―here I am‖ is not only a testimony to or about God it is also an exclamation 
of what is truly constituative of the human person.  The idea of leaving the self in the 
accusative versus the nominative case defines the human subject as one that cannot, as 
Same, absolutize the Other.  To be a human or subject, then, is to keep the other as other 
while in the Same. The ethical subject is to be subject but only insofar as the Other is 
kept Other while in the concern of the Same. Keeping in mind that Levinas deals with the 
meaning of ethics and not the practical aspects of doing ethical things.  The "here I am" is 
the passivity that is constituative of the human person—the "passivity more passive than 
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all passivity." It is what makes the human a human.
8
  Levinas sees that the glory of God 
is brought out in the "here I am" even though "It never appears as theme, but in the 
ethical signifyingness itself."
9





 an ―indebtedness before any loan‖
12
 All these 
describe the one element of Levinas‘ system that is foundational, the idea that there is an 
owing that is constituative of the subject.  One must erase from their ideas of subject the 
ontological categories that keep the self in the fore and find already there in the subject a 
debt to the other.  Before any talk of the subject which makes it categorical in the first 
place there is an unthematizable source of obsession, an obsession that overcomes and 
commands the self towards its desire.  The desire, for Levinas, is the Other.  
As a student of Levinas, Jacques Derrida also has concern for the other as a 
foundational concept although Derrida will address the concept in terms of responsibility. 
Levinas too uses the concept of responsibility but Derrida will develop it further than 
Levinas. For Derrida responsibility comes from the idea that we are all unique individual 
persons. His deconstructive method will begin to get to the heart of the reason why this 
                                                 
8
 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 146-147. 
9
 Emmanuel Levinas, Ehtics and Infinity (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University 
Press, 1985), 8. 
10
 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, op. cit. 
11
 The concept of the accusative case is one so ubiquitous in Levinas‘ work that 
the references are too numerous to list. It will be explained in more detail later in Chapter 
One. 
12
 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Levinas Reader, Trans. Sean Hand (London: Wiley-
Blackwell Publishing, 1989) 100ff. 
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fact requires that each person is responsible for the other in a total commitment made 
before the person themselves can reflect upon making a commitment. 
To get a better idea of the reason for each person‘s responsibility one must look 
beyond the majority of Derrida‘s work and focus on a few texts that get to the reason for 
this responsibility. For this dissertation The Gift of Death
13
 will play a major part because 
it addresses best the origins of responsibility rather than the results of it. 
St. Thomas Aquinas 
A broad view of St Thomas will be taken focusing on both his scripture 
commentaries and systematic writings.  The scripture commentaries hold much in the 
way of foundational material that gets glossed or summarized in the systematic texts.  In 
the Commentary on Romans, we see that St. Thomas divides the notion of grace in two: 
one specifically for the individual and one specifically for others.  This sharp distinction 
demonstrates a division between the self and other that does not collapse into the self or 
the other as many systems have done that try to lay claim to being ―Thomistic.‖  Much of 
this understanding comes not only from St. Thomas‘ theology but also his anthropology.  
The context of ―grace building on nature‖ means that there must necessarily be a different 
look into the anthropology of St. Thomas involved in any project involving grace. To this 
end we will look at the anthropology of Aquinas first to see the ground upon which his 
theology of grace builds with an eye to otherness. 
  
                                                 
13
 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, Second Edition and Literature in Secret, 
trans. David Wills (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008) 
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The Nature that Grace Builds On:  St. Thomas Aquinas‟ Anthropology 
―Grace builds upon and presupposes nature‖
14
 is a quick way to represent the 
relationship of nature and grace in St. Thomas such that we see the need for a 
reexamination of his theology of nature looking for the elements of otherness.  
Concerning the other, we will see that St. Thomas‘ anthropology structures the person as 
being created, as William Norris Clarke puts it, substance-in-relation
15
.  As such, each 
individual is created with an aspect that focuses on the self and one that solely focuses on 
the other and even the self as an other.  In the end there is a structure of the person that is 
designed to have the two fold concern for the self and the other keeping the self as self 
and other as other.  It will be this nature that St. Thomas‘ theology of grace will build 
upon. 
The process begins with St. Thomas‘ assumption of the intelligibility of being 
which opens up the concept of the existential meaning of being and a participational 
metaphysics that undergirds his entire theology of creation. What results is a dynamic 
notion of substance that grounds the idea of being; for St. Thomas this is the idea of a real 
being over a mental being.  
The intelligibility of being grounds this entire project; if one cannot know being 
through things then all metaphysics is guesswork.  Accepting this means that things are 
                                                 
14
 ST I. Q2. A3 
15
 William Norris Clarke, "To Be is to Be Substance in Relation," in Explorations 
in Metaphysics, (Notre Dame, IN: UND Press, 1995). 
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knowable in and of themselves, that there is an ―aptitude of all being to be known.‖
16
 For 
St. Thomas, all beings proceed from God by an act of free creative intelligence and love
17
 
and, therefore, all beings are oriented towards knowing and loving, but the beings 
themselves do not easily give up their secrets; beings are open to being understood by the 
mind but require reflection.
18
 In St. Thomas‘ De Veritate the first question about the 
definition of truth is rooted in this relationship between being and intellect: ―The first 
reference of being to the intellect, therefore, consists in its agreement with the intellect.‖
19
  
The best systematic discussions of this topic by St. Thomas are probably his early 
philosophical treatise On Being and Essence and his later work Disputed Questions on 
Truth, in which this doctrine, new to the philosophic and theological world, grounds all 
beings in the perfect being of God through esse.  The essence of a thing may be posited, 
but unless it is granted a share in esse the thing has no existence. 
Combining the ideas of the existential meaning of being and participational 
metaphysics, ―being‖ becomes a dynamic sharing in the dynamic gift of God, Who is 
pure act, pure esse in Whose esse all substances participate in.
20
 The one purduring aspect 
                                                 
16
 Much of what follows on intelligibility comes from, W. Norris Clarke, S.J., The 
One and the Many, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001). 
17
 W. Norris Clarke, S.J., ―The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Today,‖ in 
Explorations in Metaphysics, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) 5. 
18
 Ibid. 17. 
19
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Truth, Vol. 1, Questions I-IX 
(trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J., Ph.D., Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952) Q. 1, art. 1. 
20
 The debate over created esse or uncreated esse is sidestepped for the moment 
but is not one that impacts greatly on the point at hand. 
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of the being is its substance.  Substance is not to be understood in a nominalistic fashion 
or after the ideas of the enlightenment for whom, substance was static and should be 
expunged from their philosophic systems as incompatible, but more on the order of a 
what-ness that ―stands under‖ the thing itself.  Even Thomas would find it difficult to use 
substance if he did not see it as dynamic; the purpose of being is to be active. 
Each and every thing shows forth that it exists for the sake of its operation. Indeed 
operation is the ultimate perfection of each thing.
21
 
It flows from this discussion that the ―self‖ is self-communicative, for its operations serve 
to communicate itself and receive information from other beings; it is in the nature of the 
being to express itself and take in expression.  Action, communication in its most basic 
understanding, is the way beings know each other; it is the way in which we know the 
presence of something as well as its nature.
22
  ―To be is to be actively co-present to the 
community of existents, of other presences.‖
23
  This co-presence involves receptivity as 
well.  In brief, all beings, all substances, exist in a relational mode by creation. Nothing 
exists that does not relate and that relation, in turn is towards the good. 
For natural things have a natural inclination not only toward their own proper 
good, to acquire it, if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to 
diffuse their own goodness among others as far as possible. Hence we see that 
                                                 
21
 SCG, I, ch. 45. 
22
 Clarke, ―The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Today,‖ in Explorations, 10. 
23
 Clarke, ―Action as the Self-Revelation of Being‖ in Explorations, 47. 
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every agent, insofar as it exists in act and possesses some perfection, produces 
something similar to itself. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to 
communicate to others as far as possible the good possessed...
24
  
The communicative aspect of being becomes the communication of goodness in action 
and which gives the universe its dynamism as an interacting system of beings based in 
love.  For the highest being in this system, God, self-communication reaches its highest 
point as ―self-communicative altruistic love‖ without which the entire gratuitously 
created universe would not exist.
25
 
The structure of being as both in itself and towards others has the necessity of the 
substantial core self or self-identity, the ―ontological root‖ of the being and, in the human 
person, is the seat of the ―I‖ that each human person speaks.  Slowly over time one comes 
to know the self through its experiences; there develops a certain self-awareness that 
comes through self-knowledge through interactions with others. In the interest of time we 
now move to grace and its building on this nature.  
Grace and Otherness in St. Thomas 
Once a basis for understanding the person in St. Thomas in established, his 
theology of grace can be seen as an extension of these ideas; ideas of otherness now come 
to the fore.  The grace structure is meant to coincide with the created natural structure.  
                                                 
24
 ST, I, q. 19, art. 2. 
25
 Clarke, ―Action as the Self-Revelation of Being,‖ Explorations, 49. This is not 
to say that creation is a necessary outpouring of the Good but only that creation is a result 
of that Good. 
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An example of this other-orientedness of grace is the distinction between Sanctifying and 
Gratuitous or Charismatic Grace, Sanctifying grace is meant for the self and Charismatic 
grace is meant for the other.
26
  In this way the structure is found to support the 
continuance of and dependence on the other.  Neither the self nor the other is reduced to 
one entity as is feared in much postmodern work. 
While the notion of sanctifying grace being for the core self has been an 
understood notion and not one for controversy, it is the notion of actual grace that brings 
up new horizons.  Charismatic grace in St. Thomas Aquinas is a grace given to each 
person for the sole purpose of the other; each person is given Charismatic grace solely for 
the other around them.  
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to God, and 
this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that whereby one man cooperates 
with another in leading him to God, and this gift is called "gratuitous grace,"
27
 
With respect to the grace freely given [charismatic grace], someone is not to be 
said to be predestined simply, because grace freely given [charismatic grace] is 
not directly ordered to this (namely) that he, who receives grace, is ordered to an 
                                                 
26
 Cf. St. Thomas' Commentary on Romans §47: ―gratia gratis data non ordinatur 
directe ad hoc quod ille, qui eam recipit, ad finem ultimum dirigatur, sed ut per eam alii 
dirigantur, secundum illud I Cor. XII, 7: unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad 
utilitatem.‖ 
27
 ST I-II, Q.111,art.1. 
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ultimate end, but through that grace others are ordered to an end as in 1Cor. 12.7: 
―to each is given the manifestations of the spirit for their utility.‖
28
 
This concept has not been looked into nor has it been brought up in the contemporary 
discussions about the other.  St. Thomas sees as importance in the divisions of grace that 
he creates for his analysis. It is the first of the divisions of grace in the Summa 
Theologica and is the starkest in its division as being for the self and for the other.  Not 
only is the nature created by God one of keeping the other as important as the self, St. 
Thomas has the structure of grace, the presence of God in man, broken down along these 
same lines, keeping the distinction between self and other, holding them in tension but 
keeping them equally important to the individual person. 
The Dialogue with Postmodernity 
The concern for not collapsing all into one is found as a common theme. St. 
Thomas‘ theology maintains difference and supports it with the very structures of grace 
and nature. This finds resonances with the postmodern concern for the other and its 
collapse into the self found in the modern philosophical and theological project.  My 
initial thought is that there will be important points of intersection between the two and 
they will both address the root concerns for the other.  I have confidence that this project 
will be new and important due to the fact that there has been a lack of attention paid to St. 
Thomas by the postmodern thinkers
29
 and the radically different philosophico-theological 
                                                 
28
 Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos. Lectura §47. 
29
 With the possible exception of Jean-Luc Marion. 
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projects that are found between St. Thomas project and the project of his contemporaries 
and those that followed such as Scotus and eventually Cajetan who both claim to be 
faithful to St. Thomas‘ teaching, a false assertion concerning this point.  
There will inevitably be tensions, points that will not be easily reconciled. These 
points will be brought out and discussed in their contexts with an eye towards creating an 
acceptable level of discourse between them.  Some of the differences will come as a 
result of the differing frameworks within which each project resides.  For the moment 
these may remain as irreconcilable differences but a way may be found towards a 
practical reconciliation within which each can work. The way around many of the 
tensions will be to go back to the root concerns found in the origins of the postmodern 
concern for the other and see if they are addressed in St. Thomas‘ theological project.  If 
they are, the differences between frameworks may become insignificant and no longer a 
matter of division.  
For St. Thomas there is an understanding that we cannot consume the other into 
our selves other than through creating an impression of it and then taking the copy into 
ourselves. This keeps the other as other but it does not treat the other in itself. It 
maintains the otherness of the other by not intruding on the other as the same. St. Thomas 
knows that our knowledge of things is through this creation of a copy, the taking in of the 
form of the thing, and not a true consumption of the other.  He also understands that the 
constant review of the form of the other is needed and ongoing.  
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: POSTMODERN CONCERN FOR THE OTHER 
 
There are a few places to begin a discussion of the postmodern concern for the 
other. Ideally one would start with those that began the movement towards concern for 
the other in its postmodern form. To this end we will look at Emmanuel Levinas first and 
also his student and critic Jacques Derrida. After an analysis of their understanding of the 
root of the concern for the other we will take a cursory look at the various versions that 
claim a Derridian or Levinasian foundation to their understanding of the concern for the 
other. We can see their influence in Lieven Boeve and Richard Kearney to name just two 
of many. When the particular paradigm of the concern for the other is drawn out of their 
work and some examples of it in theological work has been examined the question of 
whether this concept can be found in the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas can be 
addressed. 
Emmanuel Levinas 
For Emmanuel Levinas the root of the concern for the other is a pre-thematic, pre-
conceptual and pre-intentional concern that comes before the individual person can 
choose to be concerned for the other. Essays such as ―God and Philosophy‖
30
 as well as 
texts both philosophical and exegetical such as Totality and Infinity
31
, Otherwise than 
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Being or Beyond Essence
32
, and Nine Talmudic Readings
33
 will develop this point well. 
For Levinas the ethical is the place for the concern for the other. This ethical is the root of 
the concern. Levinas founds his understanding of the ethical in God through his Talmudic 
writings which will influence his philosophical writings.
34
 From that beginning point he 
will find a new definition of subjectivity which is entirely grounded in the relationship 
with the other. Once he has this relationship developed he will begin to negate the other 
concepts that show the concern for the other cannot be a conscious action by the 
individual but must be what constitutes the subject in the idea of the me voici. 
To read Levinas one must understand his project as a mixture between the 
theological and the philosophical.  His philosophical inspiration comes from the 
theological; an Old Testament verse will spark a philosophical line of thought.  An 
example can be seen in his use of the story about Rebecca in the Old Testament 
scriptures; she gives water from her well to the camels of Abraham‘s servants.  This is a 
starting point for Levinas to find the paradigm for service to the other and the question of 
the third party intervening in the ethical relationship of two.
35
  Levinas will take from 
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scripture a concept and translate it into philosophical language. Inherent in this is an 
understanding of the interrelationship of scripture (Torah) and philosophy; he will find, in 
the Judaic, a language that needs to be translated into the Greek.   
His use of ―Greek‖ does not just signify the language, but an entire system of 
thought that is the western philosophical tradition replete with its ontological thinking 
from Socrates to Heidegger.  Levinas will see his task as that of translating the Hebrew 
text of Judaism into the Greek language of the culture in order to pull out concrete ideas 
with which to regulate lives.  The bible must use the language of the Greeks to develop 
ideas of justice and responsibility.  The original particularity of the face of the other has 
been obscured because the original sayings of the Hebrew texts do not translate easily 
into Greek.   
For Levinas the Torah is not just the Torah but the Hebrew text plus commentary 
in the form of midrash.  It is this literary genre that gives Levinas the basis with which to 
make his claim of the continuous tension between static and dynamic in the text.  
Midrash is a conversation brought about by the Hebrew language; its lack of vowels leads 
to various interpretations and re-readings.  The continuous dialogue among rabbis over 
the centuries has created a body of work that Levinas will dialogue with and use as a 
basis for his own interpretive projects.   
The Hebrew text is always in flux; its interpretation is always a question that must 
be answered. For Levinas, to interpret the text and place it into the language of the 
Greeks, means changing the text from dialogue to monologue.  The Greek language, 
metaphorically the language of the ontologising philosophers, will settle a question and 
move on to the next question until all the questions have been answered.  This is the 
4 
 
trouble Levinas finds with the Greek translation of the Torah; it has lost its dynamics and, 
essentially, its life.  Greek thematization is required for the Torah to be ―known‖ by any 
person, though; the alternative is to be in flux in a constant revealing of the text as the 
Hebrew and midrashim demonstrate. 
To those that insist that the two disciplines of philosophy and theology must be 
separate, Levinas would disagree. ―But I did not have the impression, early on, that 
philosophy was essentially atheistic, and I do not think it today.‖
36
  He will take from 
scripture and midrash a conversation between the rabbis and find in it a philosophical 
beginning.  ―I search by way of the old wisdom. I illustrate with the verse, yes, but I did 
not prove by means of the verse.‖
37
  Many detractors have accused Levinas of using the 
Torah as first principles from which he will construct a philosophy.  An example of his 
method can be seen from his mixing of the injunction ―thou shalt not kill,‖ with the 
notion of ―love thy neighbor as thyself,‖ where Levinas will see a beginning for the 
understanding of the ethical subject. This is what Levinas means when he says, 
―Philosophy, for me, derives from religion.‖
38
  Religion will bring about the inception of 
an idea that needs philosophical construction in order to be ―known‖ by the person. 
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With this understanding of the foundations of Levinas‘ philosophical work, a 
connection to the theological becomes more plausible.  In examining his Talmudic works 
and his philosophical works, one can see that his ―understanding‖ of God is twofold; 
immanent and transcendent.  There is a Kabbalistic immanent aspect to God, Elohim, and 
a transcendent God, יהוה , YHWH; Elohim can be seen as the immanent aspect of YHWH. 
Elohim is the power that continues the world, keeps it in existence, as seen in his 
power to create the world, or worlds, ex nihilo. ―His association with these worlds 
confers being, which is also called power, light, purity and holiness.‖
39
  Of interest is the 
fact that there is a myriad of worlds created and within that pleroma there is a hierarchical 
order.  Elohim is the interaction of God in the world, the soul of the world in a hierarchy 
of souls that has its highest in Elohim and the lowest, apparently, in the universe of rocks 
and such.  Most of these distinctions are taken from the writings of the Rabbi Hayyim 
Volozhiner, a late eighteenth and early nineteenth century rabbi from Lithuania 
considered by Levinas, and others, to be one of the last great Talmudists.  His writings 
influenced the way Levinas approaches the Torah and its various commentaries.  An 
important concept in Levinas‘ understanding of Elohim is from the Rabbi about the 
―higher‖ being the soul of the ―lower‖ in this hierarchy of creation.  This is from the 
Nefesh Hahaim or The Soul of Life, a text where there Levinas finds a ―hierarchy of 
holiness and dignity.‖ Elohim is the soul of the soul of the person, the soul of the person 
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is the soul of the body, which one can assume, is the soul of the inanimate things in the 
world.  There is an intimate tie between Elohim, the person, and the rest of the universe. 
The highest is the ―root‖ of the lowest in this hierarchy; the highest soul is the soul of the 
soul of the lowest inanimate object.  
Elohim, as power and sustenance of the universe and all of its creatures, must 
remain present to the universe in order for that sustenance to continue. It is this presence 
that the person has control; Elohim gives over to the person, since the person is the soul 
of the body, the task of presenting Elohim to the universe.  Presentation takes the form of 
the living out of the Torah in the ethical life as well as in the prayer of Israel.  It is in the 
living out of the Torah that the person has control of Elohim; control in the sense of the 
ability to continue His presence to the universe.  If the person stops living righteously, 
then Elohim stops being present in the world; it is a living for the other and a praying for 
the other that keeps the universe in existence.  ―The vocation, or raison d‟etre, of 
humanity is precisely to provide the necessary conditions for the association of God with 
the worlds, and thus for the being of the worlds.‖
40
  This aspect of God is seen in the 
philosophical writings of Levinas only implicitly and is downplayed in favor of the 
unsayable God that Levinas will use especially in ―God and Philosophy‖—the 
unknowable God to which we are to encounter only obliquely. 
For Levinas the most complete name for God, if there is to be one, is YHWH, the 
tetragrammaton; it is the name unutterable by any in Judaism and the name of the God 
that encompasses the aspect of the Elohim.  Elohim is considered an aspect of, but in no 
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way a comprehensive explanation of, YHWH.  The tetragrammaton is also called the 
Ein-Sof, or Infinite; ―the absolute of a God affected neither by the created world nor by 
its history.‖
41
  God‘s meaning in the tetragrammaton signifies ―something that man 
cannot define, formulate, think, or even name.‖
42
   
To get a sense of the unsayable God—the God of the tetragrammaton, the 
Infinite—a God who is unaffected by creation, one must examine his idea of God as an 
unaffected God.  Levinas will use Talmudic terms to speak of this God, especially those 
of Rabbi Hayyim.  This God is described as not having a place in the world but, is, 
instead, the condition for the possibility of place at all.  This God is the very condition of 
all being.  This understanding of the Infinite gives ground to the Elohim.  Levinas will 
see that the language used in the Torah is of a particular kind that hints at the absolute, as 
such, by its use of the second and third person in Jewish liturgy. It is through this 
understanding of the Infinite that Levinas proves a monotheism without onto-theology.
43
   
To speak of this Infinite is impossible; by speaking even the name one is already 
placing limitations on it and on the Absolute.   
Strictly speaking, then, that which is infinite and never-ending is not the absolute 
of God which nothing can determine, but the act of thinking of the Absolute which 
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never reaches the Absolute, and this has its own way—which is quite 
something—of missing the Absolute.
44
 
This act of thinking alludes to deference and a familiar post-modern idea of the last word 
having not yet been said.  Here Levinas will talk of a relation without correlate, an open-
ended relation, one between the human subject and it is originary and is also an avenue 
through which the absolute reveals meaning.  Levinas finds that in the human inability to 
conceive the Infinite there is a new way of signifying, a new way of naming.  This can 
be, at best, the God of philosophy for no other reason than this absolute God cannot 
console.
45
  There are ways of recognizing this God in one‘s life and in ―God and 
Philosophy‖ Levinas will present a few of those ways in order to, hopefully, clarify his 
idea of the Infinite and our relationship to It.  
Two ways in which Levinas discusses the Infinite in his essay are the concepts of 
insomnia and the idea of the ―putting‖ that is done by the Infinite into thought in such a 
way that it is always-already.  In ―God and Philosophy,‖ Levinas speaks of the Infinite by 
first referring to Descartes‘ third meditation and developing the idea of an innate notion 
of God in man.  He is interested in the ―breakup of consciousness‖ found in Descartes‘ 
meditation where a thought has the thing thought upon already in it before it thinks.  
Levinas will find that this signifies the ―non-contained par excellence‖ or the Infinite, the 
Ein-Sof.  ―The idea of God is God in me, but God already breaking up the consciousness 
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which aims at ideas, and unlike any content.‖
46
  This God who is the condition for the 
possibility of all beings is in the subject pre-intentionally and, certainly, pre-
comprehensionally.   
The way in which this Infinite is in the person is through a passivity that is, in 
ontological words, beyond any passivity, beyond any notion of receptivity as a collection 
of something received.  The idea of the Infinite in me is a passivity of consciousness yet a 
―passivity more passive still than any passivity‖
47
 in which one has the idea of the infinite 
forced upon them as in a trauma.  The feel for this trauma is something unassumable, an 
overwhelming of the consciousness such that it in no way can grasp or comprehend; it is 
pre-apprehensional, even pre-intentional.  Again, in ontological terms, it is before any 
beginnings of understanding or any comprehension.  It is an idea put in at the very soul of 
the subject.  This idea of the infinite is originary and can only, truly, be spoken around 
but not spoken of, because a speaking of would entail a grasping by the understanding 
and that means a concretization of something which cannot be concretized; much the 
same as the Hebrew scriptures cannot be translated into Greek without making certain 
concrete decisions about meaning. 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas will describe this Infinite in terms that lead us 
through to its possible origin. For Levinas, the concern for the other is built into the very 
existence of each person. His analysis begins with an observation of dissatisfaction in the 
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human existence and the desire that is never sated. In Totality and Infinity, he will find 
within the person a desire
48
 for perfection that cannot be satisfied with things of this 
world. He will take this desire out of the realm of the self and the existents and into what 
he will call the metaphysical realm, metaphysical desire. ―The metaphysical desire has 
another intention; it desires beyond everything that can simply complete it.‖
49
 This desire 
only feeds on itself and deepens the desire rather than fulfill it. This can only happen 
through a distance that is maintained in the relationship to the metaphysical desire. The 
distance or remoteness that he speaks of is of a radical nature and exists only if the desire 
―is not a possibility of anticipating the desirable, if it does not think it beforehand.‖
50
 This 
distance bridges the known and the unknown. Metaphysical desire understands the 
remoteness, the alterity of the other because it is transcendent, transcendence.
51
 This 
transcendence is what he calls the invisible or the Infinite and taking direction from Plato 
will utilize ontological language of height to point to the invisible or Infinite as the Most 
High akin to Plato‘s Good-beyond-Being. Levinas will maintain this notion of the Infinite 
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How does the human experience this Infinite. The metaphysical desire comes over 
the person as a trauma. The notion of the trauma is better seen in Levinas‘ description of 
insomnia and the phenomenology of the insomniac experience.  The experience of a 
sleepless night can be understood by most, but it has special resonance for the 
explanation of the intrusion of the Infinite into self.  A night of insomnia is marked by a 
desire for sleep, rest, and comfort that it is not coming due to a constant drum-beat of 
wakefulness.  One has no power over this intrusion and there is no cure for it from 
within; the person lays subject to it, pondering the unbearable heaviness of being, of 
meaninglessness.  
Onto this image Levinas will map his understanding of how the Infinite breaks 
through to make its presence known to the subject.  Sleep represents sameness, 
thematization, manifestation, immanence, intentionality, and consciousness with its 
cohorts, identity of same, presence, and history.  All these are the harbingers of ontology 
as he understands it and the reduction of the other to the same, something Levinas is 
trying to eliminate and break away from in his philosophy.  They represent the state of 
life of the majority who live in the ontological circle; for them to go beyond, to find the 
Infinite, there must be trauma.  Insomnia brings wakefulness without intentionality and 
with it: vigilance, demand, a force put onto the subject from outside coming like 
inspiration, transcendence, otherness, and the unconditioned (Infinity).  This is the non-
intentional putting that comes upon us in the trauma of the breaking through of the 
Infinite in me.  The battle between sleep and wakefulness wages in every subject; the two 
worlds teeter as each feels the pull from either side. 
12 
 
This is, on one level, an analogy of the situation in which one finds oneself jolted 
from ―natural atheism‖ or one‘s happy, self-contained life that does not involve the other 
in any considerable way.  We are jolted out in an experience that defies one‘s ability to 
define; a confrontation with something so wholly other and cannot be mastered or 
grasped.  Holocaust experiences are of this type as are other experiences of complete 
meaninglessness. There is a weight that falls on the person experiencing this that thrusts 
him towards the other out of sheer necessity; the heaviness of insomnia, the unbearable 
heaviness of being, of meaninglessness in a desperate search for meaning. 
It is in this hidden realm of insomnia that God, Infinite, is found and only in trace 
form.  Recalling Levinas‘ exegesis of Torah, especially his interest in the commandment 
not to kill, the trace of the Infinite comes in the ethical responsibility for the other, in the 
face of the other.   
The Infinite affects thought by devastating it and at the same time calls upon 
it…It awakens it. The awakening of thought is not a welcoming of the 
Infinite…the idea of the Infinite is not even taken up as love, which is awakened 
when the arrow strikes, but then the subject is stunned by the trauma finds itself 
forthwith in the immanence of a state of soul.  The Infinite signifies precisely 
prior to its manifestation.
53
   
The ―in‖ of the Infinite is this putting in the subject of the desire for the Infinite, an 
endless desire for ―what is beyond being;‖ it is a transcendence, a desire for the Good.
54
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It is a non-erotic love for the undesirable, the other, the one that cannot be desired except 
through a metaphysical desire, because the desirable must remain distant in order not to 
be assumed into immanence, and for that to happen the desire must be for the 
undesirable.  Levinas will call the ―other‖ the ―undesirable par excellence‖
55
 making the 
other the avenue to experience the trace of the Infinite.  
The injunction not to kill becomes the command to responsibility for the other as 
the other becomes the object of our metaphysical desire.  The Infinite is found through 
the responsibility for the other; God is found, obliquely through our responsibility, pre-
intentionally put into us by the Infinite God, for the other.  This is a hidden God and only 
obliquely found. 
His absolute remoteness, his transcendence, turns into my responsibility—non-
erotic par excellence—for the other.  And this analysis implies that God is not 
simply the ‗first other,‘ the ‗other par excellence,‘ or the ‗absolutely other,‘ but 
other than the other, other otherwise, other with an alterity prior to the alterity of 
the other, prior to the ethical bond with another and different from every 
neighbor, transcendent to the point of absence.
56
 
The other is not the Infinite but it is the way in which one can see the trace of the Infinite 
that is prior to any otherness as comprehensible.  
Levinas will use the Platonic concepts of height and nobility attributed to the 
Goodness-beyond-Being in order to show the need to die for the Invisible. The invisible 
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Infinite is a non-formal alterity that is prior to every initiation.
57
 Metaphysical alterity is a 
perfection that ―exceeds conception, overflows the concept,‖
58
 a perfection to which the 
things of the Earth pale in comparison. ―The Other is not an incarnation of God, but 
precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in 
which god is revealed.‖
59
 It is in the face of the other that we find a trace of the Infinite 




These are but two ways Levinas will use in trying to explain his idea of how God 
can be discerned and what God‘s relationship to us looks like.  In his explanations there 
is a great usage of apophatic language to describe this God.  In the last quote the concept 
of ―transcendent to the point of absence‖ becomes most troubling for any but the most 
diligent apophatic thinkers.  It is also at this point that we see the linkages to an older 
tradition, a tradition that we will see in Chapters Two and Three, that has much in 
common with Levinas. 
The Infinite that is not recognizable to the mind has affinities to the Cloud of 
Unknowing; Levinas insists that the Infinite cannot be seen and that the subject is not to 
seek it for it cannot be found in the realm of conceptual knowledge.  ―The Infinite 
signifies precisely prior to its manifestation; here the meaning is not reducible to 
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manifestation, the representation of presence, or teleology.‖
61
  Manifestation is 
conceptual thinking and the kind of knowledge that the author of the Cloud seems to have 
in mind. The Cloud attempts to allow a clearing of knowledge in order to find the 
darkness that is dwelling place of God. This darkness is the clearing of manifestation 
from the mind; it is a clearing of the conceptual framework within which ideas are 
constructed. Levinas will see in this realm the pre-intentionality required as a place for 
the Infinite to put in the idea of the desire for the other, a hidden oblique knowledge of 
God.  It is not God one encounters but the innate reference to God in the other; pseudo-
Dionysius would say, ―he does not meet God himself, but contemplates, not him who is 
invisible, but rather where he dwells.‖
62
 
Again it is Levinas who sounds like the ancient apophatic mystic speaking of a 
God beyond our understanding and beyond our grasp: 
It is then an idea signifying with a signifyingness prior to presence, to all 




Our first quote from pseudo-Dionysius points to this ―signifyingness prior to presence‖ 
by recalling that one is to go beyond the understanding to find the unknowable God, 
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begging for the lack of knowledge to comprehend the God.  Levinas is in a long line of 
thinkers that reach beyond the knowing to find God firmly resting in the unknown.  
Much like pseudo-Dionysius, there is a desire at work in Levinas, desire for the 
undesirable, moving the subject through non-erotic love.  Pseudo-Dionysius recalls that 
―it is enough for you that you feel moved in love by something, though you do not know 
what it is.‖
64
  Unknown love is the perfect descriptor for the pre-intentional love for the 
neighbor found in Levinas.  One is moved by it to ethical responsibility for the other and 
it comes from some place, ontologically speaking, prior to our thinking about it.  Like a 
watchman, the consciousness will take in all things to itself in order to see all that is 
before it in guarding the Same. The metaphysical desire comes from behind the 
watchman and seizes him, pointing him towards the knowable with a new intention.  
What we see in Levinas is a concern for the other that is constituative of 
subjectivity. The concern is pre-thematic, pre-intentional, and pre-conceptual. It is this 
understanding of the Concern for the other that will be the subject of our search not only 
in Jacques Derrida but in St. Thomas Aquinas as well. 
Jacques Derrida  
Following upon Emmanuel Levinas is his student and critic, Jacques Derrida. He, 
along with Levinas, forms the foundation of much of the contemporary work on 
postmodern responsibility ethics.  Levinas‘ work can be seen as a foundation for 
Derrida‘s ethics with some exceptions. One of the key exceptions is the lack of explicit 
                                                 
64
 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Cloud of Unknowing. Trans. James Walsh, SJ. (New 
Jersey: Paulist Press, 1987), 186.  
17 
 
Jewish starting points evident in Levinas.  Whereas Levinas was an observant Jew and a 
Talmudic commentator, Derrida calls himself an ―atheist‖ but, even so, will use elements 
of Judaism that form part of his identity.
65
  While much of Derrida‘s work deals with 
responsibility and hospitality, space considerations will limit us to a few main texts. The 
focus of the investigation also limits much of the source material since we are trying to 
find the origins of one‘s responsibility for the other as seen in Derrida. This specific 
aspect is addressed in very few texts; responsibilities resultant action is what is developed 
in most of his works. After delving into the roots of his understanding of responsibility 
we can form a better picture of the origin of his concern for the other. This will give a 
good contrast point to the next chapter‘s development of St. Thomas‘ idea of the origins 
of the concern for the other.  
Derrida‘s core concept can be developed in three steps. The first is the 
understanding that each person is a responsible person due to his relationship with the 
other. Next will be the idea that the other person we are all in relation to is a ―Wholly 
Other‖, i.e. a God figure. The last step is to connect the two ideas and show that ―every 
other is the Wholly Other.‖ 
As with many things Derrida writes about, he finds that every person is 
responsible in a very circumscribed way. In The Gift of Death, Derrida will use the 
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philosophy of Jan Patočka
66
 to guide his way through finding the source of the concern 
for the other. This method of using another‘s work is not uncommon for Derrida.
67
 He 
takes the starting point from Patočka and deconstructs it to find the radical elements 
within. He begins where Patočka begins, Christian elements in European history. From 
there he will delve into the elements that lay behind the philosophy. Patočka writes that 
the secret of European history is that European history is a series of developments from 
basic civilizations through the Greek civilization. The Christianity of Europe hides within 
itself the Platonic and orgiastic elements that it claims to overcome. These elements, 
instead, lay hidden, repressed, in the background of the prevailing European Christianity.  
The care of the soul with respect to death is the mark of the earlier elements and also 
marks the Christian element of the mysterium tremendum.  The base orgiastic animalistic 
desires are brought under control by the reasoning of Platonic thought and that Platonic 
thought is placed under the reign of Christianity. This mystery is one that makes us 
tremble – tremendum – and is one key point that Derrida will make his own. 
Derrida looks at mystery and secret and finds that there are several motifs that are 
in play when connecting responsibility with secret or mystery and how all of that relates 
to death.
68
  One of them is the fact that mysteries are never destroyed but live on in some 
way telling us that the orgiastic and the platonic elements are not lost but are merely 
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repressed.  The orgiastic animalistic battle against death is repressed by the Platonic 
reasoning out of where death belongs and finally the approach to death of the Christian is 
one of sacrifice. Each element has the previous one in mind and is in constant 
relationship with it. 
Another motif is the idea that Christianity has not sufficiently rid itself of the 
Platonic language to allow it to move forward.  This grounds his criticism of Christianity 
as not fully developed; it is bound by language that will not allow it to further develop.  
Within this motif Derrida, pace Patočka, finds the ideal of responsibility. The Platonic 
language of reason approaches responsibility as a purely intellectual pursuit and this 
intellectual responsibility ―discounts responsibility‖ by not allowing the person to emerge 
as the fully responsible person.
69
  
Responsibility, for Patočka is twofold; it has both an intellectual and a praxis 
dimension. If it is a purely intellectual process then the individual person is taken out of 
the exchange of responsibility. If it is a matter, exclusively, of doing the right actions in 
response to a situation then there is no room for the individual person to act, only a 
mechanical response to conditions. There must be a praxis element of responsibility, a 
pure action, that is not intellectual or rooted in reason.  
As a result, the activating of responsibility (decision, act, praxis) will always have 
to extend behind and beyond any theoretical or thematic determination. It will 
have to decide without it, independently from knowledge; that will be the 
condition of a practical idea of freedom. We should therefore conclude that not 
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only is the thematization of the concept of responsibility always inadequate, but 
that it will always be so because it must be so.
70
 
Derrida brings together the ideas of the mysterium tremendum, the mystery of 
Christianity, and responsibility; it is the way in which Christianity deals with death – 
sacrificially. Platonic thought, repressed and yet exposed in the ideas of Christian 
mystery, points the person towards a Good that is beyond the realm of the visible, but 
also links the person to the gaze of the un-seeable Person. For Patočka, the idea of the 
responsible person is one that exposes the self to the gaze of another without being able 
to see the one gazing.  From the purely Christian perspective, Patočka sees the definition 
of a person as inseparable from a responsible person whose definition is 
[the] exposing of the soul to the gaze of another person, of a person as 
transcendent other, as an other who looks at me, but who looks without the-
subject-who-says-I being able to reach that other, see her, hold her within the 
reach of my gaze.
71
 
There are obvious allusions to God in the un-seeable Person that Patočka uses in his 
definition of the responsible person. Derrida will use this analysis of the Christian 
foundation of Patočka‘s understanding of personhood as a stepping stone towards a 
deeper ―understanding‖ of God.   
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Putting the two strands of thought together, that the Christian person must be 
responsible person yet is impossible to be fully responsible; a sense of guilt is created.
72
 
The trembling of the mysterium tremendum is a result, then, of the asymmetric gaze of 
the other that we are never responsible enough towards.  
Responsibility comes from a response to an originary gaze from a ―Good that 
[can] no longer be a transcendental objective, a relation between objective things, but the 
relation to the other; an experience of personal goodness and a movement of intention.‖ 
73
 
This means a pre-intentional praxis that is not one born of reflection leading to action. 
There is something that is pushing the subject along, commanding it. As a reflection on 
death this pre-intentional command works on the subjects understanding of his 
singularity. His uniqueness brings about awareness of the uniqueness of the other but 
only after the command is felt, the command of guilt over one‘s own individual 
irresponsibility.  
It is at this point that Derrida introduces the idea that the ethical/responsible life is 
a gift. Taking his analysis from Kierkegaard and Patočka, the asymmetry found in the gift 
is the same asymmetry found in responsibility. We are given life and given it from some 
goodness that is beyond our comprehension. Each life is a gift given and, as such, each 
life is indebted to the giver of the gift. The giver takes on a Divine quality in this 
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Derrida brings in another thread to weave into the argument by further refining 
his idea of responsibility and using Kierkegaard‘s analysis of the story of Abraham and 
his sacrifice of Isaac. From this story we get an uncommon understanding of 
ethical/responsible action. Tied into Kierkegaard‘s Divine command ethics we see that it 
is better to listen to God and do what He says rather than be in solidarity with one‘s 
fellow humans. In so doing an element of secrecy is necessary for ethical/responsible 
action. Abraham kept the secret of whom the sacrifice will be from both Isaac and his 
companions. Abraham never lies but does not tell the entire truth.  
It is secrecy that Derrida finds at the heart of the individual human person. 
Derrida sees the secrecy as Abraham safeguarding his own singularity, his own self. In 
saying nothing Abraham chose to be alone in his knowledge and not be in communion 
with his son or companions. It also means he remains a unique person; ―Once I speak I 
am never and no longer myself, alone, unique.‖
75
 He will also universalize the rule by 
stating each person is responsible for silence because any talk of God would bring the 
Wholly Other into the speaker as part of the speaker and no longer unique. What is 
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implied here is that all are to keep the secret of God, to never speak of God.
76
 Each 
person has the responsibility to not speak in order that the uniqueness of the Wholly 
Other is respected as Abraham did not speak.  
Derrida has a more nuanced understanding of ―speaking‖ than is commonly 
accepted. Speaking is the absorption of the other into a homogeneity with the self. 
Speaking will take the other into the self and create a false other about which one is 
speaking. This does violence to the other in that it is no longer unique but it is one‘s 
version of the other and not the true other. The self objectifies the other and shuts off any 
ability to encounter the other. 
One can put the two strands of thought together to get a better understanding of 
the origins of the concern for the other in Derrida. The first strand is the understanding of 
the responsible person as one that exposes the soul to the gaze of the Wholly Other. The 
other is the idea of the secret. These two are really two sides of the same coin in that the 
soul bearing of the self to the Wholly Other is a persistent non-objectification of the 
Wholly Other by the self and, in a way, is keeping the secret of the other – keeping the 
other a secret. Not speaking of the other is a way of keeping the soul open to the gaze of 
the Wholly Other because there are no words spoken, no ―speaking,‖ yet. This puts the 
conditions for not speaking in the realm of the pre-intentional and the pre-thematic or 
pre-conceptual, ―beyond an axiomatic of the self or the chez soi as ego cogito, as 
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consciousness or representative intentionality.‖
77
 Any conceptualization or thematization 
is already a speaking, already an apprehending of the other into the self. One‘s 
relationship to the Wholly Other is defined by silence, secrecy, and the understanding 
that one cannot begin to speak about the Wholly Other without doing violence and 
closing the self off from the Wholly Other, closing off the soul to the gaze of the Wholly 
Other.  
Derrida understands the Wholly Other to be God albeit in a very different 
understanding than is commonly accepted by the Judeo-Christian doctrine. God is the 
―infinitely other‖ and as such is the paradigmatic Wholly Other in relation to which every 
person exists. God is the person whose gaze is cast upon each and every person defining 
them as such. Here we find Derrida falling back onto the concept of a creator God 
through whom and by whom all of mankind is created, a creation that links every human 
person together with God. This is the background to the phrase ―tout autre est tout 
autre.‖
78
 Derrida can translate this a number of ways gleaning insight with each change. 
―Every other is wholly other‖
79
 is a preferred way to show the relationship between God 
and created persons. 
The ―wholly other‖ can easily be the Wholly Other or God and through their 
linkage each person can be seen as God or at least treated as such. Derrida draws a 
distinction between himself and Levinas on this point drawing from his earlier article 
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―Violence and Metaphysics‖ where he finds trouble with Levinas‘ distinction between 
the otherness of God and the otherness of humans.
80
 Derrida can justify no such 
distinction. To objectify an other requires no distinction in what the other is. God may be 
objectified just as easily as a fellow human. Each human is a mystery that no other has 
full access to and therefore is like God with respect to the mystery involved. 
This leads to one startling fact that every other one encounters must be treated 
with the same silence as God. ―Every other (one) is God…it is declared that every other 
one[individual], each of the others, is God inasmuch as he or she is, like God, wholly 
other.‖
81
 Our concern for the other is our concern for God and keeping the secret that is 
God. Our concern for the other is the silence due God and is also a silence due to each 
human person.   
If ‗tout autre est tout autre‘ signifies that every other is singular, that every one is 
a singularity (que „tout autre est singulier‟, que tout est singularite)…, then it is 
impossible to distinguish between our obligation to God as singular and our 
obligation to everyone of our neighbours as each singular. Moreover, since our 
obligation to each one of these singularities, each of those who are wholly other, 
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For Derrida, then, the idea of being a responsible human is one that is rooted in 
―silence‖ and, as its foundation, the ethical command to silence. This command comes 
from the Wholly Other, for Derrida, God, and reaches us pre-thematically, pre-
conceptually, and pre-intentionally. This puts him in the same category as Levinas when 
it comes to finding the origins of ethical/responsible action which is fundamentally a 
concern for the other. This concern is the source of all action and is given to each human 
person through creation by a God. In this Levinas and Derrida seem to agree. Their 
disagreements in this, albeit narrow in concern, are few and impact more in how this 
foundation plays out in each individual human life and in society in general.  
 
Contemporary Theologians Using Levinas and Derrida as Their Foundation 
Those that follow, theologically, in the footsteps of Levinas and Derrida also 
show the trace of this understanding of the foundation for the concern for the other in 
their work. Briefly we can see some evidence of it in the work of Leiven Boeve and 
Richard Kearney as just two examples of the diverse influence. These theologians have 
used various themes from Levinas and Derrida with varying degree of intensity and have 
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impacted the theological filed greatly. For the purposes of this dissertation, their 
connection to Levinas and Derrida need only be pointed out. 
In an interview with Leiven Boeve,
83
 Gregory Hoskins delves into some 
fundamental question with this postmodern thinker especially his influences and dialogue 
partners. Those that come to mind initially are the cultural critics such as J-F Lyotard and 
R. Rorty but when it concerns the thinkers that challenge Christian faith and theology, 
Derrida and Marion as well as Kearney are mentioned and later Emmanuel Levinas. He is 
using these philosophers to get a deeper understanding of how the postmodern concepts 
and their proponents ―qualify the context in which Christian faith exists and from which 
this faith develops its self-understanding.‖
84
 Throughout the interview we find Boeve 
uses Derridian themes to describe his ongoing projects both with and without direct 
accreditation. In describing his project of open narratives, Boeve is discussing a 
problematic example of messianisms and the messianic as having hegemonizing 
tendencies, Boeve is tapping into a significant theme that Derrida has written on and was 
a part of Derrida‘s ongoing work.
85
 The messianic is a theme tied to the Wholly Other 
and its promise. Derrida objected to the content of the messianic but never the form of the 
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messianic because it will always foretell what is yet to come and keeps the silence of the 
Wholly Other or restricts our ―knowledge‖ of it to a trace. 
Not surprisingly, Boeve also takes other Derridian as well as Levinasian ideas as 
his foundation for understanding the problematic necessitating open narratives. Once 
again the hegemonic tendencies brought out in Derrida‘s understanding of metaphysics 
calls out for a new paradigm for narratives. Boeve thinks that the narratives passed on 
from the modern period are closed and therefore hegemonic in their structure. Using 
Derridian foundations of difference and a concern for the individual to remain an ―other,‖ 
the new structure of open narratives breaks the hegemonic hold on the individual. Once 
again, this plays on the theme of silence due to the Wholly Other. Closed narratives are 
speech in Derrida‘s understanding of speaking discussed above. Boeve is unsure of the 
place of any narratives
86
 yet finds a place for recontextualization in open narratives. His 
goal it would seem is to speak without speaking. 
In a similar fashion, Richard Kearney has taken on the concept of narratives and 
the place of the other but has a different way of using the insights of both Derrida and 
Levinas.  Kearney will use Derrida very critically and Levinas more sympathetically. 
Kearney‘s ideas of the place of narrative follow a more Levinasian path than Derridian. 
The distinction that he makes in the concept of the other is more along the lines of 
Levinas and the distinction he makes between the otherness of God and the otherness of 
                                                 
86
 See the conflicting ideas concerning the place and extent of narratives that 
Boeve himself reveals in Lieven Boeve. ―Introduction: Thinking Sacramental Presence in 
a Postmodern Context.‖ in Sacramental Presence in a Postmodern Context. Ed. Lieven 
Boeve and Lambert Leijssen (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001)16. 
29 
 
humans. Kearney will side with Levinas and go beyond to say that even Levinas does not 
make a sharp enough distinction between the types of ―others‖ not only divine and human 
but also inter-human. 
In a trilogy of books published closely together, On Stories
87
, Strangers, Gods 
and Monsters
88
,and The God Who May Be
89
 Kearney mixes Levinasian philosophical 
insights with theological concepts to come up with ideas of the other that forms differing 
categories of ―others‖ making a distinction between the alien who is a friend and the alien 
who is an enemy. He excoriates the ideas of all aliens being enemies and tries to find a 
theology that will demonstrate this. He uses theological concepts of scapegoat, the 
transfiguration and the burning bush to make his points. Kearney will look at the projects 
of both Derrida and Levinas and find them wanting. He sees that Levinas, especially, has 
a sense of responsibility that begins and is focused around the one-on-one, face-to-face, 
interaction and ultimate responsibility for the one face of the other. Levinas will later 
modify this notion of responsibility to include the fact that there are more than two 
people in the world. Kearney begins his project from the basis that responsibility must 
take in a plurality of others and there must be some way of discerning the types of others 
one comes in contact with and this leaves Kearney with one important question. 
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How can we tell the difference between benign and malign others? How do we 
know,…, when the other is truly an enemy who seeks to destroy us or an innocent 
scapegoat projected by our phobias?
90
 
Kearney bases much of his work on Levinas and Derrida but also on the Judeo-
Christian tradition and in so doing he includes the idea of God and various aspects of God 
in his work. While being critical of Levinas and Derrida, he will find an easy place for 
their work within his own and can use much of their foundational work to augment his 
own project. The concern for the other is rooted in God and something pre-intentional 
and pre-thematic but Kearney will say that for this concern to be actualized it must come 
into the realm of the conceptual in order for the individual to distinguish between the 
different types of ―others.‖ 
Even a cursory look at Keaney‘s work finds Levinas and Derrida hiding in the 
background in many subtle and not so subtle ways. He uses Levinas‘ concern for the face 
of the other as a starting point but, in contrast with Derrida, will go further than Levinas 
will in distinguishing the types of ―other‖ than can command the self. 
Kearney acknowledges his indebtedness not only to Levinas and Derrida but also 
to Ricoeur and Marion. While not thoroughly a follower of Levinas or Derrida, much of 
the work is influenced by the two. The notion of the root of the concern for the other is 
found in God and in some form of pre-conceptual, pre-intentional and pre-thematic 
concern that will help define who the individual person is. All of these are hints towards 
the Levinasian and Derridian provenance of the concern for the other in Kearney‘s work.  
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These are simply two of the many postmodern theologians that will use Levinas 
and Derrida as their foundation, if not wholly, partially. Boeve will take the insights from 
the two thinkers into the realm of the sacramental and Kearney will take them into the 
fields of narrative and what he calls ―onto-eschatology‖. There are many more examples 
of the influence of this type of concern for the other in contemporary theologians
91
 but 
these two will prove sufficient to see that their influence will continue into a new 
generation of theologians that will have to deal with the continuity of the Tradition and 
try to manage some type of connection with the past. 
Conclusion/Transition 
This first chapter is to set up the state of the problem. How do contemporary 
theologians that claim the postmodern as their starting point converse with the tradition 
of the Roman Catholic Church? This Tradition must also interact with the postmodern 
but may not have the language. Is there a language that can be spoken by both the 
Tradition of the Church spanning many philosophical eras and that of Postmodern 
philosophers/theologians with Levinasian/Derridian provenance?  The foundational 
concepts in both Levinas and Derrida that ground the concern for the other are few but 
particularly powerful. Both find the concern for the other rooted in a pre-thematic, pre-
conceptual and pre-intentional structure of concern that is found within every human 
person given by God. God may be defined as an indefinable by Levinas and Derrida but 
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God is also thus described by St. Thomas Aquinas
92
 and to the extent that both Levinas 
and Derrida consider God, so too St. Thomas. Many will argue that philosophical 
presuppositions will prevent the two traditions from speaking constructively together but 
each tradition can be stretched to accommodate some new interaction. 
With the rudimentary notions of how the concern for the other is found in the 
human person in Levinas and Derrida, the next step will take us to a representative of the 
Roman Catholic Tradition, St. Thomas Aquinas. While not the representative of the 
Tradition en toto, for no one theologian can claim this role, St. Thomas holds a special 
place in the Tradition and will prove a surprisingly willing dialogue partner. Through his 
theology, I believe there are concepts similar and expandable to the degree that dialogue 
between the Tradition and contemporary theology can move forward. What we are 
looking for is a way to interpret ethical action in terms of the concern for the other 
especially as that concern is pre-thematic, pre-conceptual and pre-intentional. This is 
evident from the work above with respect to Levinas and Derrida but will this be true in 
St. Thomas Aquinas. The next two chapters will explore this possibility. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE NATURE THAT GRACE BUILDS UPON: A REVIEW OF ST. 
THOMAS‘ NOTION OF CREATED BEINGS 
 
Due to the integrated nature of the concept of otherness, especially when dealing 
with grace, a look into the anthropology of St. Thomas is in order because for him, ―grace 
does not destroy nature but perfects it.‖
93
 This initial look into St. Thomas‘ theology of 
nature will be such that the elements of otherness orientation will emerge as primary.  
Part of this project will entail an examination of the foundational understanding of the 
creation of the human person in St. Thomas. This understanding will be the basis on 
which a theology of otherness in nature and grace can be built that is faithful to St. 
Thomas‘ own theology.  Concerning the other, we will see that St. Thomas‘ anthropology 
structures the person as a created being and, as such, is created, as William Norris Clarke 
puts it, ―substance-in-relation‖
94
.  Each created thing has, at its core, an aspect that 
focuses on the self and one that focuses on the other.  It will be this nature that St. 
Thomas‘ theology of grace builds upon and presupposes. 
In this chapter we will find the foundational understanding of the nature of the 
human person as created with two poles, substantial and relational. Three things must be 
developed in order to see this structure: first, St. Thomas‘ presuppositions that relate to 
his understanding of the person must be understood and clarified, second the 
understanding of ―being‖ in St. Thomas as substantial and relational rooted in the idea 
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that ―to act‖ follows upon ―to be‖, and third, developing the notion of person as the 
highest ―being‖.  This will leave the structure of nature open to a grace that is for the 
substantial self and for the other.  
The primary texts used will be from the Summa Theologicae (ST) but there will 
also be a discussion with other mature writings such as the Commentary on the 
Hebdomads (CHeb), the Disputed Questions on Power (DP), and Disputed Questions on 
Truth (DV) as well as his early writings such as On Beng and Essence (DeEnte)
95
.  The 
process begins with St. Thomas‘ assumption of the intelligibility of being as well as the 
concept of the existential meaning of being. Along with these concepts is the notion of 
participation in his metaphysics which is integral to his entire theology of creation.  What 
results is a dynamic notion of substance and being which, for St. Thomas, is the idea of a 
real being over a mental being. The inclusion of the transcendental ―the good‖ will also 
help develop a dynamic understanding of being. 
Before beginning the discussion of the presuppositions found in St. Thomas, it 
must be acknowledged that it is in the presuppositions that some find problems with a 
dialogue between St. Thomas and postmodern thinkers.
96
 Philosophically, these issues 
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can be handled through various different methods that could reconcile the two enough to 
work together. This work is outside the scope of this dissertation where the overriding 
goal is a theological one showing the non-incompatibility of Thomistic thought for the 
contemporary discussion of otherness.  
Presuppositions in St. Thomas‟ Work 
The two presuppositions of St. Thomas that are most significant in this discussion 
are the intelligibility of being and the notion of participation. Each in their own right 
deserves dissertation length treatment but for the purposes of this work a basic outlining 
of them will suffice. Firstly, the intelligibility of being grounds this entire project; if one 
cannot know being through things or beings themselves then all metaphysics and physics 
for that matter, is guesswork.  Accepting the intelligibility of being means that things are 
knowable in and of themselves, that there is an ―aptitude of all being to be known.‖
97
  
Without accepting this principle, only the empirically testable can be accepted as known 
and only by the one testing at the time of testing; any search for an answer beyond the 
observable would imply an acceptance of the principle of intelligibility.  St. Thomas will 
bring up this point often and in various settings. In the Summa Contra Gentiles we find 
St. Thomas speaking about the intelligibility of creation such that the soul recognizes the 
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very principles underlying it.
98
 The sense that there is a general understanding of creation 
is found also in the principles that undergird the concept. 
As a foundation for his claim, St. Thomas will draw from scripture that all beings 
proceed from God by an act of free creative intelligence and love
99
 and conclude, 
therefore, that all beings are oriented towards knowing and loving.  This also implies that 
these beings themselves do not easily give up their secrets; beings are open to being 
understood by the mind but require reflection.
100
  Once again the article in the Summa 
Contra Gentiles mentioned above brings out the idea that the human person can know the 
principles but not the conclusions. There needs to be some work done by the person to 
arrive at certain conclusions about creation and beings. All of this implies that this is an 
endeavor that is possible. 
This intelligibility of being has static and dynamic principles.  The static principle 
is the principle of non-contradiction; no real being can both be and not be at the same 
time and in the same respect.  Denying this principle renders all statements meaningless 
and any sentence can be said to speak the truth no matter how absurd.  St. Thomas will 
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(Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God's love of creatures, their existence and their 
permanence. 
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link this to the very foundation of truth and any knowledge. The positive side of this 
principle is the stability of all beings: something is itself and not something else.
101
  
The dynamic aspect is the principle of sufficient reason; every being has sufficient 
reason for its existence, either in itself or in another.  While this principle can reduce to 
the classic cause-and-effect understanding of being, it should be looked at in a fuller 
sense. Alexander Pruss
102
 has a very cogent examination of the principle of sufficient 
reason in St. Thomas. He finds that the principle, while not explicitly discussed by 
Aquinas, is behind his discussion of causal principles especially in the commonly called 
proofs for the existence of God. One also finds the concept in St. Thomas‘ Commentary 
on Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics dealing with the end of acts where St. Thomas 
remarks that there must be some final end or reason for the entire endeavor lest the 
person be frustrated in existence. ―If we should proceed to infinite in our desire for ends 
so that one end should always be desire on account of another to infinity, we will never 
arrive at the point where a human person may attain the ends desired.‖
103
 St. Thomas 
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The combination of the dynamic and static aspects of the intelligibility of being 
marks the intimate correlation between the intellect and being.  ―Intellect is radically for 
being, oriented toward it by a natural, innate affinity, aptitude, or ‗connaturality‘ for 
being…[and] being itself is for intelligence.‖
105
  It is this intimate correlation between 
intellect and being that marks an initial stepping stone towards a greater metaphysics.   
St. Thomas accepted this relationship between being and intellect implicitly 
throughout his philosophical and theological works.  In St. Thomas‘ De Veritate the first 
question about the definition of truth is rooted in this relationship between being and 
intellect: ―The first reference of being to the intellect, therefore, consists in its agreement 
with the intellect.‖
 106
  There are many other instances of this correlation in St. Thomas, 
showing that the being-intellect relationship is integral to any metaphysics–not just to 
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Thomas‘.  With the intelligibility of being accepted, the next element can be developed  
in St. Thomas‘ presuppositions – the notion of participation. 
The second important presupposition in St. Thomas‘ theology of nature is the idea 
of participation which, as it came to St. Thomas, was originally a Platonic idea according 
to which lower beings which make up the plurality of the world participate in the higher 
form of that being or the Ideal and eventually, The One. For example a tree would 
participate in ―treeness‖, the form or Ideal of tree.  This structure was solidified through 
Plotinus
107
 and then Proclus
108
 and came to St. Thomas in the basic tripartite form where 
first there is something containing the fullness (perfection) of whatever aspect is being 
participated in, and that this perfection necessitates its being the essence of a unique 
source; second, there is a participant that participates in the perfection in a limited, 
restricted way and, third, the participation is necessarily a dependence on the source.
109
  
The participant, due to its participation, must be a composite, then, consisting of, at least, 
the participated perfection and the receiving participant.  St. Thomas takes this format 
and combines it with notions from Aristotle involving potency and act in order to explain, 
more clearly, how the participant and the participated perfection interact. 
Within the Thomistic corpus there is one work that singles out this notion of 
participation and it comes at the beginning of his career. His CHeb was written in the 
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later 1250‘s and addresses Boethius‘ ideas of participation in detail. Much of what he 
writes in this short exposition can be found throughout his works in the rest of his life.
110
 
In this commentary, St. Thomas delves into the various ways of understanding 
participation taking as his starting point the distinction, developed by Boethius, between 
esse and ―that which is.‖
111
 In what is a thorough exposition on Boethius‘ understanding 
of participation, St. Thomas comes up with three different ways of understanding the 
notion.
112
   The first idea of participation is that ―whenever something particularly 
receives what pertains universally to something else, it is said to participate in it.‖
113
 To 
demonstrate this he uses the idea of the person participating in animal, ―since it does not 
have the account of animal in its full generality.‖
114
  The genus animal has a universality 
that the species person does not contain in its totality or universality – the person is not 
every animal. In the first instance St. Thomas sees the particular receiving something that 
is universal to something else. The thing participating does not contain the fullness of 
what it is participating in. The example is that of a human participating in animal. Human 
does not contain everything that pertains to animal but does share some of the 
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characteristics. Humanity is not the fullness of animal. The other example is that Socrates 
participates in humanity but is not the fullness of humanity. Socrates does not contain all 
that it is to be human, only his particular portion. Human would include all hair colors, all 
skins colors all heights, etc. Socrates participates as a particular participating in a 
universal. 
The second notion of participation is a subject participating in its accidents or 
matter in its form. This is the participation of a specific subject in a more abstract 
accident as a statue will participate in whiteness or gold in the form of a statue. The 
pattern emerges that the more specific participates in the more general. This is also the 
similar pattern for the third example of the effect participating in the cause. St. Thomas 




The first of the above ways deals analogously with participation as the concrete 
participating in the abstract or the particular in the universal. The second example is that 
of a concrete participating in an abstract. The examples could be the same as in the first 
but St. Thomas uses generic terms saying that matter participates in form or that subject 
(substance) participates in accidents. These more generic terms are better suited for the 
original purpose of this section of his commentary which is to delineate the difference 
between esse and ―that which is.‖ The argument is that the particular participates in the 
universal applies to this relationship. The particular ―that which is‖ or ―a being‖ 
participates in the universal esse or ―act of being.‖ The ―that which is‖ can participate in 
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something but esse cannot because esse is the most universal and so there is nothing more 
universal in which it can participate.  
Simply understood, participation, as taking a part of something, should not be 
construed as the taking of something in a physical manner, leaving an absence in the 
source.  Participation can be seen to be analogous to the sharing of an idea with another 
where the sharing does not take away from the source but does benefit the receiver. In 
this way the number of participants does not affect the source – God does not diminish or 
become more rarified as the number of creatures increases. The notion of participation in 
his metaphysics is the way St. Thomas avoids some of the many problems of the one and 
the many.
116
   
The notion of participation is foundational to the understanding of St. Thomas‘ 
theology of creation especially when dealing with the human person. It forms the 
foundation of the existential meaning of being and forms the basis for St. Thomas‘ 
anthropology. The presuppositions laid out are those that will play the most important 
roles in the discussion to come. I believe that so far they do not fundamentally conflict 
with any of the postmodern ideas I have discussed above in the areas delineated.  
I do not believe that either of the two presuppositions violate any of the 
postmodern concerns to the extent that they impact the discussion of the rootedness of the 
concern for the other in the human person. With these presuppositions understood, the 
next step is to delve into the heart of St. Thomas‘ anthropology starting with the basic 
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notions of substance and being from which basis the notion of personhood can be 
addressed and, then, ultimately the structure that will hold, for the human person, the 
grace of God and promote the concern for the other in its innermost core. 
 
 
The Dynamic Notion of Substance and Being 
The ideas of substance and being are practically interchangeable when 
considering the human person. Substance or being, for St. Thomas, becomes the 
foundation for understanding the human person. To understand substance is to understand 
the structure that God created in order to come to the fullness of love for God and 
neighbor. Combining the ideas of the existential understanding of substance and being 
with the notion of participation, we find that substance becomes a dynamic sharing in the 
esse of God, Who is pure act.  To see how this comes about, two paths will be taken: 
first, substance or being will be looked at metaphysically through an examination of the 
term esse and the existential understanding of being, the second path will be to see what 
comes from examining substance and being as good. These two paths come together to 
create a dynamic notion of substance that forms the basis for understanding personhood.  
St. Thomas has an existential notion of being, or substance, at play in all of his 
philosophical work. Understanding being through the existential lens means that the 
structure of all existing things is not focused on the essence but on the fact of existence. 
His understanding of existence is that of essence informed by esse, or ―to-be,‖ conferring 
on the real being its existence. The best systematic discussion of this topic by St. Thomas 
is probably his early philosophical treatise DeEnte in which this doctrine, a new 
44 
 
formulation in the philosophic and theological world at the time, grounds all beings in the 
perfect being of God through His esse.  This treatise will go beyond traditional 
Aristotelian ideas of matter and form to create an analogous relationship with essence and 
esse. The essence of any thing may be posited, but unless it is informed by esse, the ―to-
be,‖ of God, the thing has no existence.  The essence of a thing is the passive element that 
is given dynamic existence by esse just as matter is the passive entity that is given shape 
by form. 
Connecting both Aristotelian lines of thought with Platonic, St. Thomas will use 
the notion of participation to relate how esse informs the essence. Working from the 
second definition of participation, esse becomes the more abstract but active element in 
participation. Previous formulations of existence focusing on form and essence do not tie 
in the relationship between God and the creature. The existential meaning of being loses 
none of the linkage to the intelligibility of being due to its rooting in the divine esse.  
In a word, what St. Thomas has succeeded in doing is to shift the center of gravity 
in the constitution of the real from form and essence to actual existence as inner 
act, without thereby letting go of the intelligibility of being; for existence itself, as 
the directed participation in God‘s own essential perfection, has now become the 
root of intelligibility itself, mediated to our finite intelligences through the 
spectrum of finite forms.
117
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St. Thomas also uses the potency/ act relationship as an analogy when explaining the 
essence/esse relationship. Since the act of being, esse, is given from God, it is the active 
―to-be‖ informing the passive essence.
118
  This puts the act of being, esse, at the very 
heart of any existent thing without taking away the connection between the created 
receiver and the Creator, the giver of the esse; only existing things have esse.  
St. Thomas brings out the inability for esse to participate in anything early on in 
his CHeb when he examines the language of being and beings. He will draw the parallel 
of the runner and running, ―a being‖ and ―the act of being.‖ A runner is the subject of 
running but running is not the subject of running, running cannot run, only a runner can 
run. In the same way a being is the subject of the act of being, the act of being cannot be 
the subject of the act of being. Boethius remarks that ―being itself not yet is‖ or cannot be 
because it is the very act of being; being is not but a being is. 
In St. Thomas‘ notion of the existential meaning of being he eliminates from the 
category of real beings things like ideas and possibilities. Some alternate versions of 
Thomism have included ideas as falling in this category. The problem arises in the 
interpretation of St. Thomas himself when it comes to what defines a ―real‖ being. In 
DeEnte and in his DSS, St. Thomas will discuss the definition of what a being is or what 
can be properly called a being. These two works seem to bracket the Thomistic oeuvre 
with DeEnte written around 1256 and DSS written around 1272.
119
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In DeEnte, the first chapter deals with definitions of essence and beings. In the 
opening lines we find that a being, ―in itself can be spoken of in two ways.‖
120
 These two 
ways describe ―a being‖ as either that of a substance or accident as understood through 
Aristotle‘s ten categories,
121
 or ―a being‖ signifies the truth of a proposition.
122
 St. 
Thomas will quickly dispense with the latter definition because of its superficial nature in 
a discussion of existing things.  Anything that uses the copulative ―is‖ can be considered 
a being in this latter sense even though most would agree that many of the things 
affirmed in these statements are not existing things. He will use the idea of blindness as 
an example. Blindness is not an existent thing but is, in actuality a privation of 
something, sight. There is no free-floating blindness that someone may run into. Later in 
other treatises St. Thomas will use this definition to connect being with truth. This is also 
another aspect of the intelligibility of being mentioned above. 
The first way of understanding ―a being,‖ ens is through Aristotle‘s ten categories, 
the first of which is substance and the other nine demark the accidentals that rely on the 
substance for existence. The definition concludes with the statement that only things that 
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exist in reality can be called ―a being.‖
123
 His use of ―in re‖ gives the sense of something 
tangible, something in reality, something that can be touched or seen, something that has 
accidents and is not immaterial. He emphasizes this point in the following line bringing 
out the idea that blindness and the like are not ―beings‖ since they do not have accidents 
and do not support accidents.
124
 
The section of his treatise On the Separated Substances that deals with the same 
subject only treating incorporeal substances and is in response to Plato, Aristotle and the 
Islamic philosopher Avicebron around whom the treatise seems to revolve. After 
presenting Avicebron‘s understanding of angels (separated or incorporeal substances) 
along with the essentialist understanding of being, St. Thomas begins to refute his 
argument eventually getting to a refined definition of being. Avicebron considers esse to 
be an accident that gets added on to the essence of a thing and tries to demonstrate that 
esse has three different orders when considering the separated substances.
125
  St. Thomas 
will reverse the roles of esse and see that there is a difference in the way substances 
partake in esse. 
For, since being is not predicated of all things univocally, the same mode of being 
is not required in all things that are said to be; rather, some participate in esse 
more perfectly, and some less perfectly. For accidents are called beings, not 
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because they have in themselves esse but because their esse is in that which is in a 
substance. Again, in all substances, there is not the same mode of being.
126
 
Here St. Thomas is nuancing the way esse as accident should be understood. He is 
arguing against Avicebron who believes that all things are composed of matter and form 
and saying that spiritual substances do not contain matter but they do exist and participate 
in esse not as accidents in a substance but as the substance itself which has a proper 
essence or definition. The substance-accident relationship does not hold when discussing 
the existence of angels or immaterial substances because their existence is not accidental 
as Avicebron seems to hold. St. Thomas has the notion of essence participating in esse in 
the background of his analysis of Avicebron. He sees the main flaw in Avicebron‘s 
argument as not understanding the proper relationships between matter and form in 
incorporeal beings and therefore misunderstands the relationship between essence and 
esse.  
More recent reviews of the notions of the essence-esse relationship bring out the 
differences between medieval thinkers before and after St. Thomas and emphasize the 
uniqueness of St. Thomas‘ approach.
127
 In more recent decades, Clarke has emphasized 
the distinction in St. Thomas between real and mental beings; real beings are present due 
to their own intrinsic act of existence (esse) beyond simply being thought up. For Clarke, 
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the criterion for understanding the difference between the two is action; real beings act, 
ideas do not unless acted on by a real being.
128
 This idea is still debated and some have 
found this to be a flaw in Clarke‘s understanding of St. Thomas although a closer reading 




Esse as Active 
The existential meaning of being marks real beings as existing beings due to their 
intrinsic act of being or esse. This changes the way being is viewed from ―lifeless‖ 
presence in a form/matter formulation to active presence that has the act of existence in 
common with all real beings.
130
  Another way to present the idea of the essences-sharing-
in-esse is to turn the concept around to show that esse is limited by essence in a real 
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being.  This reversal places the importance on the act of being itself, the esse, especially 
as it relates to God. The act of existence flowing from God is limitless until it is bounded 
by a particular essence.  The act of existence is then seen as a ―maximum‖ limited by 
each differentiating essence.  It is the common share in esse that roots all beings in a 
community, sharing their debt of existence to God, a debt rooted in the idea the 
Platonic/Neo-Platonic notion of participation. 
The existential meaning of being of the being or substance is dynamic.  Since it is 
the purpose of a being to be active—a substance that is interactive through its act of 
being—there is an intrinsic dynamism within the notion of being. The structure of this 
dynamism is rooted in the notion of esse as pure act and the connection of all existent 
beings with esse giving all existent beings a dynamic existence.
131
 This brings about the 
idea of God as pure act for ―in God, to act and to be are the same thing.‖
132
 
From this we see the relationship of all existing things as essence plus esse. 
Behind the notion is that esse is active. From his earliest philosophical writing we see that 
concerning substances, ―…being [esse] it receives from God and this being [esse] is 
received as an actuality.‖
133
 Esse is the actuality that every being (ens) receives to 
become actualized and existent. Also in his commentary on Aristotle‘s Metaphysics, St. 
Thomas looks at esse from the point of view of the first mover, 
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Again, if the first mover is eternal and unmoved, it must not be a potential being 
because any potential being is naturally fitted to be moved, but an independent 
substance whose essence is actuality.
134
  
and from the point of view of intelligible things: 
Therefore it has been shown from the series of movers and things moved that the 
first mover is a simple substance and an actuality…It follows, then, that the first 
intelligible entity is a simple substance which is an actuality.
135
 
From his philosophical works we get a picture of an esse that is simple and 
dynamic and one that interacts with all existence. 
Now all created causes have one common effect which is being, although each 
one has its peculiar effect whereby they are differentiated: thus heat makes a thing 
to be hot, and a builder gives being to a house. Accordingly they have this in 
common that they cause being, but they differ in that fire causes fire, and a 
builder causes a house. There must therefore be some cause higher than all other 
by virtue of which they all cause being and whose proper cause is being: and this 
cause is God, Now the proper effect of any cause proceeds therefrom in likeness 
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This interaction is one that affects all of creation as creation. The active esse that is given 
to all created beings gives all beings a dynamism that reflects its existence. The first 
mover is active and simple it is also intelligible and eternally actual. This first mover is 
what St. Thomas will call God, while it is not the fullest definition, it is important for the 
present discussion. The first mover, in Aristotelian analysis is the mover that begins all 
other motion. St Thomas will make this foundational but will add the Platonic notion of 
participation to augment the active aspect of the first mover. This first mover is the ―to 
be‖ of all existence and all existing things participate in that ―to be.‖ 
St. Thomas sees God as esse and the giver of esse to creation; His very essence is 
esse. In St. Thomas‘ CHeb, the understanding of the relationship of the essence of a thing 
to its being is in the background. Once again he is developing the ideas from his earliest 
writings especially DeEnte. All beings (ens) are made up of essence, which is the 
definition of the individual thing, and its share in the ―act of being‖ (esse). This leaves 
room for there to be potentiality in every being because it could not actually exist. St. 
Thomas says that he can know what a dog or a phoenix is without ever knowing that they 
exist.
137
 Now since there is no potentiality in God there should be no distinction between 
the essence and esse in God as is seen in the ST:  
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… existence [esse] is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness 
and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. 
Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, 
as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as 
shown above [ST I, Q3, a1], it follows that in Him essence does not differ from 
existence. Therefore His essence is His existence.
138
 
Through the proofs of the existence of God, St. Thomas comes to the conclusion 
that God is eternal among other things and from that background he finds that there is no 
passive potency in God.  
The being whose substance has an admixture of potency is liable not to be by as 
much as it has potency; for that which can be, can not-be. But, God, being 




Here we have tied the philosophical to the theological. In seeing that, for St. Thomas, 
esse is what gives existence and is pure actuality and also that God is the Creator and 
Who gives existence and is also pure activity, St Thomas links esse and God.  
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With the understanding of esse as dynamic activity we can see St. Thomas‘ 
mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics as innovative. His use of the notion of 
participation gives the creature access to the perfections of the source; it gives the 
essences existence through the gift of sharing in esse from God.  We have shown above 
how St. Thomas uses this notion to relate the existing being with the act of being, 
participation means essence participates in the act of being. The essence is not greater 
than the esse participated in; it is a particular that participates in a universal analogous to 
a concrete participating in the abstract. This seems to reverse the focus of much of the 
philosophical discussions regarding essence found in the Middle Ages and into the 
modern age where essence was seen as primary and the dynamic force of the existing 
entity. St. Thomas turned the essence into a passive role that needs to participate in the 
active esse.  
When St. Thomas does talk of beings participating in esse he is more nuanced 
than even this treatise will lead one to believe. This now brings to the fore the third way 
of understanding participation – an effect participating in its cause.
140
 At this point there 
are two ways to pursue the notion of participation as effect in a cause. The first way can 
be that of a purely philosophical method in which we do not assume the existence of God 
and work towards that end in dealing with participation. The other way is that of theology 
in which, for St. Thomas, the existence of God is a given. St. Thomas can be seen as 
doing both and at times may seem to be conflating both. Elsewhere St. Thomas goes 
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through a philosophical development of the existence of God but, for our task, St. 
Thomas has already discussed the ideas of participation with the idea that God exists and 
works from there. 
In his exposition of Boethius‘ text and in later works such as his Quodlibetal 
questions, St. Thomas deals with the idea of beings participating in esse to have 
existence. He does not like the idea that they are related as matter to form or as substance 
to accidents.
141
 The third way of participating in something that St. Thomas brings out in 
his exposition of Boethius‘ Hebdomads is as an effect participates in a cause, ―especially 
when it is not equal to the power of the cause.‖
142
 The creative power of God comes into 
effect here as the effect of an existent being can be seen to participate in its cause – esse. 
While the esse participated in is not God per se,
143
 it comes from God and is part of His 
creative work. The issue itself is not as important to this discussion as it is to others since 
the basic presupposition is that esse comes from God and it is that in which an essence 
participates in order to become an existing being. The cause is God and the effect is 
existence. 
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Anticipating an objection to this principle by postmodern thinkers, one must recall 
that this esse is prior to any beings, it is prior to all creation and does not yet enter into 
the discussion of the individual human person. The esse of God is not the Same that all 
things reduce to in the postmodern rejection of what they consider classic metaphysics. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the concept of the esse will fall into the same 
level as the Wholly Other or the concepts of the Infinite. If those concepts are kept by 
postmodern thinkers then the dialogue can continue with St. Thomas. 
Substance and Active esse 
To refine a definition of substance
144
 found in St. Thomas one must start with the 
empirical questions that St. Thomas is presented with. What exactly perdures in a being; 
what stays throughout the various changes over time and why this is important? For St. 
Thomas the answer is ―substance.‖  There must be some principle of self-identity that 
does not change over time. This becomes important because the history of the idea of 
substance has changed dramatically from the thirteenth century and especially St. 
Thomas‘ understanding of it. A short review of the changes are in order. 
Various concepts of substance that have arisen since St. Thomas, most of which 
come from the modern era and depart drastically from the understanding of substance St. 
Thomas knew.  To draw out the contrasts one need only look at philosophers such as 
Hume, Locke, and Whitehead as well as the diverse religious traditions that were not 
engaged with the Latin west such as Buddhism. Hume and the empiricists find no 
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permanent substance, insisting instead that beings are a collection of various states (both 
physical and psychological) in constant flux,
145
 that there is no substance that remains 
through the changes of time, no ―in-itself.‖  Locke, while not as extreme in his rejection 
of substance, still asserts that it is unknowable and is posited merely to support the 
accidental properties we encounter.
146
 Whitehead draws from Descartes‘ definition of 
substance as isolated self-subsistent substance and utilizing process philosophy‘s ideas of 
the total inter-relatedness of things, claims that all beings are inter-related and influence 
each other, changing each other and leaving no place for an ―in-itself‖ substance.  This 
leads Whitehead to a total rejection of the idea of substance.
 147
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The non-dualist Mahayana school of Buddhism has an understanding of reality as 
pure mind and the ―substance‖ of things is an illusion. This understanding is very close to 
Whitehead‘s in positing total inter-relation between beings, but it has an even more 
radical ―ontological emptiness‖ at the heart of it.  By discarding the ideas of independent 
beings, the truth about reality can be seen as simple spiritual mind or, beyond that simple 
spiritual mind, to something indescribable.
148
  Given the impoverished views of 
substance as these thinkers understood it, there was no reason for them not to reject 
substance as having anything useful to offer philosophy.
149
 Many of the contemporary 
philosophers have sympathies with the enlightenment understanding of substance.  
All these descriptions or rejections of substance lack the dynamic notion that 
Thomas understood.  For them, substance was static and should be expunged from their 
philosophic systems as incompatible or useless.  Even Thomas would find it difficult to 
use substance if he did not see it as dynamic.  An examination of the human experience 
can lead to the basic questions revolving around the question of the permanent ―in itself‖ 
aspect of existence, a principle of self-identity within every substance.  
A few steps can easily demonstrate that the question of this principle must be 
addressed.  First, by looking at the human experience one finds that there must be 
something that lasts throughout the changes. To deny this, one would have to address 
questions about memory, moral responsibility, and even something as simple as a 
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promise or a pledge. For St. Thomas and other Thomists these questions require an 
answer that stipulates something that endures from one moment to the next; memory 
gives us a recollection of past events as our own past events, moral responsibility allows 
us to say, ―I did this‖ and to take responsibility for an action and its consequences, all of 
which are extended through time.  Pledges and promises that we make are also based on 
expectations that we are going to be around to keep them, that we will be the same person 
when the time comes to honor them.  The fact of some kind of perduring self, one that 
remains throughout changes, is necessary for any anthropology to come to any agreement 
with human experience.   
The next step is to realize that the principle of self-identity is something radically 
different from the changes a thing goes through: the ―self‖ cannot be the same as all the 
changes, because the changes do not last through time as the self does; so the self either 
must be identical and not identical at the same time, or it must be radically different.  The 
self is the subject at the core of the changes. It transcends the phases of change and the 
two form a ―real metaphysical composition.‖ 
150
  When one looks at the tradition prior to 
the fourteenth century to find a name for this perduring self, ―substance,‖ which emerges 
as that which stands under something with its companion term for the changeable as 
―accident.‖  It is this substance/accident relationship (first clarified by Aristotle) that St. 
Thomas uses to form the language with which to speak about the self and personhood.  
St. Thomas, while not specifically addressing the issue in any one place, has an 
underlying understanding of the dynamic notion of substance. The axiom that ―action 
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follows upon being‖ is held through much of St. Thomas‘ systematic works. The 
following quotes are a sampling of citations
151
: 
Every Substance exists for the sake of its operation.
152
 




It is the nature of every actuality to communicate itself insofar as it is possible. 
Hence every agent acts according as it exists in actuality.
154
 
The substantial forms of things, which, according as they are in themselves, are 
unknown to us, shine forth to us through their accidental properties.
155
 
It is easy to see from these texts that an existing substance is made for its operation, for 
action, and that action requires a core self that is a metaphysical co-principle with its 
changing accidents. St. Thomas has the foundation for a future argument with Hume, 
Locke and Descartes latent in the work; the foundation is latent because these questions 
were never raised to St. Thomas in his day.   
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The idea of a substance, as something perduring through changes as well as its 
allied accidents, are controversial ideas to modern philosophers such as Locke and 
Hume.
156
 The latter idea is necessary as the way in which the former expresses itself; 
something neither Locke nor Hume would accept.  This is not to say that the substance 
does not change.  The substance/accident relationship is such that there is never one 
without the other. The only way a substance is in act is through the accidents. As self-
identical, the core of the being is intimately tied to the accidents while keeping the ―self‖ 
intact. The substance necessarily changes in its accidents, for otherwise there would be 
no communicative action of the core self.  The substance changes but not substantially; 
the accidental change, though, is not be a mere change, but the way in which the 
substance itself changes.
157
   
It flows from this discussion that the ―self‖ is self-communicative, for its 
operations serve to communicate itself and receive information from other beings; it is in 
the nature of the substance to express the self and be effected by the expression of other 
substances.  There are two possible ways of coming to this conclusion on one‘s own: first 
by observation and then by metaphysical reflection.
158
  Observation of all levels of 
substance from inorganic to human life show a propensity for interaction: inorganic 
materials give off energy as well as being present to other substances. The rock has color 
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and weight. Plants interact, reproduce, and sustain themselves, and humans live in 
community as political and moral people. Human persons communicate in these ways but 
also communicate in a higher order. At this highest level, the human person loves and 
cares and interacts in intimate ways that are attempts, by the self in the substance, to give 
to the other something of the self and to receive from the other something of its self.  In 
all these observations we find that there is a communication of the inner core to other 
substances regardless if it is a rock communicating hardness and weight or a human 
communicating its rational self to other rational selves. 
Metaphysical reflection on a being that in no way interacts or expresses itself 
yields a being that is either non-existent or irrelevant. If there were no action from within 
or from without the substance, it would make no difference to itself or to anything else; it 
would be ―indistinguishable from nothingness.‖
159
  The medieval adage agere sequitur 
esse proves to be the driving force behind this reflection: action follows upon being.  
Action is also a criterion for discovering a real being—if it acts, it is a real being either in 
itself or as part of a being.  Action, communication, in its most basic understanding, is the 
way beings know each other; it is the way in which we know the presence of something 
as well as its nature.
160
  ―To be is to be actively co-present to the community of existents, 
of other presences.‖
161
   




 Keep in mind St. Thomas‘ presupposition of the intelligibility of being. 
161
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At this point St. Thomas‘ structure of substantial being becomes apparent. 
Substance as the ―in itself‖ aspect of being, grounds a being and gives it its perduring 
core of self-identity.  The relational aspect of being, building upon the existential 
meaning of being, is the ―towards others‖ aspect.  Being is meant to act and receive 
action; it exists to act and action is its perfection.  Clarke sums up this structure by saying 
that ―to be is to be substance in relation.‖ From here the question may be asked about 
what kind of actions beings perform.  
The Good 
Along with substantial being, the notion of the good becomes very important to 
this discussion of action. The question arises as to what kind of action, at its core, the 
substantial being is undertaking.  St. Thomas inherited the idea of the good in its 
relationship with being from the later Church fathers and early medieval scholars.
162
 This 
relationship is one of convertibility. In this short section we will go over St. Thomas‘ 
understanding of the good as it relates to being in our limited focus on action and being. 
St. Thomas works within the understanding of the transcendentals as they relate to 
beings. including being, truth, unity, and goodness as seen in his Commentary on the 
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Divine Names of Pseudo-Dionysius.
163
 This leads to St. Thomas‘ use of the adage ―being 
and good are convertible‖
164
 that has been used by many before and after him.
165
 This 
connection with being is not without its detractors.
166
 Much of the controversy revolves 
around the understanding of what the good is. Most of the objections are rooted in an 
understanding of the good as moral good whereas St. Thomas speaks of ontological good, 
a good connected with perfection.
167
 The difference is significant and to confuse the two 
will lead the kinds of misunderstandings that have plagued this discussion for centuries.  
What is the Good? 
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For St. Thomas the Good is connected with perfection and as such also is 
connected with causality and eventually action.
168
 In the ST I Q5, a1, we get a summary 
of what the good is for St. Thomas: 
Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear 
from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in 
some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): ―Goodness is what all 
desire.‖ Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for 
all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. 
Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that 
makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (3, 4; 4, 1). Hence it is clear 
that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of 
desirableness, which being does not present.
169
 
Goodness is the same thing as being in the realm of existing things.
170
 This is the 
question to be answered and he does so through a short summary of the things that have 
been discussed in the few earlier questions. First what is good must be desirable. This he 
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takes as a given and comes to him from Aristotle‘s Ethics.
171
 What makes the good 
desirable is its perfection because that which is perfect is desired. Perfect has very 
technical definitions to St. Thomas. 
We must first consider that ―perfect‖ is said in several ways. For something may 
be simply speaking perfect, or something may be called perfect in a certain 
respect. Something is simply speaking perfect when it attains to the end that 
belongs to it according to its proper nature, while something can be called perfect 
in a certain respect when it attains an end in regard to things accompanying its 
proper nature, as an animal is said to be perfect simply speaking, when it reaches 
the end that it lacks none of those things that constitute animal life.
172
  
Perfect in the case of being is with respect to the fact that a being (ens) exists; it 
lacks none of the constituent elements for something that exists – it has esse. Therefore in 
this sense of perfect, all real existing things are perfect and therefore have the aspect of 
the good in them. In this sense goodness and being (ens) are the same. All existing things 
are good in that they exist.
173
 From this it is clear that the idea of the good is not a moral 
goodness but a perfective goodness. 
St. Thomas puts a new order in the relationship between the good and being that 
especially differs from the received Platonic/Neoplatonic tradition in which the Good was 
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considered beyond being or outside of being. St. Thomas changed this relationship 
depending on the order in which one is investigating. In the order of existence, the good 
and being are the same but in the order of ideas the Good is subordinate to Being; in 
order to be good something must first be.   
In ideas being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a 
thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that 
stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the 
intellect. Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because 
everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality.
174
 
Existence has priority in analyzing goodness and, while they are still intimately related 
but differing in orders. 
The good also has a unique character in that it is considered self-diffusive, it 
wants to continue on to its ultimate end. As such, the good has the character of an end 
and is that which is sought after and desired.  
For natural things have a natural inclination not only toward their own proper 
good, to acquire it, if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to 
diffuse their own goodness among others as far as possible. Hence we see that 
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every agent, insofar as it exists in act and possesses some perfection, produces 
something similar to itself.
175
   
The good has the characteristic of driving towards perfection and achieving its ultimate 
end. It is active in its pursuit of perfection and that active pursuit also produces goodness 
and being or, at minimum, demonstrates their existence.  
Typical examples of beings seeking their good and perfection would be the 
human desire to reproduce and create another human and the bodies need for food which 
will help it achieve perfection. This is not to say that all things the body desires are for its 
perfection but they are all desired as goods. Every action is ordered towards an end, 
which St. Thomas calls the good, either real or perceived.  This action fulfills the one 
acting or benefits another as the agent desires.
176
  However the action manifests itself, 
action is required as a result of esse. From this it follows that action follows upon 
existence. 
But we can say that actuality necessitates action.  Esse, which is good as 
perfective and desired, can be said to be diffusive of itself in that esse necessitates 
action.  In every finite being esse naturally flows over into action ad extra.
177
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Being results in the communication of goodness in action and gives all of 
existence its dynamism as an interacting system of beings based in something. That 
something is love.  For the highest being in this system, God, self-communication reaches 
its highest point as self-communicative altruistic love without which the entire 
gratuitously created universe would not exist.
178
  Here, St. Thomas as theologian and 
philosopher pulls together the Christian understanding of God as Love (1 John) and God 
as being, ―I am Who Am‖ (Exodus 3) and makes them foundational to his metaphysics: 
the God who is Love is also Being.  Revelation provides data about the Triune God 
useful in completing his metaphysics.  God, the Father, Son, and Spirit interact through 
self-communication; the Father gives over everything to the Son and they, together, give 
over all to the Spirit.  These relationships, founded in eternal love, are part of the nature 
of the Triune God as esse, the same act of existence in which all created beings 
participate in some way.  As human persons participate in the existence of God we also 
share in the need to communicate in love to another, several others even, as part of our 
nature.  The human being is different than other created material beings in that we have 
the rational capacity to act on this nature or deny it; lower beings are fixed in a simple 
responsive, unreflective form of self-communication. 
Through the analysis of esse from two angles we arrive at the conclusion that 
substantial being is a very dynamic concept; through its participation in esse, the ―to be‖ 
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given it by God, is active. It is also good and that good is itself self-communicative and 
therefore active, outward-oriented and remains so as far as it is in existence. With this 
understanding of being and substance the next step is to discover what type of substance 
is the highest and where does the human person fit into this structure. For St. Thomas, 
―person‖ is the highest form of being. 
The Person  
To understand St. Thomas‘ use of the term person, some of the history that has 
come with the term should be investigated so a deeper understanding of how he uses the 
term will come to light. St. Thomas will see the person as the highest form of substantial 
being and to see why this is so will require a historical survey of the term. After a brief 
history of the term ―person‖ some of the essential elements of what a person is can be 
uncovered as well as how those elements play into the present task of building a 
framework around which grace can inform. The person, as the highest form of being, is 
so in both its intellect and its will as it strives towards self-awareness while also being 
self-communicative and receptive in its relationship with the world around it. 
Many avenues lead to the understanding of the term ―person‖ in its Christian use, 
some from Greek and others from Latin provenance.
179
 In the early Greek perspective the 
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word prosopon meant the mask of an actor or the appearance of someone. The term 
developed from the combination of three parts of words (pro-, ops-, -on), the central part 
taken from the verb meaning ―to see‖ or ―to be seen‖.
180
 Initially the term was an 
anatomical reference to the area between the neck and the top of the head in a human, the 
term then expanded to include the idea of a mask used at theatrical plays, and then to the 
role played by the actor. Over time, we find development from an objective thing, a 
mask, towards personality; from a part in a play to the actual character of the 
individual.
181
 The word connoted a sense of manifestation, a bringing to light out of the 
shadows, a distinctive and unique hidden depth revealed through action. Further, the 
periphrastic usage (kata prosopon, against the face) indicates intimate face-to-face 
communication. Aristotle said that the human is the only animal with a face indicating 
that the face manifests a depth that only the human person has.
182
 Both the uniqueness 
and the relationality of the human are brought out in the developing concept of prosopon. 
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Only later related to prosopon is the philosophical term hypostasis, which 
originally meant a substance that stands under something. Under the Stoics and Gnostics 
this term slowly changed to mean individual substance and took on a sense of uniqueness 
and individuality, a change from essence to instantiation.
183
 With emphasis not on the 
appearance of a thing or the face but more on a particular nature's unique manifestation, 
the development of the meaning of hypostasis draws closer to that of prosopon. 
God was called simply a substance in the Greek philosophical understanding of 
the word ousia, a term handed down from the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical 
schools. Ousia is the abstract noun of the verb einai (to be) that could give it the meaning 
of 'being' in any sense of ‗to be‘.
184
 In Aristotle, ousia has two subdivisions that he named 
secondary ousia and primary ousia. The secondary ousia or substance is sometimes a 
species and sometimes a genus but the primary ousia is always an individual substance or 
a real individual thing. Aristotle related the primary and secondary substances by 




The Latin history of the term for person centers on the term persona, most likely 
derived from the Latin root ―to sound,‖ sonare, with ―through,‖ per, added as a prefix, 
creating per-sonare. This construction was a Latinization of a term taken from an older 
Etruscan term for a mask, phersu, worn by actors during festivals in honor of 
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 By the time of Cicero the term was used with legal meanings in 
considering individual people as well as the personal character of the the person with 
respect to the community. The idea of person in this context was considered not so much 
ontologically as communally. Legal proceedings depended on the personal character that 
the individual possessed, slave or free for example. At that time the general philosophical 
understanding of persona was the individual human substance (ousia in Greek) in its 
proper and distinct human individuality.
187
 The understanding of persona as relational is 
concentrated on the external communal relation; by the Christian era, some kind of 
relational understanding of the word persona was in usage.  
Greek and Latin usages converged in the Christian age as the early councils 
needed precise language and concepts to help the Church understand the deposit of faith, 
particularly in the Trinity. The Church took the language of persona in Latin or prosopon 
and hypostasis in Greek, with their dual concepts of unique individual relation, and 
further developed and deepened that language. Taking cues also from the usage of the 
poets and popular philosophers Christianity also had to integrate the Latin usage. Cicero's 
first use of the Latin essentia to render the Greek ousia never gained currency though, as 
substantia became the common translation. Substantia, though it might have originally 
meant ―existence,‖ came in practice to mean ―an existent thing.‖ 
The Christian Usage of “Person” in the Early Church 
                                                 
186
 Schmitz, ―Geography,‖ 29; Porter, ―Keeping,‖ 531; Sacramentum Mundi: An 
Encyclopedia of Theology, (VolA ed. Karl Rahner, NY: Herder and Herder, 1969),404; 
von Balthasar, ―Concept,‖ 20; Schmitz, ―Selves‖, 196. 
187
 Schmitz, ―Geography,‖ 29. 
74 
 
The scriptural tradition of the Hebrews survived in the Greek-speaking culture 
through translations of the texts known as the Septuagint (LXX) and it is this tradition 
that the Christians received. The Greek prosopon is found over twelve hundred times in 
the LXX and translates roughly fifteen variations of the Hebrew word panim (face) alone 
or with a preposition, mepanim meaning opposition as in turning ones face against 
someone or something (in Greek, kata prosopon).
188
 The development of the Hebrew has, 
in a way, paralleled the development of the Greek where the term can mean the face of a 
person or the countenance and personality of the person as well as the whole person.
189
 
This usage in the LXX opened the text to prosopographic exegesis found in the early 
Christian writers. Biblical authors used different characters in dialogical roles to give life 




By the time the first century was coming to a close, a certain amount of the 
prosopographic exegesis was in usage. The new Christians took the roles found in the 
Old Testament texts and combined them with the Latin and Greek philosophical 
understandings of person.
191
 The acceptance, in faith, of Jesus of Nazareth, an individual 
human being, as God, along with the individual Persons of the Father and the Holy Spirit, 
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all roles found in scripture, began to draw together the philosophical and theological 
understandings of ―person‖ as a unique, real, living, individual being. The Fathers used 
philosophical tools to answer questions about the faith, refining the definition of the 
person into this unique individual. 
Questions about the person of Christ became more complex as the Church grew 
and for the first time there was a need to explain and defend the faith. Answering 
questions about Christ required the development of a Christian ontology drawn from the 
Greek and Latin ontologies found in the lands where the new Christians lived. A new 
vocabulary was needed and a philosophic way of speaking about the faith in general and 
Christ specifically was required. Tertullian was an important developer of the philosophic 
language bridging Greek and Latin. 
Development of the Christian Use of “Person” 
The Fathers had recourse to the Greek philosophical tradition as they professed 
simultaneously a unity and plurality in the Godhead. In Aristotle they found five ways of 
looking at unity in substances, three of which they could use for their purposes: unity by 
substratum, unity by genus and unity by species.
192
 The Fathers used each of these three 
to convey an idea of God as substance and to explain what that substance was.  
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Tertullian, whose understanding of ousia most likely came through Stoic 
reinterpretations of Aristotle, used substantia in a way that was similar to the secondary 
ousia in contrast to the specific material of a thing.
193
 For Tertullian substantia was 
polyvalent; he understood it as either ―some particular kind of stuff' or ―stuff of which all 
things are composed.‖
194
 Substantia was an abstract term for Tertullian; everything had a 
substance to it and the only real thing was corpus, corpora or body. He also used 
substantia as a thing composed of a certain kind of ―stuff;‖ in Tertullian a thing is a 
substance as opposed to having substance. 
His understanding of God as a corpus gives rise to the question of what kind of 
corpus; Tertullian's answer is that the triune God is a spiritus.
195
 ―Tertullian himself 
presents of substantiae which admit of a kind of distribution and plurality which does not 
constitute a division.‖
196
 Tertullian combined all of his concepts of substantia into an 
understanding of God as seen from the internal order in God. 
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Tertullian is considered the first to use persona in its fullness in describing both 
Christ,
197
 and the Trinity.
198
  Ratzinger thinks that it was Tertullian's use of the term 
person in this context that made the word enter ―intellectual history for the first time with 
its full weight‖
199
  and began an ever increasing usage of the word in developing the 
articles of faith and fighting heresies. In Adversus Praxeum Tertullian uses ―person‖ to 
mean both the presence of someone, say, God,  
who equally rejoiced with a reciprocal gladness in the (person of Him) Fathers' 




and the individual unique being: 
But you will not allow Him to be really a substantive being, by having a substance 
of His own; in such a way that He may be regarded as an objective thing and a 
person, and so be able (as being constituted second to the God the Father,) and 
make two, the Father and the Son, God and the Word.
201
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Tertullian used his philosophical vocabulary that was a mixture of Aristotelianism and 
Stoic Platonism to the great advantage of the Church however some issues were still 
unresolved concerning the faith and new ones arose as the language of the west became 
Latin. Increasingly troublesome translations between the Greek and Latin became much 
of the task at hand for the Cappadocians. 
The council of Nicea (325) convened to deal with various heresies and questions, 
particularly Arianism.
202
  To solidify the understanding of the Father/Son relationship, 
the council taught, ―One in being with the Father (homoousion).‖
203
 In the anathemas of 
the council were references to hypostasis and ousia based on the Greek definitions which 
were equivalent. Athanasius used the anathemas to advance his early position that 
hypostasis should not be used to speak of the persons in God. Many Fathers were strong 
defenders of the unity in substance as Athanasius was but many also became entangled in 
conflicts over terms. 
The Cappadocians 
After Nicea there are two possible understandings of the ousia-hypostasis 
relation. The first follows Aristotelian thought wherein ousia is secondary ousia, an 
abstract-being, and hypostasis a concrete-being. The second way of seeing the two is to 
see them as both concrete-being where there is a single united substance in God 
                                                 
202
 For more detail see Norman P. Tanner, SJ. Decrees of the Ecumenical 
Councils, Vol. I, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), 1-3. 
203
 What the council did not address in the creed was the person of the Holy Spirit 




expressed in three persons.
204
 The Cappadocians chose the second way avoiding the 
first's potential modalism; they used all the philosophical tools available to show how the 
two concrete-beings, ousia and hypostasis are related. 
In the early time of the Cappadocians the terms ousia and hypostasis were 
identical; referring to the unity of God. Basil, like Athanasius, initially defended the 
equality of the two citing Heb 1:3,
205
  the Nicene Creed anathema
206
  and an earlier letter 
from Athanasius
207
  for support. He later took up Origen's definition of God as one ousia 
and three hypostaseis in hopes of clarifying the distinction between the substance and 
persons in God. To refine the distinction, Gregory of Nazianzus wrote about the unity and 
inseparability of hypostasis and ousia, ―the individuality is only the manner in which the 
identical substance is objectively presented in each several person.‖
208
  After Basil 
affirmed the distinction between the two terms he said that the distinction between the 
ousia and hypostasis is the same as the distinction between general and particular;
209
 
confessing that God is one ousia or substance but with distinct hypostaseis. The 
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difference, he writes, was like that ―between the animal and the particular man;‖
210
 
Gregory of Nazianzus also defined hypostasis as ―modes of being in the Godhead.‖
211
 
The Cappadocians distinguished without separating the two terms and integrated this 
distinction throughout their writing. 
What relates hypostasis and ousia is the processional relationship of the 
hypostaseis; their ―modes of being‖ as unbegotten, begotten and proceeding. Though 
equal in substance, the hypostaseis do have an order within them; the Father begets the 
Son and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. According to Basil, ―God, who is over 
all, alone has, as one special mark of his own hypostasis, his being Father, and his 
deriving his hypostasis from no cause; and through this mark He is peculiarly known;‖
212
  
Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus shared this understanding of God the Father 
as the originator, uncaused; each promoting order in relationship without subordination of 
the Persons.
213
  The concepts are summed up in the idea of homoousios, being of the 
same ousia or 'of one being', while keeping the hypostaseis equal.
214
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During this time, linguistic conflicts continued between the east and west as ousia 
was translated into Latin as substantia and later as essentia;
215
 hypostasis was also 
translated as substantia due to the continued equating, in the west, of ousia and 
hypostasis. Only when Tertullian used the term persona in Latin to speak of the three 
relations in God did persona become closely associated with hypostasis. Confusion arose 
between East and West with his use of persona, which translated into Greek as prosopon 
or mask. When the East said, ―one ousia and three hypostasis,” the West heard in their 
Latinized terms, ―one substantia, three substantia,” which was Arian or tri-theist. When 
the west said, ―one substantia, three persona,” the East heard in Greek, ―one ousia, three 
prosopon, ― one substance and three masks, which is similar to the formula used by 
Sabellians to say there is no distinction of persons in the one God but just three different 
masks or outward presentations.  
It was the need for the distinction between the ousia and hypostasis and the 
equating of hypostaseis with prosopon that gave Basil cause to change his use of 
hypostasis, instead using prosopon even though he preferred hypostasis.
216
  Because of 
the translational difficulties, the subtle differences between ousia and hypostasis were 
missed by the west; the idea of the unified substance of one God in a trinity of relational 
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hypostaseis does not come through until after the Cappadocians have refined the use of 
persona and theologians like Augustine advance their work in the Latin west.
217
 
At the Councils of Nicea and Constantinople the terms for what is unity and what 
is trinity in the Godhead were finally codified in creeds. In the Nicene creed, God is 
referred to as ―one‖ and the Son is begotten ―from the substance of the Father‖ but also 
―consubstantial with the Father,‖ showing that the person of the Son is separate from the 
Father but they are of the same substance.
218
 Though persona or prosopon are not used, 
the designation of the Son as a separate entity is understood as the individual prosopon, 
hypostasis or, in Latin, persona. In the Council of Constantinople the same is applied to 
the Holy Spirit described as a separate, ―lordly and life-giving one, proceeding forth from 
the Father.‖ The proceeding forth indicates the same substance as the Father. It is only a 
hundred years after these first councils that the term persona understood as hypostasis 
becomes common in the decrees at Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451). 
This is the language inherited by St. Thomas and used by St. Thomas but not 
uncritically. As observed above, St. Thomas was aware of the translational issues that 
influenced the early Church Fathers. He does, though, hold Boethius‘ definition of 
―person‖ as standard and correct. The person is an ―individual substance of a rational 
nature.‖
219
 Working through the various linguistic nuances, he agrees with Boethius that 
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the term ―person‖ should be used for rational substances versus irrational substances 
which should just be referred to by the term ―substance.‖
220
 
Person as highest form of Being 
In St. Thomas, the person holds a distinct place in the hierarchy of beings.  
Mankind is at a unique meeting-point between the intellectual and spiritual realms, he 
calls the human person the lowest of the spirits but also the highest of the material 
order.
221
  The best phrase to describe the human person is ―embodied spirit.‖  Directly 
above the human person in the intellectual realm—the angelic realm—are those creatures 
without bodies, and above all of these is God as the infinite spirit.
222
  Personal being is 
the highest form of being because it is used to describe the Persons in God. This is a case 
where theology influences philosophy. The Christian use, in general, and Boethius, in 
particular, of the term person is of prime importance for St. Thomas. It enters into his 
thought as a given that ―person‖ describes something more perfect than regular being. 
Because of what a person is, Clarke says that it: 
is nothing but being itself freed from the limits of material modes of existence that 
hold it down in the darkness of  un-self-conscious lack of self-presence, being 
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itself allowed now to take on the full dimensions of what it meant to be, that is, to 
be active presence in the world.
223
 
For St. Thomas ―‗person‘ signifies what is most perfect in all nature--that is, a subsistent 
individual of a rational nature‖
224
 and also:  
person denotes a certain nature with a certain mode of existence. Now the nature 
which person includes in its definition is of all natures the most exalted, to wit 
that nature which is intellectual in regard to its genus. Likewise the mode of 




For St. Thomas, the human person is first a spirit, an intellectual essence, that 
receives its esse from God in order to exist. Reflection upon the operations of the soul 
reveals the many activities that are purely spiritual, beyond the simply material body. St. 
Thomas will place the human soul among the separated substances but also among the 
weakest requiring material sense input.
226
 His analysis demonstrates that the soul 
possesses its own act of existence, which then informs the material body.
227
  The soul is 
the essence of the particular human person and that particular essence requires a material 
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body in order to ―rise to an indirect, analogous knowledge and direct love of the 
Transcendent Spiritual source of itself and its cosmos.‖
228
  As we will see, it is through 
the body that the human person communicates its being to others and seeks the creating 
God.  
To see how this applies to the discussion at hand, the elements of personhood can 
be broken down into two main aspects, those dealing with the self and those dealing with 
the other. Those dealing with the self concern the intellect and the will that brings about 
self awareness and self determination respectively. Those dealing with the will are self-
communication and receptivity. These are the elements that give the person its 
characteristic structure of in-itself and for-the-other. This is the structure that was created 
to allow grace to act.     
Self-Awareness in the Intellect  
Self-awareness is a focus, by the intellect, on the self synthesizing everything in 
its self-knowledge. The structure of being as in itself and towards others has the necessity 
of a substantial core self or self-identity.  This core is the ―ontological root‖ of the 
substance and, in the human person, is the seat of the ―I‖ that each human person speaks.  
Slowly over time one comes to know the self through its experiences; there develops a 
certain self-awareness that comes through self-knowledge.  Even Descartes finds that his 
radical doubt starts with an ―I‖ that does the thinking.
229
  To be able to say ―I‖ is the 
unique prerogative of personal being.  Human persons as personal beings are present to 
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themselves in a way that animals are not capable of.  The human, in its unique place 
among creation as embodied spirit, can rise above the material aspects and reflect upon 
the self as self and not as a mere reflection in a stream.  
As a negative consequence of human material nature, self-awareness takes time 
and effort to develop; higher orders of personal beings—angels and God—are present to 
themselves immediately and completely due to their immaterial existence.  From infancy 
through old age the human person needs to work to become ever more aware of itself; 
other beings are used in getting a clearer picture of the inner core.  The corporality of the 
human person limits the ability truly to know the self in its entirety principally due to our 
openness to the Infinite rooted in our ability to transcend the material.  Since the human 
person is by its nature an immaterial intellect, he is open to God who is infinite intellect 
and will.
230
  The ends of the human intellect are knowing God and knowing the self 
through a continuous process of discovering the self and extending ourselves towards the 
final experience of the Beatific vision where we will know ourselves completely.
231
   
Self-Determined -Will  
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The human person‘s will informed by the intellect is the avenue for action and, as 
a spiritual faculty, the will is oriented towards the Good.
232
  Lower material beings are 
locked into instinctive responses and cannot reach above their corporeality. The human 
person can strive for the good that is beyond the material and aim at the infinite Good 
that becomes available to him through the participation in the divine esse.  Moreover, the 
human person will not be satisfied until union with the Divine Good is achieved; as 
Augustine says, ―Our hearts are restless…until they rest in You.‖
233
    
[A] human being is by nature a finite embodied spirit, in search of the Infinite, in 
a social solidarity with his fellow human beings, on a historical journey through 
this material cosmos towards its trans-worldly goal.
234
 
The social aspects of the human person flow from the necessary communication innate in 
its nature.  As we communicate, we form a system of relationships and interactions—we 
form a community—that continues throughout history, though not bound by it.  Since we 
are material bodies, we use the created universe as our path to reach the ultimate goal that 
is beyond this world—God.   
Through the freedom of the will, the person achieves a radical self-mastery or 
self-determination as he can say, ―I did this.‖ All moral action is a way of coming to 
understand and possess the self as the person has the ability to govern himself.The human 
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person can self-direct to act as God acts by listening to the divine law placed in the 
heart—the natural law.  This is not to say that one should act in a purely legalistic manner 
following laws without reflection.  By using the intellect, the human person can govern 
life towards harmony with the rest of the created universe in an imitation of God seeking 
the good of the whole, in general, and a personal perfection, in particular.  A well formed 
intellect will see the good actions as good, in themselves, and not as rules demanding a 
particular action. 
Integral in this self-determination is the notion of responsibility; the human 
person is the sole responsible agent of action regardless of whatever influence on the 
intellect; a person‘s action is one‘s own. According to St. Thomas: 
For every person is bound to examine his actions according to the knowledge 
which he himself has from God, whether natural or acquired, or infused from 
above; for every man is obliged to act according to reason [i.e., in context 
according to his or her own personal participation in reason].
235
 
Self-determining action is the manner in whichthe human person comes to develop the 
self; it develops ―who we are‖ from the actions of ―what we are.‖  We develop the self 
through an action-reflection-action pattern in which we judge ourselves and change 
towards a good; the intellect will, ideally, find the true good towards which to aim.  
Self-Awareness as the in-itself aspect of the person is fulfilled through both 
knowledge and will in their proper functioning  in accordance with the law placed in 
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them by God.  Going beyond the Delphic command to ―know thyself,‖ to ―possess 
thyself‖ is foundational in the establishment of the person.  In an ever-maturing process 
this self-awareness will only reach its goal in the presence of God when we will be face-
to-face with the source of everything we are.   
Self-communication 
On the other side of the human substance there is a need to go out from the self to 
others; the in-itself must have its towards-others which comes about through 
communication. For the rational person, communication is more than simple programmed 
instinctual interactions. The person, as a rational creature, whose intellect reaches beyond 
itself, communicates through willful giving of some aspect of the self.  As opposed to 
irrational beings such as rocks or plants, more than simple electrons or spores are 
communicated as part of human nature; the good is communicated. 
As seen above, an aspect of being is its convertibility with the good. As such there 
is the notion of diffusiveness within all beings. There is a need to send out the good of 
itself out into the world.  
For natural things have a natural inclination not only toward their own proper 
good, to acquire it, if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to 
diffuse their own goodness among others as far as possible.
236
 
It is both for the good and as a result of the good that every substance communicates, 
especially the person. The person can determine the content (in many cases) and direction 
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of this communication. Like the irrational substances, the human person communicates 
through its accidents; our very material existence communicates our presence and certain 
things about us to others. Unlike the irrational substances the human person can 
communicate thoughts and desires as well as results of intellectual activity. We can tell 
someone that two plus two is four. 
From an experiential point of view, the human person possesses a grossly limited 
ability to communicate in the early years of life and communication skills take many 
years to learn.  The in-itself dominates in the early years and continues to make an effort 
to communicate through some kind of action and, as a result of that action, reflection, and 
then more action. Over time the repeated action-reflection-action system brings in 
information through action‘s corollary—receptivity.
237
  As the human person matures, the 
system creates a network of interactions building a community around him.  Each of the 
persons in this community are doing the same thing and create an ever-increasing social 
community around the human person, something St. Thomas found completely natural.
238
  
This ever-increasing interaction is the necessary way for the human person to 
grow and become ever more self-aware due to the temporal-material nature of existence.  
The angelic persons are all-knowing immediately and without error because of their 
immaterial existence; these spirits interact without any regard for, or limit from, time.
239
  
The human person requires another to mirror the self. Contemporary personalist thinkers 
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like Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre have developed this insight into 
human nature.  The development of relationships is easily seen in the growth of an infant 
through adulthood especially in the adolescent years where identity gets its first real taste 
of freedom.  At this stage, the intellect begins to grasp abstract concepts and begin a 
radical deepening of the person‘s most intimate relationship—himself and God.  The 
intellect, open to the Infinite, can begin its un-fulfillable attempt at fully grasping 
everything including Infinite Being or God. 
In St. Thomas‘ treatise on man, priority is given to the human person above the 
rest of creation due to its intellectual ability to go beyond itself.  The soul is directed 
towards the infinite, universal being.
240
  The human person must become aware of this 
through interactions with particular things. The more the human person interacts, the 
more understand of the place in the order of being is developed—the more one finds the 
self to be relational in nature.  These principles are true for all persons, but the angelic 
realm and the Infinite Being do not have the material existence that limits our ability to 
achieve our expansion towards the Infinite.     
In human interaction the question could be asked, what is it, truly, that we give 
when we communicate?  Recall St. Thomas‘ notion of the good as a property of being 
and that beings by their nature communicate the good to others; they do this out of the 
richness that they have within them.  Each creature has a different aspect of the Infinite 
Good that they participate in and it is that share that they can give. Setting aside the 
involuntary communications of the person such as things that would marks it presence: 
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Despite all the conflicting drives within our flawed human nature, it is still 
connatural for a human person to be a lover, to go out towards others we love, 
sharing what we have and wishing them the good they need for their own 
flourishing, for they too are good by participation in being similar to our own.
242
 
What human persons give is, in part, who they are, the things they know, wisdom, all 
mediated by the material that is part of human nature. 
The universe of beings becomes reoriented towards a communitarian existence, 
especially in its highest form, the person.  The sub-rational beings exist to serve the 
human person and the human person is meant to be in community as substance-in-
relation.  The created, material, universe, then, becomes gathered up by the human person 
and directed back to its source, Infinite Being, as part of a communio personarum.  From 
this we get an idea of the person as an individual substance of a rational nature that must, 
in order to come to full fruition, be in active communion with other persons and other 
substances. 
Receptivity  
As a corollary to the active self-communication, receptivity is also a fundamental 
aspect of a being.  If one is to communicate effectively one‘s message must be received 
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and if one wishes to learn anything about a being it must receive the communication sent 
by that being.
243
  Receptivity is a part of creation and is part of all things except for God 
because God has no potentiality. We will see that it is in potentiality that the created 
order involves receptivity in general and then we will investigate the receptive aspects of 
the person where we will see that receptivity does not necessarily imply a lack or 
potentiality. 
There are many places where the notion of receptivity occurs in St. Thomas‘ 
work. Most will refer to material things and their potentiality such as matter in general or 
designated matter specifically. Other times the concept of receptivity will involve the 
immaterial separated substances such as angels. An example of St. Thomas‘ use of the 
concept of receptivity can be seen in the following quote. 
The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually 
―pre-containing all things,‖ as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things 
participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. 
Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the 
acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations 
thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all 
acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the 
receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now 
the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive 
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potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by 




First we see that potentiality is receptive of act. This is an idea that pervades all of 
St. Thomas‘ work on the act/potency relationship and an idea in which most of his 
philosophy of creation is rooted. Potential things are able to receive an act. Receptivity is 
built into the very understanding of creation, even things that are not yet in existence. All 
potentialities are ―receptive potentialities.‖  Primary matter receives some differentiating 
aspect and then that is capable of receiving some specific form.
245
  Even the intellect is 
receptive because it is not active until acted upon.
246
  Anything in potency is receptive of 
some act otherwise there is no reason for it to exist in potency.  
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The Latin potentia is a passive concept of power or force. A power is something 
that is not always in act. This is why it also takes on the meaning of capacity, another 
passive, unfulfilled term. It is a term that connotes future possible use but at present is not 
being used or activated. A potential receives some kind of act in order to fulfill its 
capacity or its function. All creatures, save God, are in need of some kind of activating 
principle. 
passion is found in the soul and in every creature, because every creature has 
some potentiality in its composition, and by reason of this every subsistent 
creature is capable of receiving something.
247
 
If nothing else, every creature receives its existence from something else. 
Therefore in every being other than the first, there is present both a ―to be‖ itself 




 By the very fact of creation there is receptivity in all creatures. This translates to 
the creature itself after it is in act, after it receives its ―to be‖ whereby receptivity 
becomes part of its very nature. Is this the reason why persons need to interact? St. 
Thomas does not specifically say. Putting together the notions that the intellect needs 
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input in order to be active and the notion that the intellect informs the will places the need 
to communicate and receive communication at the heart of human existence.
249
  
Effective communication essentially entails sending and receiving messages.  
Thus every being that communicates should, in its nature, have some aspect of receptivity 
within itself.  One can look at the irrational beings and see this in primitive form: in 
chemical elements, electrons are given off and received, plants give off spores and 
receive them, etc.  As the focus narrows to the personal being, the giving and receiving 
aspects also change in their character.  
In the communication of love, there is an inherent element of mutuality in the 
process.  Clarke analyzes friendship with its mutual love and finds that ―one‘s love is 
accepted, joyfully welcomed by another, and returned in kind, and the same is true 
reciprocally for the other person with respect to me.‖
250
  The highest love, then, requires a 
receptive nature. 
In an Aristotelian analysis, receptivity is an imperfection, a passivity that lacks 
activity but the imperfection is in the temporal order of material things. If one were to 
remove time and matter from beings, receptivity will take on a completely active role in 
their love relationship.  One lover gives love, in its entirety, to the beloved, timelessly, 
and the beloved receives it, timelessly, in its entirety, and the beloved returns the same.  
Timelessly means eternally, an ―always‖ aspect in the relationship revealing that the 
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beloved always both receives the love of the lover and fully possesses it.  Receptivity is a 
perfection in the love relationship when stripped of its limitations.  
This aspect of the person did not come from St. Thomas but from the Christian 
tradition especially as it is developed by the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar 
who brought out the aspects of receptivity in the love between the Trinitarian Persons.  
Tradition holds that the Godhead is a Trinity of Persons—St. Thomas calls these Persons 
constituted by relations that are subsistent—that are in an eternal love relationship,
251
 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
252
  The Father begets the Son and their love begets the Holy 
Spirit.  The Son and the Spirit are essentially first receptive and thankful to the Father.
253
  
Their receptivity is not seen as a reduction in the esteem of the Son or the Spirit but an 
equally worthy personhood.  Each has its self-communicating personhood coeternal with 
its receptivity. 
We see here a unique ―Christian philosophy‖ in the true sense of that phrase; this 
philosophy is using the truths of revelation to further its rational natural project.  The 
Trinitarian Persons and ―God is Love‖ from 1 John, points natural reason past a point 
where otherwise it would have stopped.  Using basic revealed truths as philosophical first 
principles points the philosopher towards a solution to an otherwise unanswerable 
problem.  The human mind can only travel so far in this philosophical journey without 
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help from a higher source.
254
  In a Christian philosophy faith and reason must work 
together to reach its goals. 
Coming full circle we can see the root of our being inside this Triune God of 
interpersonal relationships as the source of our existential meaning of being especially in 
personal beings.   
The reason why all being, and all persons preeminently, are such is precisely 
because that is the way the Supreme Being, the Source of all being, actually is, 
and, since all creatures—and in a special way persons—are participations and 
hence images of their divine Source, then it follows that all created beings, and 
more intensely persons, will mirror in some characteristic way the divine mode of 
being.
255
   
Through participation in divine Being (esse), the human person shares in Divine 
inclinations and Divine structure;
256
 human persons, too, are involved in the eternal 
process of communication and receptivity, the communion of persons.  This grounds the 
reasons for the person‘s drive towards self-expression and self-awareness, moving the 
human person to communicate, through the body, to others.  The paradigm for perfect 
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communication is love, a full self-giving of the goods of the self for the good of the 
other.
257
   
On the human level, the fullness of love must be given over to other human 
persons through the body and in the most intimate fashion.  This is necessary due to the 
fact that humans come to know themselves through interactions with others and if there is 
no interaction, something of the self is lost or at best does not develop fully.  Time limits 
the interactions and therefore some intimacies take long periods to develop and sustain, 
but the rewards outweigh the efforts as each in the relationship learn better to 
communicate its good to the other and learns how to receive the good of the other.  
Self-transcending  
Considering the relational structure of substance, especially as person, the person 
looks to develop both aspects of that relationality both horizontally and vertically.  The 
relationships between human persons are, ontologically, on the same horizon and are key 
to the full flourishing of the human being.  Horizontal relationality finds its pinnacle in 
the love relationship between the human persons.  In that relationship, the one must go 
out of himself to the other in concern and in sending the goods he has to offer; to go 
outside of oneself is how one fulfills itself. 
What has been said of being is a prologue to developing an understanding of self-
transcendence.  The study of being and the human person has brought to the fore key 
concepts that lead into self-transcendence: common human nature rooted in the share of 
esse and being made in the image of God.  All human persons share in the same human 
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nature, the same essence of humanity, and this binds all of humanity together.  Human 
beings also have their existence in God as they share in Divine esse; the unity is in and 
through the Supreme Being as participants in the same gift. Finally, from revelation, we 
share in being made in the image and likeness of the Triune God; this same God-man 
relationship grounds an even deeper vertical relationship. 
Being made in the image of God grounds the upward drive of the person towards 
God; our intellect and will are ordered to the Infinite since God is the Infinite Being and 
Source of all.  This goes beyond mere contemplation of God to a true movement towards 
Him in what would seem to be a move away from the self and towards God.  Persons are 
drawn out of their self-centeredness towards a God-centeredness, changing the 
perspective to that of God. The person takes on the new task of letting go of the self to 
enable God be at the center and guide the will and intellect all from within the core self.  
―I live, now not I, but Christ lives in me‖ (Gal. 2:20). The will as well as the intellect is to 
be ordered to God in this new re-centered existence. 
Looking again to the Trinitarian life, the dynamic overflowing of love for each 
Person from the Other is paradigmatic for the give-and-take of the human existence.  As 
the eternal processions within the Triune God are eternal due to their unlimitedness, the 
human existence is limited by matter, making the give and take extend over time and 
waxing and waning with each person.  Human imitation of the Unlimited God proceeds 
forth from poverty and richness.  In richness, we offer to others what goods we have, not 
just material possessions but the riches of the self, and in poverty we take from others and 
their richness.  No two persons have the same poverty and richness making for infinite 
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combinations and infinite possible ways the human person can fulfill themselves and 
others. 
The core self, center of the intellect and will, is aimed at God, pushing the de-
centering of the human person along its way. The intellect is ordered towards the whole 
of being in its ability to step outside of its material confines and try to grasp totality.  It is 
driven, through the grasping at totality, to know God and eventually to see Him as He 
sees.  The will is driven towards the good, seeing God as the good in being and driven 
more towards communion with God as the end of mankind. Once in communion with 
God the human person desires to love as God loves.  Transcending the self is the final 
step in reaching the end of the human person, communion with God.  From this 
communion comes an increased understanding of our radical dependency on God as the 
source of all being.
258
   
The Human Person That Will Receive Grace 
Beginning with substantial being, the Aristotelian/Platonic mosaic found in St. 
Thomas and expands into an even richer notion of person as the highest being.  To a 
simple explanation of essence and esse patterned after the Aristotelian concept of act and 
potency Thomas adds the Platonic idea of participation and the self-diffusiveness of the 
good to develop a notion of the human person. Substantial being in all its fullness 
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becomes, as Clarke would say, ―substance-in-relation;‖ which means, ultimately, that to 
be a person is to be in communion. Where Boethius understands person as an ―individual 
substance of a rational nature,‖ St. Thomas goes beyond him and says the person is 
―subsistens distinctum in natura rationali (a distinct subsistent in a rational nature).‖
259
   
Since the person is not something added into being from the outside, but is the 
highest perfection and most intense expression of existential being itself, the 
person takes on more intensively the whole dynamism of existence as expansive, 




Putting all this together we see the picture of the human person that arises from 
St. Thomas‘ theology and philosophy. The human person as an individual substance of 
human nature has several characteristics that, as we will see, opens up a new 
understanding of St. Thomas‘ structure of grace. Recall that grace builds upon nature and 
so the structure of nature form the foundation for the structure of grace. The human 
person is structured to be a rational substance, a substantial being that has within itself 
two poles: the in-itself and the towards-others.  As we have seen the substantial being has 
a core in-itself part that is the center of self-awareness and the place from which 
communication happens.  The person, as substantial being is also good and as such 
wishes to diffuse itself and its goods outside of itself.  
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The greatest difference between the person and other substances is its rational 
nature, a nature that can reflect on itself and seek the good through various ways beyond 
those of instinct. Fundamentally this plays on the desire towards outward action 
culminating in the ultimate outward action that is love.
261
 Grace, as the love of God, 
enters into the human person from the very beginning and settles into the very nature of 
the person. If unopposed, this grace will transform the person and bring to perfection all 
of the actions natural to it. 
The accidents that form the outward other-oriented aspect of the ―purely natural‖ 
human person are, as created, the means by which the interaction between the human 
person and the rest of creation happens. There is also the self, the core of the human 
person that forms the seat of its essence. This part receives grace as well as the for-the-
other aspect. In the next chapter we will see that grace maps well onto this structure of 
nature, especially for the human person. There is an aspect of grace that elevates the in-
itself pole of human nature and an aspect of grace that elevates the for-the-other pole of 
human nature. With this understanding of grace we will see a source of ethical action that 
lies within the human person that is pre-conceptual, pre-intentional and at the origin of 
the human person. 
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CHAPTER THREE: GRACE IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS‘ PERSPECTIVE 
Having established the human person as substantial and relational in the previous 
chapter this chapter will try to find a similar structure to St. Thomas‘ theology of grace. 
To do this four things will be addressed: first, how St. Thomas defines grace, second, the 
foundational universality of grace for all created rational beings, third, an example of the 
division as emphasizing the other-orientedness in the division of grace into grace for the 
individual and grace for the other in the Summa Theologicae and support from various 
other texts of St. Thomas and, finally, the synthesis of this theology of grace with his 
theology of nature.  The final synthesis will bring together the results of chapter two and 
three in order to find a new view of grace in St. Thomas Aquinas that will be able to 
dialogue with the post-modern concept of otherness in the final chapter. 
1. What is Grace in St. Thomas‟ Theology? 
St. Thomas has examined grace in a few places with great focus but the ideas of 
grace permeate almost all of his work.  For our purposes here the Commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard (CSent), the Disputed Questions on Truth (DV), from his 
early works, the Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) from the middle years of his work and as 
well as the Summa Theologicae (ST), Quodlibetal Questions
262
(QQ) and his commentary 
on Paul‘s letter to the Romans (CRom) and others from his later works will form the basis 
for analysis. There will be much overlap but there will also be development as his 
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thought matures over time. Each new development will contribute to the overall 
understanding of how St. Thomas understands grace and its relationship with nature.   
Grace in Commentary on the Sentences and Disputed Questions on Truth 
The earliest work of St. Thomas that treats grace directly is found in CSent.
263
  
The ideas are not significantly different from those found in DV
264
 but there are variations 
in themes that come to the fore in each treatise or summa. Each slight variation is used to 
bring out various elements of grace that are developed over time. In these early treatises 
we find that the disputed questions are a freer discussion of the topic and the early 
development of St. Thomas‘ theology of grace will focus on the DV due to its more 
comprehensive nature.
265
  That being said we must first find the elements that appear in 
CSent in order to begin the analysis.   
The themes that present themselves on grace in CSent and, in more depth, in DV 
support and develop the notion that grace is love, the Divine Love of God. In the CSent 
we find that the first focused discussion of grace gets to the origin of grace itself – the 
love of God which can be taken to mean the ―friendly reception in love,‖ or, understood 
another way, it is a gift freely given out of that love.
266
  The initial emphasis on love 
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which is given great import in this part of the commentary may be due to the fact that 
Peter Lombard himself brings it up early in the distinction.
267
 As a commentary, St. 
Thomas is not as free to express the depth of his understanding of love and grace as he is 
in his treatment of grace in DV. 
Throughout Peter Lombard‘s Sentences, especially Distinction 26, we find that 
Lombard struggles to keep prominent the fact that grace is given out of love and that love 
is integral in the workings of grace. Grace and love are connected intimately from the 
idea that grace allows the angels to love God perfectly
268
 to the idea that love is the Holy 
Spirit which is the Charity that makes the human person love God perfectly.
269
 This 
particular aspect of love in Lombard‘s work may be the source for St. Thomas‘ remark 
that grace can be called the Holy Spirit.
270
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expressed in St. Thomas‘ work describing grace or love and could be an unusual act of 
deference to Lombard, who is a revered authority throughout St. Thomas‘ career. St. 
Thomas will go on to correct Lombard on the mission of the Holy Spirit and the 
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definition of charity, fully engaging Lombard and correcting him without any 
reservations in the Summa Theologicae and later treatises. 
 Even as a young commentator on the Sentences, St. Thomas had his own ideas 
about love and grace. Love is the source of grace and the source of whatever flows from 
grace, i.e. gifts. In the CSent, love is the first notion mentioned and from it all other 
definitions flow. Love plays a foundational part in describing grace in these two early 
treatises but in DV we see that love is mentioned in more depth and with more freedom 
than in CSent. As seen above, in the CSent, love is the origin and is the reason for the gift 
being given, but in DV the gifts given are directly linked to love especially later in 
question 27 but there is always an understanding that grace is primarily the love of God.  
In DV, grace is like the love, or ―favorable reception‖
271
 that a benevolent king 
has for his subjects and it is a love that brings gifts.  He says that these are the definitions 
that are important in ―divine matters.‖
272
  Grace, for St. Thomas, then, is Divine love
273
 
that bestows gifts on creation. Only later in the Summa Theologicae will he add other 
layers to his definition of grace including the subject‘s response to that love.
274
 
Delving into the philosophic underpinnings of grace we see that in the CSent the 
technical definitions of grace emerge starting with the question of whether it is created in 
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the soul. This question opens the door to further development of the idea of grace and its 
place in the human person. At this point in the CSent, various points have been made 
about the soul and the human person in general and this discussion builds off of that base. 
Grace is created in the soul as opposed to being part of the essence of the soul; it is in the 
soul as an accident and is not a power of the soul. Instead grace is one thing that comes to 
the soul from without and affects every part of the soul and thus every part of the human 
person.  
Grace must be created in the soul and not part of its essence due to the nature of 
an essence which is its definition as we have discussed above in chapter two. This 
essence marks the limits and ends of the substance the essence is a part of. The end of the 
purely human person is a purely human end, that is, an end that is natural as opposed to 
supernatural. St. Thomas makes the distinction between the purely natural human, one 
without the aid of sanctifying or charismatic grace, and graced humanity, one that is 
affected by sanctifying and charismatic grace.
275
 The purely natural end of the human 
person is not union with God per se but is open to the possibility of union with God.
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This union with God is explained as the ultimate end of the human person in earlier 
chapters of both the CSent and DV and is taken as a given by the time these sections are 
written.  It is not until grace enfolds the human person that this possibility of union with 
God is realized. Since it is not part of the soul it must be created in the soul. His 
reasoning begins and ends with the idea that there is a change in the person with grace 




Since this change came from without it is classified as an accident, not part of the 
essence but is a cause in that it changes the person, giving him the ability to be in union 
with God. The question St. Thomas addresses is whether grace is the efficient cause or 
the formal cause of that change. If it were an efficient cause then there would have to be 
something else that stood in between God and the human person and affected the change 
making grace a mediating cause and adding a step between God and man; this, St. 
Thomas says, is ―alien to the faith.‖
278
 The cause, then, must be a formal cause because it 
changes the very soul as giving it a new form.  It is within this article that St. Thomas 
says that grace is the form of the soul. The effect is immediate on the soul and changes it 
so that it can now achieve union with God and receive the various gifts of God as a result 
of that love. On these two points we find further support in DV as the questions also get 
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deeper elaboration. Question 27 of DV combines some of the articles in CSent especially 
around Distinctions 26-29.  
Regarding grace as created in the soul, DV seems to flip the order of explanation 
from what was seen in CSent. Here St. Thomas starts with the more technical aspects of 
grace all the while keeping the element of love in the background. In this first article in 
Question 27, St. Thomas asks whether grace is something created in the soul where he 
will immediately make the distinction between grace given freely
279
 or charismatic 
graces, and grace that makes one pleasing
280
 or sanctifying grace
 
in order to answer the 
particular question with more precision.  He does this to situate various ways in which 
grace is received in the human person.  He also takes for granted that charismatic or 
gratuitous graces are obviously something created in the soul due to their periodic and 
unique nature. The reason for this will be discussed below in greater detail. The idea that 
sanctifying grace, the grace that makes the human person pleasing to God, is created in 
the soul is his main concern. 
Following upon the CSent explanation, St. Thomas will give more detail as to 
how grace is a new creation in the soul and is not and cannot be part of the soul in its 
essence. Sanctifying grace makes one acceptable to God and this is a state no one can 
achieve on their own. Through a series of scriptural passages St. Thomas supports the 
notion that the grace of God bestows on the human person a new supernatural life.
281
 This 
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new life is explained as a gift given out of love that starts from God.  ―[B]y the very fact 
that by His will God destines someone for eternal life, He supplies him with something 
by which he is worthy of eternal life.‖
282
 The love of God starts the process and supplies 
the individual human person with gifts that make them worthy, in themselves, to be in 
union with God. This love is grace which is ―not only…being loved by God with a view 
to eternal life but also…being given some gift by which he is worthy of eternal life.‖
283
 
The created-ness of grace with respect to the soul comes from the nature of the human 
person‘s essential inability to reach union with God, a condition changed by grace. 
From this we see that St. Thomas builds on the foundation he touched on in CSent 
and when not constrained to Lombard‘s framing of the question, he develops his own 
ideas on grace and its essential definition. As he did in CSent, the other main question 
regarding grace is its relationship to the essence of the human person. Grace has the 
essence of the soul as its subject. This is to say, that the soul is informed by grace and 
grace gives a new life to the soul – a spiritual life.
284
 These two early works treat grace 
essentially the same but emphasize different aspects: DV focuses on the distinctions 
between the various types of grace in their technical definitions, CSent with its focus on 
the origin in love. These aspects will be reorganized when St. Thomas engages those that 
are not of the Christian faith in his next large theological summary, the Summa Contra 
Gentiles. 
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 DV Q27, a6, ad2. ―grace, which is the principle of spiritual existence, 
presupposes the essence of the soul.‖ 
112 
 
Summa Contra Gentiles 
The SCG presents grace, in its first detailed presentation of the topic, as Divine 
help. The structure of this first summa, which presents St. Thomas‘ Christian faith to 
those not familiar with the tenets of the faith, is to start from experience and reason; it is 
more of a philosophical approach to the notion of grace. He begins to approach grace by 
showing the need for divine help and then explaining what that help is. In chapter 147 of 
Book 3 St. Thomas presents the need for help.  
But, beyond this, man‘s ultimate end is fixed in a certain knowledge of truth 
which surpasses his natural capacity: that is, he may see the very First Truth in 
Itself, as we showed above. …So, if man is ordered to an end which exceeds his 
natural capacity, some help must be divinely provided for him, in a supernatural 
way, by which he may tend toward his end. 
and, 
Furthermore, there are many impediments presented to man in the attaining of his 
end. For he is hindered by the weakness of his reason, which is easily drawn into 
error by which he is cut off from the right way of reaching his end. He is also 
hindered by the passions of his sensory nature, and by the feelings whereby he is 
attracted to sensible and lower things; and the more he attaches himself to these, 
the farther he is removed from his ultimate end, for these things are below man, 
whereas man‘s end is above him. He is further hindered by frequent bodily illness 
from the carrying out of his virtuous activities whereby he may tend toward 
113 
 
happiness. Therefore, man needs divine help, but he may fall completely short of 
the ultimate end as a result of these obstacles. 
Earlier in the book, he presents the need for every creature to attain its perfection 
and calls that perfection, following Aristotle, happiness.
285
 We see from above that the 
human person is in need of divine help to achieve his ultimate happiness. We can see in 
this argument the same elements that were put forward in the questions of whether grace 
is created in the soul but he presents them in the order of outward appearance. He has 
shown that the human person desires this happiness but also that the human person needs 
help to achieve his ultimate end and this help can only come from some entity that is 
greater than the human persons themselves. 
The creative love of God may be seen to be irresistible but that would go against 
the nature of the humanity that God created. Grace is not coercive in its work. It is 
necessary that the needed help must not be forced on the human person due to the 
demands of free will.
286
 This is the tie between grace and virtues, an important element 
touched upon in the earlier works but only later more fully developed in the SCG and an 
entirely separate treatise on virtues.
287
 St. Thomas will appeal to scripture to support the 
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ideas of free will in the human person but will, in the end, make a philosophical argument 
for the requirements of free will in attaining happiness. 
Moreover, man reaches his ultimate end by acts of the virtues, for felicity 
[happiness] is assigned as a reward for virtue. Now, forced acts are not acts of the 
virtues, since the main thing in virtue is choice, which cannot be present without 
voluntariness to which violence is opposed. Therefore, man is not divinely 
compelled to act rightly.
288
 
As Divine help, it will not force action from a human person and neither will it diminish 
good action; it is an assist to the will. This help is what the human person needs to 
achieve happiness and it is not a usurpation of human power but merely an assistance to a 
will that otherwise would be unable to obtain its end.  
After he establishes the need for Divine help he calls this help grace and begins to 
describe it in terms of love. Grace is the free gift of help given to the human person out of 
Divine love. It is some perfection of the human person that is given so that God can be 
loved above all things. 
God‘s love is causative of the good which is in us, just as a man‘s love is called 
forth and caused by some good thing which is in the object of his love. But man is 
aroused to love someone in a special way because of some special good which 
pre-exists in the person loved. Therefore, wherever there is found a special love of 
God for man, there must consequently be found some special good conferred on 
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man by God. Hence, since in accord with the preceding explanation sanctifying 
grace marks a special love of God for man, it must be that a special goodness and 
perfection is marked, as being present in man, by this term.
289
 
God‘s love is a creative love and it creates the good in the human person that will then 
turn around and seek out its own good which is God. This is how Divine love differs 
from human love; Divine love causes the good in the other whereas human love seeks the 
good that is already in the other. 
He approaches the name grace through various different means. It is called Grace 
due to the fact that it is given freely or ‗gratis‘ and what is given is divine love, a creative 
love that changes the human person in his relationship to God.     
In fact, a person is said to be in the ―good graces‖ of another because he is well 
liked by the other. Consequently, he who is loved by another is said to enjoy his 
grace. Now, it is of the essence of love that the lover wishes good and does what 
is good for the object of his love.
290
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This Divine help is needed for the human person to attain happiness both in this life and 
the next due to human nature being oriented towards a supernatural end.
291
  This 
supernatural end is the perfection of the human person and to help anything towards its 
perfection is to wish and work for its good, St. Thomas‘ definition of love. 
But a special mark of divine love is observable in the case of those to whom He 
offers help so that they may attain a good which surpasses the order of their 
nature, namely, the perfect enjoyment, not of some created good, but of Himself. 
So, this help is appropriately called grace, not only because it is given gratis, as 
we showed, but also because by this help man is, through a special prerogative, 
brought into the good graces of God.
292
  
God‘s assistance orients the human person towards the vision of God, the ultimate end.  
Grace is the assistance that makes the person able to enjoy the presence of God through 
the fact that one is made enjoyable to God.  
Now, this grace, within the man who is graced by it, must be something, a sort of 
form and perfection for that man. For, a thing that is directed toward an end must 
have a continual relation to it, because the mover continually moves the moved 
object, until the object comes to its end as a result of the motion. Therefore, since 
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man is directed to the ultimate end by the help of divine grace, as we showed, 
man must continually enjoy this help until he reaches his end.
293
  
St. Thomas uses form language to speak of the essential change in the nature of 
the one in the state of grace. This change of form is explained as a change in the ultimate 
end of the desires and passions of the human person.  Divine love orients all of these 
passions towards their true ultimate end, a shared end with the Lover – God, the ultimate 
good.  This sharing of an end is a mark of friendship.  Grace, then, is that which gives the 
human person friendship with God with all the requisite shared ends and desires and 
interests that accompany this friendship. 
Again, there must be some union of things for which there is one end, as a result 
of their being ordered to this end. … Now, the ultimate end, to which man is 
brought with the help of divine grace, is the vision of God in His essence, which 
is proper to God Himself. Thus, this final good is shared with man by God. So, 
man cannot be brought to this end unless he be united with God by the 
conformation of his will. And this is the proper effect of love, for ―it is proper to 
friends to approve and disapprove the same things, and to be delighted in and to 
be pained by the same things.‖ Hence, by sanctifying grace man is established as 
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From the SCG we get a broader and deeper definition of Grace. Grace is the 
Divine help given by God to the human person in order that one will be able to reach a 
friendship and union with God. This help changes the person and gives them the ability to 
act rightly through their virtuous acts. All these elements have come together not only 
from other section of SCG but from previous treatises such as the DV and CSent. We will 
see that the ST will pull from all of these works and come to a more complete discussion 
of how we can understand grace. 
Summa Theologicae I-II, Q110 
In the ST the so-called treatise on grace
295
 provides a concise assessment of what 
grace is and what it does.  Question 110 of the first part of the second part of the ST, in 
particular, deals with the essence of grace giving three various ways of understanding 
what the term ―grace‖ means.  This question establishes that grace is a quality of the soul, 
as opposed to an infused habit, that is in the essence of the soul.  This description fits into 
the understanding of the nature of the human person operative in St. Thomas‘ work 
discussed above.  St. Thomas begins with the examination of the various possible 
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meanings of the word ―grace‖ in the first article.  He states, ―Grace is taken in three 
ways‖
296
 that are not mutually exclusive but are inter-related.  
According to the common manner of speech, grace is usually taken in three ways. 
First, for anyone's love, as we are accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good 
graces of the king, i.e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for 
any gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act of grace. 
Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given "gratis," inasmuch as we are 
said to be "grateful" for benefits. Of these three the second depends on the first, 
since one bestows something on another "gratis" from the love wherewith he 
receives him into his good "graces." And from the second proceeds the third, 
since from benefits bestowed "gratis" arises "gratitude."
297
 
 The first definition mentioned is love or favor.  St. Thomas notes that this love is 
the kind that someone greater bestows on a lesser such as a king that loves his subjects.  
From this love gifts flow to the subjects from the king. The third definition is gratitude on 
the part of the subject for these gifts.   
What kind of love is this?
298
  As the article continues, St. Thomas explains, again, 
the differences between human love and Divine love.  Human love is rooted in the good 
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that is already in the creature whereas Divine love gives that good to the creature from its 
creation.
299
  Divine love begins with God and makes the creature lovable in human eyes.  
Human love does not cause the good in the other human but presupposes the good given 
by God. 
It is to this good that the gifts are ordered.  The gifts from God transmit the good 
to the creature and through the creature the good is sent out to all other creatures.  From 
this definition we can see the gift-grace connection; grace bestows something upon the 
human person and that person, in turn, gives it to others as an extension of God‘s love.  
Both the ST
300
 as in DV
301
 begin their analysis of grace by saying that grace is in the soul 
of the person, residing in them as a stranger in a strange land.
302
  In the ST we see that the 
objections raised against grace being created in the soul are taken primarily from 
scripture and go to the idea that grace is a change in God. God now looks upon the 
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human person and sees that he is lovable and therefore loves him.
303
  The objections in 
DV and in the CSent are similar but there are more nuances in them as they draw from 
authorities other than scripture namely Augustine and Anselm.  Most of them pointing 
out that nothing is created anew in the soul from the moment of creation and therefore 
grace must be something that is outside the soul and accidental to the body in the way 
one is accidentally hot or cold.  
Grace is considered as either a motion or a quality of the soul in the second 
article. The distinction brings out two different aspects of grace as Divine love.  This love 
will both make the person pleasing to his ultimate end and also incline him towards 
achieving that end.  As motion, grace moves the person to know and do certain things 
that point the person towards the good.   
Now it was stated above, man is aided by God's gratuitous will in two ways: first, 
inasmuch as man's soul is moved by God to know or will or do something, and in 
this way the gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul; 
for "motion is the act of the mover in the moved." III Physics
304
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This points to the second definition of grace in the previous article. The gifts bestowed as 
a result of the Divine love are motions given to man.  These motions, as we will see 
below, include the charismatic gifts such as, for example, prophecy and miracles.  This 
motion, to know, to will, and to do, grants each individual a share in the work of leading 
not only themselves but also others to their ultimate end – God.  
As a quality, grace is the first definition of Divine Love.   
[M]an is helped by God's gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by 
God into the soul; and for this reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide 
less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernatural good, than for 
creatures, whom He loves that they may acquire natural good.
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This is the creative love that creates the good in man.  As a persistent quality in the soul, 
grace makes the person pleasing to God and to others leaving something in the soul that 
enables it to be inclined to the Ultimate Good.  This inclination is described as infused 
but it is not to be confused with an infused virtue. 
 As was seen in SCG but with more refinement, distinguishing grace from an 
infused virtue is the concern of the third article.  Indispensable to his argument is the 
definition of a virtue.  A virtue deals with a specific order: the acquired virtues to the 
order of nature and the infused to the order of the supernatural. It is also true that a virtue 
disposes one or inclines one towards a particular way of acting but it is only in accord 
with the particular nature. 





Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, 




St. Thomas sees the affinity that grace has to the idea of a virtue but finds that grace is 
something presupposed.  It is presupposed to the infused virtues as the ―natural light of 
reason‖ is presupposed in the acquired human virtues.  Virtues orient the person towards 
an end that is the perfection of their nature.  Without an orientation towards a 
supernatural end created by the new life created through sanctifying grace, there is no 
possibility of attaining it.  
 From what has been said we see that grace is the love of God that is given to all 
creation through which certain gifts flow.  The Divine love not only gives life and 
sustenance to all of creation, it elevates the human person to a participation in the Divine 
life.  This participation is marked by the bestowal of certain gifts that enable others to 
come to a participation in the Divine life as well. These gifts include the infused virtues 
of faith, hope, and charity and also orient all the other acquired virtues to their 
supernatural end. As each person shares in God‘s love, they also share in the drive to 
diffuse that love to others.
307
 
2. The Foundational Universality of Grace for All Created Rational Beings: Man‟s 
Capacity for Grace Includes all Mankind. 
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With the definition of grace put in greater relief, its pervasiveness can be 
discussed. To this end three questions will draw out what receives grace and to what 
extent grace is received.  The first question is does all creation receive grace? Next, to 
what degree does each element of creation receive grace, i.e. does some facet of creation 
receive more than others? Lastly, does every human person receive grace? Once these 
three questions are addressed we can advance to the next section regarding how the 
divisions of grace build upon this.  
Does all creation receive Grace? 
St. Thomas addresses the question of who and what receives grace directly in the 
ST: 
God loves all things that exist. For all things that exist are good, in so far as they 
are. The very existence of anything whatsoever is a good, and so is any perfection 
of it. Now we proved above that God is the cause of all things. A thing must 
therefore be, and be good, to the extent which God wills.
308
 
The very act of creation is an act of love, of grace.
309
 Everything that is created is loved 
by God.  As he references previous questions about God being the cause, St. Thomas 
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gives the reason for Him causing creation – love.  This love makes creation good; ―and 
God saw that it was very good‖ (Gen. 1.31). This would appear to mean that God loved 
all creation appropriately and, in one sense, this is true.  The divine will is a simple will 
and does not suffer greater or lesser in its love. ―[God] loves all things by an act of the 
will that is one, simple, and always the same.‖
310
 God loves His creation and also sustains 
it. 
 God continues to keep all of creation in existence not out of necessity but out of 
love for creation, a love that is neither necessary nor commanded. Drawing from 
Aristotle‘s de Anima, St. Thomas will begin with the ideas of motion to start his 
demonstration. 
But it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the 
heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal 
and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence no 
matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot 
proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; 
311
 
St. Thomas approaches motion through Aristotle and thereby continues Aristotle‘s 
project with regards to motion and its principles. All motion is either mediately or 
immediately the result of the motion from a first mover, an Unmoved Mover, the first in 
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the causal chain of events. For Aristotle this is a self thinking thought.
312
  For St. Thomas, 
the first in the causal chain is God, a personal God that takes a continual interest in the 
workings of His creation. 
but this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by necessity of 
nature, as the motion of the heavenly body. Now not only is every motion from 




God‘s plan of providence is evident in creation since all created things come from God 
and participate in God and depend on Him for existence.
314
 
And thus the act of the intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon 
God in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it 
acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act.
315
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Consequently creation is really nothing but a relation of the creature to the Creator 
together with a beginning of existence. 
God does not create things by one action and preserve them by another. The 
existence of permanent things is not divisible except accidentally in so far as it is 
subject to some kind of movement: and in itself is in an instant. Hence God‘s 
action which is the direct cause of a thing‘s existence is not distinct as the 
principle of its being and as the principle of its continuance in being.
316
 
 As St. Thomas understood it, there is no doubt that God created and sustained 
creation through a continuing act of grace. To this point St. Thomas is showing that all of 
creation receives some kind of grace, at minimum, the grace of existence. The next 
question is to what extent this grace continues or increases in creation. 
To what degree does each element of creation receive grace? 
 From what has been said it would appear that God loved all creation equally and, 
in one sense, this is true but in another sense it is not. The fact that God can love things 
more or less depends on the understanding of God‘s love. When considering the source 
of love, God, the love given is equal since God‘s love is simple and one. Considered from 
the side of the things loved, it differs. As we spoke of earlier, love is a creative and 
diffusive love. What determines the various degrees of love from God is the creatures 
rank in the hierarchy of beings; it is in the thing‘s goodness.   
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Again, as was seen in chapter two and above, God‘s love is creative and a simple 
observation will show that there are diverse things in the universe and with each 
difference there is a greater or lesser degree of goodness in things. As the ST says, ―God 
loves better things more.‖
317
 Better is a reference to a hierarchy of natures and St. 
Thomas will pull from the book of Revelation to see that there are different relationships 
between created things: 
For according to Rev. 21:17 the measure of a man and the measure of an angel are 
the same, although some angels may be better in respect of it than some men, and 
some men better than some angels. Yet the natural condition of an angel is better 
than that of a man. Hence it was not because he loved man more that God 
assumed the nature of a man, but because man needed him more.
318
  
Human nature is in the hierarchy of beings as below that of the angels but after human 
nature was taken up by the second person of the Trinity, the nature became greater than 
that of the angels.
319
 God wills for a creature a certain good and that willing makes it so. 
―[N]othing prevents us from saying that God loves one thing more than another, 
according as He wills it a greater good.‖
320
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God‘s love is one that creates the good in the beloved and through that we see the 
degrees of love found in the hierarchy of created things. An early attempt at defining love 
in general is found in the CSent and provides a good framework for looking at Divine 
action in love. He takes his starting point from Dionysius in chapter four of The Divine 
Names, love is: 
a unitive and concretive power, moving superiors to exercise providence for those 
having less… further moving coordinated things… to a communicative 




When it pertains to God, we see that love moves the subject to turn towards better things 
which, in the case of God and creation, is God. Love turns the person towards God not 
through coercion but through desire of its ultimate end. God is the first and the last for all 
creation. It is the place from which they came and the place towards which they tend. 
 Through creation, God has determined those creatures that are more deserving of 
being gifted with greater good. This is so due to the proper governance of things by God. 
[P]erfect goodness would not be found in created things unless there were an 
order of goodness in them, in the sense that some of them are better than others. 
Otherwise, all possible grades of goodness would not be realized, nor would any 
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creature be like God by virtue of holding a higher place than another. The highest 
beauty would be taken away from things, too, if the order of distinct and unequal 
things were removed. And what is more, multiplicity would be taken away from 
things if inequality of goodness were removed, since through the differences by 
which things are distinguished from each other one thing stands out as better than 
another; for instance, the animate in relation to the inanimate, and the rational in 
regard to the irrational. And so, if complete equality were present in things, there 




We see the hierarchy from inanimate to animate and irrational to rational. From stones to 
plants and animals to the human person, the hierarchy reaches up through the angels to 
the Divine which gives the order as part of His creative act. 
Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved 
more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or 
less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because 
He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. 
In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In 
this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a 
greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say 
that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of 
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goodness in things, as has been said, no one thing would be better than another, if 
God did not will greater good for one than for another.
323
 
From the two quotes above we can see that the order of things is created by God 
and that order is based on the amount of good that God gives to each creature. It can be 
said that the order is determined by the varying degrees to which things make present the 
love of God. Divine providence orders things as needed and creates things to manifest 
Divine love in varying ways. Therefore the amount of love is given by degrees as 
determined by God. 
In this hierarchy we see that creatures with a rational nature stand out as 
particularly loved. These rational natures include the human and the angelic. There is a 
special love, and grace for rational creatures, all rational creatures particularly, for our 
purposes here, the human person. This is due to the love of God being of a particular 
kind. The love that God gives to the rational creature is the love of friendship. 
… friendship is possible only with rational creatures who can return it, and who 
can share in the work of life, and fare well in fortune and happiness. Benevolence, 
also, is properly towards rational creatures.
324
 
Irrational creatures can neither love God nor share his intellectual life of happiness. 
Properly speaking, therefore, God does not love them with the love of friendship. But he 
does love them with the love of desire a love that is for the creatures utility to God and 
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man. God has ordained them for the rational creature, indeed for Himself—not as if he 
needed them, but for the sake of his loving-kindness, in as much as they are useful to 
rational creatures. The creation of irrational creatures, which includes the animals and 
plants, thus becomes part of the love that God has for His rational creatures, the human 
and angelic persons. 
 We now see that all created beings share in grace at least in that of creation and 
sustenance. The rational creature also receives Divine help over and above that, though, 
due to his free will and supernatural end which is not shared with non-rational creatures. 
The next question is if all rational creatures share in this Divine assistance or if there are 
those that do not or will not. 
Does every human person receive grace? 
From what we have seen it can be said that every human person receives grace, 
the love of God, and it is a special kind of love, it is the love of friendship. This is not to 
say that all humans will join in friendship with God but all have access to it and have 
been able to access it from the beginning of creation, either their own personal creation or 
the creation of the world.  
… it is only in God that creatures have existed from eternity. Yet, since they have 
existed in Himself from eternity, God has known their proper natures from 
eternity, and for the same reason has also loved them from eternity.
325
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What does this grace look like for the human person? Grace is the help that St. 
Thomas spoke of when defining the notion of grace. The nature of the human person is to 
be elevated beyond the merely natural world in which he exists. The help of grace allows 
each human person to achieve that goal. This is where salvation enters into the discussion 
of grace. The ultimate goal of the human person is union with God which is only 
achievable if God lifts him up into this union. Being in union with God can only be 
achieved on His terms, though. To be united with God means to be like Him, to be one 
with him. We become ―partakers of the divine nature‖(2 Peter 1.4). 
At this point one could begin, again, a discussion of the virtues and meritorious 
acts. Grace empowers the person to act meritoriously and deepen in virtue. It is 
undisputed that St. Thomas sees the virtuous person as being the one who achieves union 
with God.
326
 It is also the virtuous person that helps his neighbor. This is the result of the 
outpouring of love on the part of God. Nowhere does St. Thomas find that this love is 
restricted in any way on the side of God towards humanity. But St. Thomas‘ moral 
theology is where we can see the conditions for the rejection of this assistance as a result 
of the sin of the individual human person.  
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The relationship between God and the human person with respect to grace and 
human action is one that is described especially well and with particular relevancy to this 
dissertation in St. Thomas‘ Compedium Theologiae
327
 which is worth quoting at length. 
Accordingly, divine providence governs individual beings in keeping with their 
nature. Since rational creatures, because of the gift of free will, enjoy dominion 
over their actions in a way impossible to other creatures, a special providence 
must be exercised over them in two respects. First, with regard to the aids God 
gives to rational creatures in their activity, secondly, with regard to the 
recompense allotted for their works. God gives to irrational creatures only those 
aids by which they are naturally moved to act. But to rational creatures are issued 
instructions and commands regulating their lives. A precept is not fittingly given 
except to a being that is master of his actions although in an analogous sense God 
is said to give commands to irrational creatures also, as is intimated in Psalm 
148:6: ―He made a decree, and it shall not pass away.‖ But this sort of decree is 




Here we see the difference between rational and irrational creatures. The rational 
creatures have regulations for their lives principally because rational creatures have 
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dominion over their lives, i.e., they have mastery over their actions and a will to carry 
those actions out. Only analogously can it be said that God gives irrational creatures 
commands that they follow. Not only does the rational creature have regulations to 
follow, but there is punishment and reward for their action. This merit is related to 
salvation and the ultimate reward for good acts. 
 The merit for good action is not only earthly but is also a heavenly reward; as is 
the punishment for evil action. 
The deeds of rational creatures are imputed to them in blame or in praise, because 
they have dominion over their acts. The actions of men are ascribed to them not 
only by a man who is placed over them, but also by God. Thus any praiseworthy 
or blameworthy action that a man performs is imputed to him by the person to 
whose rule he is subject. Since good actions merit a reward and sin calls for 
punishment, as was said above, rational creatures are punished for the evil they do 
and are rewarded for the good they do, according to the measure of justice fixed 
by divine providence. But there is no place for reward or punishment in dealing 
with irrational creatures, just as there is none for praise or blame.
329
 
The irrational creature does not get reward or punishment for its action. These creatures 
do not have any supernatural connection and therefore will not be achieving a 
supernatural end which is the goal of rational creatures. The rational creatures, then, need 
some kind of supernatural help. Bringing in the understanding of nature from our chapter 





two, St. Thomas will give a short summary of the human condition as needing 
supernatural help to achieve their supernatural end. 
Since the last end of rational creatures exceeds the capacity of their nature and 
since whatever conduces to the end must be proportionate to the end according to 
the right order of providence, rational creatures are given divine aids that are not 
merely proportionate to nature but that transcend the capacity of nature. God 
infuses into man, over and above the natural faculty of reason, the light of grace 
whereby he is internally perfected for the exercise of virtue, both as regards 
knowledge, inasmuch as man‘s mind is elevated by this light to the knowledge of 
truths surpassing reason, and as regards action and affection, inasmuch as man‘s 
affective power is raised by this light above all created things to the love of God, 
to hope in Him, and to the performance of acts that such love imposes.
330
 
Virtue is the way in which St. Thomas analyzes the actions of the human person and 
judges how the person interacts with other persons. The virtues are built up in the person 
but are also given origin and aid through grace. 
These gifts or aids supernaturally given to man are called graces for two reasons. 
First, because they are given by God gratis. Nothing is discoverable in man that 
would constitute a right to aids of this sort, for they exceed the capacity of nature. 
Secondly, because in a very special way man is made gratus (or pleasing to God) 
by such gifts. Since God‘s love is the cause of goodness in things and is not called 





forth by any pre-existing goodness, as our love is, a special intensity of divine 
love must be discerned in those whom He showers with such extraordinary effects 
of His goodness. Therefore God is said chiefly and simply to love those whom He 
endows with these effects of His love by which they are enabled to reach their last 
end, which is He Himself, the fountainhead of all goodness.
331
 
 As we have seen above in this chapter St. Thomas is consistent in his definition of 
grace as Divine assistance and love. Grace is given to the human person due to the love 
of God and through nothing that is in the human person deserving these gifts. Grace is 
also described as love and the gifts that are gifts resultant of that love. From this entry in 
his Compendium of Theology, St. Thomas gives a concise summary of the relationship 
between grace, Divine Love, virtues and the human person as rational being.  
 No rational creature is excluded from this economy; all human persons are loved 
by God and this love is formative. Every human person has grace as his origin and 
sustenance making him completely reliant upon God for existence, action and elevation. 
All of this is done without man‘s consent or even his awareness. For St. Thomas this is 
the structure of the human person as a created rational being. Their origin is in grace, 
created without consent or, presumably, knowledge of this fact nor can they reflect upon 








 Other avenues to understanding this aspect in St. Thomas would be to 
investigate the mystical theology present in his work as well as his division of grace in to 
138 
 
As far as salvation of the individual is concerned, St. Thomas‘ understanding of 
grace opens up all of created rational beings to a salvific grace that sets no limits except 
those set up by the rational creature itself. The virtuous life is the path that God has set up 
as the path to follow for the achievement of this happiness, this blessedness, and God 
wills that all should be saved.
333
 But it is ultimately up to the person not or reject this 
salvation. We also see in DV that even if the sinner rejects God and his grace, there is 




St. Thomas has much to recommend these ideas, especially from scripture. I Tim 
2.4, ―who desires all men to be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth,‖
335
 as well as 
1 John 4.16 ―he who abides in charity abides in God and God in him‖
336
 God wishes that 
all should be saved and those desiring salvation will keep His commandments. The 
keeping of commandments happens through virtues, the habits acquired by practice and 
elevated by grace. 
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the postmodern condition. For this see chapter four for an analysis of his work on 
prevenience. Delving, in depth, into these avenues is for another project not this 
dissertation. 
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What comes out in St. Thomas is the notion that all humans receive grace, not 
only the grace of creation but also the grace that provides further assistance in their 
existence. For the rational creature, grace becomes an added ―light‖
337
 that will assist 
them in choosing well and choosing the good. This light will also help the person attain 
union with god and, as we will see below, help others to attain union with God. The 
virtues, the rational creatures path towards union with God, are assisted by grace and are 
elevated by grace and much has been written about their importance and their 
relationships. Another aspect of grace that is not spoken of as thoroughly in this context 
is the grace that is given specifically for the other. Each human person is given his share 
of this grace and it becomes part of his existence. The next section will develop this idea 
better from the work of St. Thomas himself. 
Does this apply only to those baptized in the Church? 
At this point the question may be asked whether or not all of this analysis deals 
exclusively with the baptized in the Church.  I think the evidence proves that this 
understanding of grace extends to all humans regardless of their being situated inside or 
outside of the Church. In the section of the ST‘s treatise on grace we see that grace is 
involved in all human actions such as knowing and wishing or doing any good 
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 This does not require the baptism of the human person but only the 
creation of the human person. Baptism adds and perfects this initial grace of creation but 
St. Thomas does not recognize any real un-graced nature and especially any un-graced 
rational substance. 
In article one of question 109 in the ST the logic proceeds thus; to know anything 
one needs grace,
339
 it is evident that an unbaptized person knows something therefore 
unbaptized person lays claim to the fact that some form of grace obtains. The same can 
be said of an acting person; there is need of divine assistance to do any good or will any 
good,
340
 it is evident that an unbaptized person does will and do some good, therefore 
there is some grace in the unbaptized person. Granted the kind of grace mentioned that 
these men have is the most rudimentary but it is also an axiom found in St. Thomas that 
grace is simple and singular while differing only in its effects. For the unbaptized person 
there are limited effects that can be produced whereas for the baptized person the effects 
are greater and more fruitful. It is also interesting to note that, even for the baptized 
person there are unequal effects. Some receive ―greater or lesser share in the grace of 
newness‖
341
 as they go through baptism. It is important to note, though, that in either 
situation, baptized or unbaptized, St. Thomas presents the human person as graced. 
3a. A division of grace into grace for the individual and grace for the other in the ST 
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For the most explicit example of the other orientedness of grace, a division St. 
Thomas makes in grace is of keen importance. For this division of grace, one needs to 
turn to the ST and delve into the heart of St. Thomas‘ treatise on grace
342
 and his more 
detailed examination of the example of charismatic grace
343
 in the later section of the 
ST
344
 as one way of demonstrating the other-orientedness of grace. In this section we will 
examine the division of graces in ST I-II, Q111 and the later section of ST II-II that deal 
with the division specifically. In the section to follow we will look at the other parts of St. 
Thomas‘ work that touch on this division and bring it out in various degrees including his 
commentaries on scripture.  
ST I-II, Q 111: A Division of Grace 
In Question 111 we have the division between charismatic and sanctifying grace. 
In St. Thomas the order in which things are presented is important.
345
 The first division 
we see, then, should be the most important or the one that will impact the rest. The first is 
between sanctifying and gratuitous grace, the second is between operative and 
cooperative grace and the third is prevenient and subsequent grace. In the question he 
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returns to the distinction between sanctifying and charismatic grace for the last two 
articles of the question. Up to this point in this section on grace he has discussed the 
necessity and basic structure of grace.  
This first division is centered around the Dionysian idea that ―things are led to 
God by other things,‖
346
 and that things are well ordered ―[a]nd hence since grace is 
ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to 
God by others.‖
347
 From this, St. Thomas will see that grace is primarily divided between 
grace for ourselves, sanctifying grace, and grace for the other, charismatic grace. 
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to God, and 
this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that whereby one man cooperates 
with another in leading him to God, and this gift is called "gratuitous[charismatic] 
grace," since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature, and beyond 
the merit of the person. But whereas it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, 
but rather that he may cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called 
sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 12:7): 
"And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility," i.e. of 
others.  
The question arises as to why this is the first distinction and why it is significant 
that this is the first division that St. Thomas will make in his understanding of the 
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divisions of grace. He will follow this distinction with more popular divisions of grace 
but the choice of the first division needs some examination. He wishes to deal initially 
with the ideas of sanctifying grace and so has to make the distinction in order not to deal 
with anything else. He makes this division possibly with an eye towards his 
understanding of nature as structured between a purduring self and a communicative 
relationality. As we saw in chapter two, this understanding of nature must be mined out 
of his theology but this division of grace is obvious and deliberate. Since St. Thomas 
does not address his reasoning directly, only an attempt at a reason can be made.  
From the body of the first article itself, very little can be gleaned. He chooses to 
make this first distinction in order to single out sanctifying grace but in doing so he has 
created a polarization of grace into the separate divisions. This is more of a case of 
dividing to distinguish and clarify rather than anything else. This polarization does create 
the two different realms for examination: sanctifying grace for the self, charismatic grace 
for the other. The next section will show that this is not an idea that came to him near the 
end of his career but it finds its way into various discussions of grace well before the ST.  
The importance of this division as seen by its prominence in the question means that this 
division is important to St. Thomas.
348
 He evidently saw that this was important enough 
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to get out of the way before proceeding on to sanctifying grace. We will see that it does 
tie into his understanding of Paul‘s letters. 
The objections to this division are on different grounds, some very superficial 
such as the third objection where the very name is objected to, but even that occasions a 
moment to reinforce the idea that there are two different important aspects of grace, one 
of the self which is sanctifying and one for the other which can also be called non-
sanctifying. The non-sanctifying is the charismatic grace which, to the objector, seems to 
be a tautology since all grace is gratuitous.
349
 St. Thomas wants to keep in the fore the 
idea that there is not only a grace for the individual self. The other objections can be 
referred to previous questions as misunderstandings of how grace acts – formally rather 
than efficiently, and that grace is not granted on demand by the creature as creature but is 
a gift from God.  
 In the fourth article of the question St. Thomas begins to define more clearly 
where he got the notion of charismatic grace and how it is divided in itself. Charismatic 
grace is mentioned in St. Paul‘s first letter to the Corinthians
350
 and it is from that passage 
that St. Thomas shows the divisions within this grace for the other. He gives the reference 
in the sed contra section of the article slightly paraphrasing the passage from the vulgate. 
The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 12:8-10): "To one indeed by the Spirit is given 
the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge, according to the 
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same Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, 




For St. Thomas the divisions are already made by St. Paul and St. Thomas needs 
only to expound upon them.
352
 Charismatic grace gives one the ability to help bring 
others to salvation, cooperating with God, as an extension of the love of God working in 
the individual. To bring someone else to the knowledge of something, a person must be 
able to know the thing he is trying to teach, be able to confirm what he knows, and be 
able to present it to others in a way that is persuasive. The divisions St. Thomas finds in 
St. Paul are those elements: knowledge, confirmation and presentation.  
It is interesting that in this discussion of things that move a person externally, we 
find that the first thing St. Thomas picks out of St. Paul‘s passage is that God must grant 
an initial act, faith,
353
 to the person assisting in the salvation of another so that he has the 
knowledge of God to pass on to others. Whereas the habit of faith is an internal 
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movement of the soul by God,
354
this faith is not the virtue of faith but a less inhering, 
non-habitual knowledge put into the person.  And from that movement of assent that will 
work on the person‘s intellect, comes the ability to ―be certain‖
355
 about the supernatural 
things of God. With this knowledge of faith, the individual can be granted wisdom and 
knowledge of things supernatural.  
The working of miracles and prophecy are the gifts that confirm the knowledge 
given. Miracles, especially healing, are given to some to prove the presence of Divine 
power. These can also include the control of natural elements such as making the sun 
stand still or dividing a sea. These unexplainable miracles serve to prove the existence of 
the Divine, as does knowledge of things that have not yet happened. Prophecy is 
considered proof of a Divine source Who knows all things past and present as well as 
future or even just the ―secrets of the heart‖ which would be the discerning of spirits in 
St. Thomas‘ understanding. 
With regard to presenting the faith to hearers in a way that they will understand, 
the gift of tongues and the interpretation of speeches is given. For St. Thomas, the gift of 
tongues is the speaking of different languages as was seen in the earliest apostles when 
they were said to be speaking in languages of all different origins in Acts 2.
356
 This 
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 ST II-II, Q6, a1 ―Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of 
faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.‖ In this particular article, faith is this 
supernatural certitude, see a4, ad2. 
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 For St. Thomas‘ take on the reason for tongues as a remedy for the idolatry 
punished at Babel see ST II-II, Q176, a1. This understanding of the gift of tongues is one 
of two that hold sway among Jewish and Christian commentators. The other notion of the 
gift of tongues refers to an unintelligible language that only the speaker and God 
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enables the speaker to be unburdened by other languages when traveling and spreading 
the word of God. So it is with the interpretation of speeches. St. Thomas groups the two 
together and implies that this interpretation is of diverse languages. In this sense one sees 
that the two go together as it would be good for there to be, at least, someone that can 
speak in diverse languages and one that can interpret the language. Other than this there 
is little in the ST that speaks about the interpretation of speeches.  
These are the graces associated with grace given freely and all of them are works 
of the individual for the assistance of the other in bringing the other to a knowledge of 
God either through various words or miracles. St. Thomas recognizes that each individual 
person can be granted these gifts regardless of their status. Sanctifying grace is not a 
prerequisite for the charismatic graces. Faith granted as a supernatural certitude is the 
beginning of these gifts and then this knowledge is transmitted to others. The ST shows 
that the distinction between grace for the self and grace for the other is a real distinction 
in St. Thomas and this distinction is important. St. Thomas finds origin for this 
distinction in the scriptures and his commentaries on the scriptures demonstrate this 
concern. It is to these commentaries, along with some other works, that we shall now 
turn. 
3b. Support from various other texts of St. Thomas 
                                                                                                                                                 
understand and even among those that hold this understanding debate as to whether the 
speaker can understand what is being said. It is clear from St. Luke‘s passage that 
speaking in tongues means the use of different languages but most of the scholars that 
argue for the incomprehensible speaking to God will actually use the 1 Corinthians 
passage from St. Paul. This seems to indicate that St. Thomas had no other notion of 
speaking in tongues than that of speaking different languages. 
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While the ST provides a concise account of the distinctions in grace, it is not the 
only place that these distinctions are found. The commentaries on Paul‘s letters are a 
good source of much of the nuances found in the ST. In this section we will look at 
several different commentaries as well as other synthetic treatises such as DV and SCG. I 
believe this will show that the different distinctions in grace between grace for the self 
and grace for the other is not an insignificant notion in the thought of St. Thomas. DV 
being one of the earliest treatises written by St. Thomas shows this distinction and some 
basic ideas about grace that follow throughout his career. The SCG will build on this idea 
making similar distinctions. 
In DV we get the same division of grace between sanctifying and charismatic 
graces. He also quickly moves on from the discussion of the charismatic graces to get to 
sanctifying grace, the more important of the two in the order of grace.  
In divine matters we accordingly speak of two kinds of grace. One is called grace 
gratuitously given or gratuitous grace, as the gift of prophecy and of wisdom and 
the like. But this is not in question at present, because it is evident that such gifts 
are something created in the soul…
357
 
Notice also that he assumes the reader will recognize the charismatic graces as something 
that comes to a person only temporarily as created in the soul and not dwelling in the soul 
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since ―ingratiatory grace can be called gratuitous grace, but not conversely, because not 
every gratuitous grace makes us worthy of eternal life.‖
358
  
 Following up on the definition of grace we see a place for the charismatic graces 
in a response to an objection that references the letter to the Romans that ―faith comes 
through hearing‖ (Rom 10.17). The reply to this objection deals with both graces. Faith 
comes through the sanctifying grace and the person becomes perfected in that faith 
through the hearing of the things of the faith and this, in the reply, is the word of the 
preacher but also fits with later definitions of what the charismatic grace does. The 
―utterances‖ of the faith are the gifts of prophecy and tongues. The hearers are perfected 
through that hearing. 
 We see that in DV the distinction between the charismatic and the sanctifying 
graces are not fully developed in their implications but the ideas are there for future 
treatises such as the SCG and the ST. In the SCG we find no real distinction between 
graces. What does come out is the foundation for the distinction. St. Thomas makes the 
point that knowledge of the faith has to come from someone, for some it comes from God 
and for others it has to come from other humans, regarding knowledge of the things of 
faith: ―some persons had to receive them directly from God, then others from them, and 
so on in an orderly way down to the lowest persons.‖
359
 There is a certain way in the plan 
of God that all will end up hearing the things of the faith. It is either through God or from 
someone who has received it from God; grace for the self and grace for the other. 




 SCG III, 154. 
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In the commentaries on St. Paul‘s letters, we find St. Thomas focuses all of his 
work on the letters relating to grace. In the commentary on the letter to the Romans St. 
Thomas begins his work on the Pauline corpus and the prologue for it acts as the 
prologue for his entire study of St. Paul.  
He wrote fourteen letters.  Nine instruct the Church of the Gentiles, four the 
leaders and princes of the Church, that is the rulers, and one the people of Israel, 




Grace is the underlying theme for all the letters and St. Thomas finds that they are 
already set in a specific order that lends itself to this sort of analysis. The canonical order 
of the letters beginning with Romans through the letter to the Hebrews displays this 
format. St. Thomas is aware that the letters are not placed in chronological order but 
seem to have another order in mind.
361
 
 In the discussion of grace, St. Paul‘s letter to the Romans takes pride of place 
since it is concerned with grace, ―in itself.‖
362
 The letters that follow describe how this 
grace is found in the sacraments as well as the unity of the Church and so on. Each letter 
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plays a role in defining how grace works in creation. The first to be examined should be 
his commentary on Romans because it will discuss the nature of grace in itself. In it is the 
two fold understanding of grace as for the self and for others. 
With respect to the charismatic grace, someone is not to be said to be predestined 
simply, because charismatic grace is not directly ordered to this, that he, who 
receives grace, is ordered to an ultimate end, but through that grace others are 
ordered to an end as it says in 1Cor. 12.7: ―to each is given the manifestations of 
the spirit for their utility.‖
363
 
 This discussion of grace is strikingly similar to that found in the ST. Most 
scholarly timelines place the writing of these commentaries during the time of the writing 
of the ST but it is safe to assume that, since the medieval cycle of education in theology 
begins with the Bachelor of the Sacred Page and then moves on to the Master of the 
Sentences, St. Thomas had these ideas in the back of his mind throughout his career.
364
 
Also in this section the discussion of the charismatic graces is not primary and this short 
statement on them seems to indicate comfort with the idea and an understanding that the 
reader has some knowledge of this distinction. 
There is not much more about the charismatic graces in his commentary on 
Romans with the exception of a later comment on the graces that each use in which he 
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 CRom Cap 2, 47. Respectu vero gratiae gratis datae, non dicitur aliquis 
praedestinari simpliciter, quia gratia gratis data non ordinatur directe ad hoc quod ille, 
qui eam recipit, ad finem ultimum dirigatur, sed ut per eam alii dirigantur, secundum 
illud I Cor. XII, 7: unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem. 
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indicates that the charismatic graces are not given to each person the same way but are 
diverse in their manifestations.
365
 This is perhaps anticipating his commentary on the first 
letter to the Corinthians. The commentary on Romans does seem to parallel the ST in 
focusing its discussion on sanctifying grace and mentioning the charismatic graces as 
another grace given to each person for the other. 
 In the commentary on the first letter to the Corinthians we see the charismatic 
graces spoken of more thoroughly. In chapter 12 of the letter, St. Paul delineates the 
charismatic graces and St. Thomas will discuss them as he had in the ST only from a 
purely scriptural basis. In the twelfth lecture pertaining to 1 Cor. 12.1-6, St. Thomas sees 
that the Apostle is trying to explain the gifts of the spirit or the charismatic gifts.
366
 In this 
section he speaks of the gifts being given to those who do not possess God, those not in 
sanctifying grace, such as Balaam‘s ass or Caiaphas. In this way we see that some graces 
are given to those who are not in sanctifying grace but he makes it seem that if someone 
is not in sanctifying grace the only reason he would receive these graces was for the 




 The charismatic graces are spoken of as giving strength to the Church but also 
being done by someone who may not be within the Church, a ―sinner, in whom the Holy 
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Spirit does not dwell.‖
368
 Again in this section St. Thomas demonstrates how someone is 
given graces that do not benefit the person themselves but those of others. He also shows 
the almost superficial nature of these graces by pointing out the distinctions between 
other graces and the charismatic graces that he specifically mentions. The graces are not 
of wisdom or knowledge but the utterance of wisdom and knowledge. The utterances 
only benefit others since they are meant to be voiced for outside hearers. St. Paul also 
mentions faith but St. Thomas qualifies the type of faith as just the utterance of things of 
the faith. 
[T]he Apostle places in the charismatic graces not wisdom and knowledge, but 
the utterance of wisdom and knowledge, which pertain to the ability to persuade 
other by speech about matters pertaining to wisdom and knowledge.                       
.  
Now, the principles of the doctrine of salvation are the articles of faith, and in 
regard to this he adds: to another is given faith by the same Spirit. It is not taken 
there for the virtue of faith, because this is common to all members of Christ, 
according to Heb (11:6): ―Without faith it is impossible to please God.‖ But it is 
taken for the utterance of faith in the sense that a man is able rightly to propose 
manners of faith, or for the certainty of faith someone has in an excellent way. 
The charismatic graces of prophecy and speaking in tongues are centered around 
utterances and are for the building up of others as is the working of miracles. All of these 
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deal with a part of humanity that is directed towards the other. St. Paul also writes that 
God will distribute the graces ―apportioning to each one individually as He wills.‖(1 Cor. 
12.11) St. Thomas takes this to mean that the Apostle is pointing out that God can choose 
any individual for such graces leaving open the possibility that all humanity has the 
ability to receive this grace. 
 From the above we can see that St. Thomas has taken time to develop the 
distinction of graces between those for the self and those for others. These differing 
graces are found throughout his work in some form or another. We see in DV the 
distinction is in place but not well explained while in the SCG the distinction is not 
explicitly mentioned at all. The scriptural commentaries do bring this out in a more 
definitive way and also give a hint as to the origins of the distinction.  
 Recall that in Question 111 of the ST regarding the divisions of grace, the other 
divisions can also be shown to demonstrate, to various degrees, this distinction between 
the for-the-self and for-the-other. The distinction between operating and cooperating can 
be seen in this perspective as the operating deals only with the person receiving the grace 
while the cooperating works with the person as they interact with creation. The division 
does not have the same strength in its argument as does the sanctifying/gratuitous 
division but it can show affinities towards it. The same can be said for the 
prevenient/subsequent distinction where the prevenient deals solely with the for-the-self 
and the subsequent works in the person‘s outward actions. Again, the division is not as 
obvious for bringing out this distinction but it does show affinities.  
 What St. Thomas appears to be doing is drawing out the distinctions to focus one 
aspect of grace that draws form the full understanding of grace. Grace, as the love of God 
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is a diffusive and attractive love and, as such, draws others to it through the ones that God 
loves. The love within the one loved becomes an outward expression and that expression 
touches others. I would say that St. Thomas would agree that the love infused in us from 
grace is a driving force that will lead us towards a deeper love, in a never ending quest 
towards fulfillment in God‘s love. It is this drive that focuses on the other, makes us want 
to help the other. This may be seen in how St. Thomas understands fraternal correction, a 
simple act of keeping a brother along the correct spiritual path. 
 Is there a precept for brotherly correction? Yes, both the ST and the DVirt speak 
to this. The ST is characteristically brief but to the point: 
Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because thereby we 
drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of which pertains to charity 
rather than the removal of an external loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the 
contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of 
external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the 
healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need.
369
 
As an act of charity it is done through love, if done correctly as the article continues, and 
so love does have a motive force that brings out the desire for the other to walk in the 
view of the ultimate Good. 
 The DVirt speaks more freely about the effects of love, read grace, in the idea of 
fraternal correction. 
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There is a precept about brotherly correction. The reason is that we are obliged by 
precept to love our neighbor. Love, though, in itself includes wishing the good of 




Love appears to have, within it, the very interest of the other at heart. This understanding 
of love as grace and grace as for the other is important to St. Thomas. Love is the 
foundation of all concern for the other. Even before one thinks to correct, there is love 
driving all of creation towards its perfection in God. 
 I hope that what has been developed here is the beginnings of a greater discussion 
among Thomists about the other-orientedness of grace in St. Thomas. Grace itself is the 
love of God and that love has properties that give it this orientation. Love as diffusive and 
creative will fit within the confines of the created natural order well because in the order 
of creation, love came first and then all the existing things follow. 
4. Synthesis of this theology of grace with his theology of nature 
The theology of nature and the theology of grace in St. Thomas Aquinas are not 
separate theologies but the same theology that delves deeper into the human person. From 
what has been said above, the nature of the human person includes a dyadic structure of 
the in-itself and the for-the-other. His theology of grace will build upon and elevate this 
nature forming the human person as one focused on outward action as part of his very 
essence. To synthesize the ideas of nature with those of grace, the natural structure must 
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have a foundation for the associated grace. This will show how the grace structure is built 
on the framework of the created natural human person. Once the connection is made 
between nature and the grace, the next step is to show that grace brings with it some form 
of motion, a command that can be cooperated with or not. With these two ideas 
developed a new sense of the human person rooted in Thomistic theology can be brought 
into conversation with contemporary theologies especially those of the postmodern 
phenomenological ilk.  
For St. Thomas, the human person, as the highest of substances – a rational 
substance, is created with a core self that is the perduring part of the human person 
lasting through the changes of time. It is the ―I‖ that answers to another‘s call or the ―I‖ 
that refuses to help another. This core self, for the human person, requires the assistance 
of its accidents.
371
 It is through these accidents that the self makes itself present to the 
other. 
The accidentals express the differences between humans and form some of the 
distinguishing characteristics that will make each human develop into the unique 
individual human person over time.
372
 It is through them that the human person interacts 
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 This is a particular need for the human person versus the angelic or Divine 
person. The human requires the use of the senses and therefore a body, an accident which 
changes, to interact and receive information about the world around it. See also chapter 
two. 
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with others and can hurt or help others. The accidentals include the physical 
characteristics of the human, things that change over time and are used by the in-itself to 
make the self present to others while also affecting how the in-itself understands the 
otherness of the world around it. 
The created person, when examined as ―natural,‖ has both of the aspects of the in-
itself and the for-others and as such form the foundation for grace to build from and 
transform. Described as the love of God, grace will transform this nature in its most 
radical elements. Grace affects these elements of the for-the-self and for-the-other. Of 
which, the most important for St. Thomas is the grace that touches the in-itself – 
sanctifying grace, the grace that makes one pleasing to God, through which the human 
person can achieve union with God. When grace touches the in-itself, when the love of 
God touches the self, that love is transformative and is salvific in that the self is made 
pleasing to God and this is commonly called salvation or justification. This grace affects 
the internal, the self, and only the individual person can reap the benefits; no other person 
will have any notion as to whether or not the other person, the individual self, has been 
touched by grace.  
St. Thomas will not say that there are different graces but there is one grace, one 
love that flows from God, at the will of God, not in any uncontrolled or necessary fashion 
but in a singular grace that affects the human person in different ways due to the structure 
of the person.  This singular grace will touch upon the in-itself and that brings about a  
salvific effect since the core in-itself is the person. That same love which touches the in-




Recall that the love of God, as with all love which has its source in God, is 
diffusive of itself and any connection or share in that love will communicate that 
diffusiveness or at least the need for that diffusiveness. Connection with God‘s love 
drives the person towards communicative relationality, concern for the other. This love 
wishes the good for the other and so it drives the self towards a love for the other. The 
connection with grace, the love of God, activates the human person‘s concern even if in 
small rudimentary ways.
373
 The diffusiveness of Divine love through everything it 
touches fulfills the natural structure of the human person and perfects it bringing to all 
creation this diffusive love for the other. As the aspect of provenience brings out, this 
love is before us as is the associated love, or concern for the other. 
This aspect of grace seems to act on the accidentals of the person and enhances 
their abilities. Charismatic grace touches each human person for the benefit of other 
human persons and not for the self because it touches upon those things that are not 
essential to the salvation of the in-itself, those accidentals which interact with the 
other.
374
  Being affected by grace in the accidentals is part of the unity in love for each 
person that God has and shares with His creation. The gifts of prophecy, miracles and 
healings as well as tongues all rely on the various physical changeable aspects of the 
human person: the voice, the hands, the tongue, etc.; miracles presumably conferred by 
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the hands or by some touch are not something the individual person activates at their will 
but are only activated by God‘s will. The grace that is for the other uses the aspects of the 
person that are created to be the outward oriented means of expressing the self to others. 
God uses the accidentals for His ends by giving them a particular end and these gifts do 
not inhere in the individual human person because the accidentals are changeable and a 
change in the accidents does not necessarily mean a change in the substance.  
From what has followed in chapters two and three the interaction of grace and 
nature is a thoroughly intimate and integrated interaction by design and by creation. A 
question to be asked about the miracles and healings and all of the charismatic 
manifestations is their purpose. Why would God choose to use the individual as a means 
to convey these gifts of miracles and healings and so forth? Why does not God just heal 
the person or perform the miracle or sign Himself and skip the human interaction? St. 
Thomas does not present an answer to this question, directly, since this question was 
never put to him directly nor was it of any concern for the various thinkers of his time. 
The answer to this question is for another time and another philosophical era. The only 
hint St. Thomas gives as to a possible answer lies in his notion of grace itself. 
Grace, as a singular entity, is love and is active in that it is from God, pure act.
375
 
Divine love creates and wants to be diffused so being created in love means that created 
things want to communicate that love.
376
 The analysis of creation in chapter two shows 
that the created being is meant to communicate its own goodness. The accidentals are the 
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means of that communication for the human person. The angelic person does not need 
this nor does the Divine; their communication is instantaneous and complete due to their 
immaterial aspects. The human person requires accidentals to communicate the goodness 
found in the self. The goodness of the human does not reside in the physical 
characteristics, the hands or feet or lungs, but in the goodness given to the self by the 
Divine love poured into the person, the self, the in-itself. 
Divine demand 
When looking at the human person, both graced and natural, a picture of a 
communicative, loving, active person arises, one that is created with these attributes as 
essential to its very existence. The human person is graced and that grace activates, by 
creation, the communicative activity which, at its root, is the radical foundation for the 
ethical demand within the human person. Grace is the source of this demand to love from 
the very beginning, before the human person begins his reasoning; before the human 
person can reflect on the demand or the source. The diffusive love of God drives the 
human person towards the perfection of the self and the other. 
St. Thomas has developed a way of looking at the human person that leaves open 
this analysis. His discussions of charismatic grace and sanctifying grace along with the 
structure of the human person all leave open the possibility to see within the human 
person this divine demand to love, to communicate the good. We have seen this in earlier 
examples of fraternal correction and the virtues in general. St. Thomas also has much in 
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the way of analyzing why the human person does not follow this demand.
377
 Sin is the 
reason the human person does not follow this demand but the love of God can overcome 
this blindness and restore the human person back to where he should be and can clearly 
see the ethical demand as part of the perfection of his existence. 
Is the analysis of charismatic grace the totality of the understanding of the for-the-
other in grace? Absolutely not, but it is one aspect that has not been discussed in much 
detail, yet one that has much to recommend it in a conversation with contemporary 
postmodern theologians and philosophers. Charismatic grace is one of many ways or 
seeing the pre-thematic, pre-conceptual, pre-intentional concern for the other. Analysis of 
prevenient as well as operative grace can also prove fruitful for future pursuits. In the 
next chapter we will see one such analysis of provenience by a current theologian coming 
from the postmodern perspective. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DIALOGUE 
Two dialogue partners have been presented and now the dialogue can begin with 
full understanding that it will not end here nor will it be satisfactorily started. The 
conversation must continue so that the Tradition can be built up and presented ―ever 
ancient, ever new.‖
378
 To this end I hope to bring together some of the elements from 
Levinas and Derrida with those of St. Thomas. I have tried to put the work of St. Thomas 
into a postmodern context and can now begin to compare their thoughts. On one plane, I 
believe that they have much in common and will attempt a synthesis that will hopefully 
prove fruitful in advancing theology in the postmodern context.  
Let us recall the key elements form Levinas that will be of help in this discussion. 
For Levinas, God as the Infinite that only leaves a trace, is the source of all ethics, 
speaking most generically; it is ―a pre-thematic, pre-conceptual and pre-intentional 
concern [for the other] that comes before the individual person can choose to be 
concerned for the other.‖
379
 It is in this concern for the other, actually, in a responsibility 
for the other, that the Infinite, or God, is found. Driving the person towards this 
responsibility for the other is a transcendent desire for God. A desire that will never be 
fulfilled but only deepens as the desire grows.  
There is something in the human person that desires beyond what it can reach and 
that desire yields a command from the object of that desire, the Infinite, God. The 
command ―do not kill‖ is in the person from the very beginning in an always/already 
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relationship to the self. It is, in fact, this concern that constitutes the subject. How much 
one responds to this command determines the degree to which one has subjectivity. 
Levinas is trying to get to the heart of ethics and, for him, it lies in the command coming 
from God, the Infinite, Who is unreachable and (almost) entirely transcendent. The trace 
of this Infinite, giving just a glimmer of the Infinite, rests in the face of the other to whom 
we are bound by this command to care for more than ourselves. 
It seems that we are commanded to love one another from the very beginnings of 
our existence. Commanded by an Infinite that reaches us through the other and so our 
relationality helps us see the Infinite and helps us follow the command that the Infinite 
gives us. We receive the commands, though, in true passivity, a passivity in which are not 
aware of the passivity. This command comes to us before we can reflect upon it and 
before we can react to it. This command gives us our orders well before we think to ask 
for them as well as giving us the ability to act on that command since it is constitutive of 
the subject. 
The basic elements of command and passivity mixed with the always/already 
structure of the command given pre-intentionally, pre-conditionally, and pre-thematically 
can be examined in dialogue with St. Thomas‘ idea of grace given in creation to all 
beings and sustaining that creation. The ideas of the Infinite and the desire for the Infinite 
have affinities in the work of St. Thomas. Thinking the idea of the Infinite is thinking 
God and, in many ways, we see it as the love of God. It is this love that will be the similar 
driving force in the concern for the other. 
The Infinite is God as the condition for the possibility of all beings. In St. Thomas 
the condition for the possibility of creation, for the possibility of all beings, is the love of 
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God, without which, there would be nothing. Levinas‘ Infinite is the love of God and 
cannot be approached in its fullness in any way. The love of God leads us to some 
understanding of God through its effects but works to keep undermining any real 
understanding of God. While not fully comprehending God in any degree of 
completeness, humanity, as an existing being, though, always/already has the love of God 
in them through creation in grace and through being sustained in grace.  
The Infinite, for Levinas, is the non-contained, an idea working on the human 
person to break up consciousness in hopes of eliminating any conceptualizing thoughts of 
the Infinite. This is not unlike the mystical tradition that St. Thomas receives which speak 
to the inability to grasp onto any total understanding of God which includes St. Thomas 
himself; “I adore you devoutly, hidden God.‖
380
 ―He spoke of a God beyond everything 
holy theology could say about him. He spoke of the God he loved as inconceivable.‖
381
 
St. Thomas knew that there was a veil between knowledge of God and God and made 
that explicit in his work on the knowledge of God. 
Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be 
known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects 
and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God 
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whether He exists, and on to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, 




It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to 
attain to God in some degree is great beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. 
Dim., Serm. xxxvii). In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended 
is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be 
known. …But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the 
knowledge of the Divine intellect…
383
 
Our knowledge has limits and is grossly incapable of grasping the Infinite love of God or 
its source. 
 The desire for the Infinite is also an element in Levinas‘ understanding of the 
subject, a desire for what is beyond being, for the Good. It is the desire for what cannot 
be desired, the undesirable, and especially the ―undesirable par excellence.‖
384
 The desire 
for the Infinite, as we have seen, can translate to the desire for the other.
385
 For St. 
Thomas ―love precedes desire‖
386
 and so, for St. Thomas, to approach Levinasian desire 
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for the other, there is first love for the other. In St. Thomas, the love with which a person 
loves is a share in divine love. William Hoye demonstrates this in his lecture on human 
love in the thought of St. Thomas.
387
 Human love is the desire for union that is rooted in 
the desire for union with God. The union can be one of friendship or of lovers but it is 
rooted in the desire to be in union with God – the purpose of grace. 
 We can see that the desire for the Infinite is a non-erotic love, an agapic love that 
is the love of God. Desire for the Infinite leads to a desire for the other and that desire is 
the beginning of love. One can look at desire as love and so desire for the infinite is a 
love for the infinite and desire for the other is a love for the other. The source of that love 
is God and so they love the others through the same love with which they love God and, 
therefore, because God loves humans, so should other humans love humans. Through our 
love we see that we love others due to the love of God which is in us before we love. The 
love of God is grace and so our love is rooted in the always/already presence of grace. 
These are good examples of how one can use Levinasian ideas to get to a deeper 
understanding of Thomistic thought as well as the received Tradition. 
In Levinas there is also the idea of passivity that marks the subject. One can easily 
see the passivity in the human person as this always/already presence of Divine love in 
the background of existence. Like a trauma, the love of God is present even before one 
understands that there is love. It comes from outside of the human person and, as such, 
comes to them without their consent or understanding. A passivity more passive still than 
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any passivity as it comes over the human person so as to bring the person into existence 
activating the very essence of that individual.  
Using Levinasian passivity to describe the always/already aspect of God‘s grace 
will get to the heart of the idea that grace comes first in the order of creation. God‘s grace 
founds the subject through love, through the grace of creation. The initiative is all God‘s 
and through that initiative the human person comes about. The ultimate passivity of the 
person is this reception of existence from God through grace. No initiative from the 
human person can begin this for themselves.  
Divine grace is not partitioned though, it transmits not only the creative aspect of 
esse but also its diffusive content, love of the other. From before the very beginning of 
each passive essence, each not-yet-existent individual there is active Divine initiative 
giving it existence through grace, through Divine love. Using Levinas‘ language of 
passivity can get to the very radical nature of Divine initiative and the necessary human 
dependence upon God for everything.  
The dialogue with Levinas can continue and deepen as both thinkers build up the 
other. Levinas through the lens of medieval thought has yet to be developed but there are 
some beginning this process. Fr. Michael Purcell is one that has brought Levinas into 
dialogue with St. Thomas and other medieval thinkers in the realm of grace as prevenient. 
Fr. Purcell comes from the postmodern philosophical milieu but has also shown a 
willingness to examine the work of medieval thinkers such as St. Thomas Aquinas. He 
comes from his work on Levinas and brings to this discussion a question of the 




Out of almost all of the scholarly work done in this area thus far, Purcell comes 
the closest to dealing with the dialogue of post-modernity and medieval thought on 
grace.
388
 His work entails placing Levinas in dialogue with the Tradition especially as 
seen through Karl Rahner but also St. Thomas through Rahner. Purcell will approach 
grace form the aspect of its prevenience, an aspect that seems to belie its pre-thematic 
nature. Purcell does not pursue this avenue but, instead approaches the idea of 
prevenience as evidence for grace‘s constitutive relation with subjectivity.  Using 
Rahner‘s (through St. Thomas) idea that we only experience grace in its effects and never 
grace as such, Purcell will develop the idea that grace goes before the subject and is 
before the subject. The person does not experience grace in itself but only the after-
effects. Purcell will use Levinas‘ idea of the anteriority of the posterior to describe grace 
as prevenient. 
Grace is experienced, phenomenologically only after the fact and a 
phenomenological analysis of the effect will bring out the ―before‖ of grace that is always 
already prevenient to the subject. The effects of grace will always present themselves and 
only then lead to an understanding of the cause as anterior. Purcell will see in Levinas 
this idea of the posteriority of the anterior and see that as a description of grace, 
prevenient grace. Grace is only seen after the fact and ―in terms of the fact.‖
389
 Grace 
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becomes apparent after it has an effect on the subject thereby telling the subject that grace 
is present. 
Purcell will use St. Thomas‘ division of grace as a connection to the Tradition as 
seen in St. Thomas. In the ST I-II, Q111, we find the division of grace. One of the 
various divisions is that between prevenient and subsequent grace as well as the division 
of operating and co-operating grace. Purcell takes the notion of operating grace, a grace 
that God works in the person without that person‘s input, and prevenient grace, a grace 
that comes to the person before their willing or doing of any good, to get to an idea of 
grace that is before the willing or hoping of the person. It is before the person yet fully 
penetrating of the person and constitutes the very subject himself. He will also reach back 
to the Council of Orange and St. Augustine for his understanding of the provenience of 
grace as received by St. Thomas.  
The key point is that human initiative is dependent upon and assisted by the 
prevenient and continuing action of God whose grace gives both the possibility of 
both willing and doing the good. In short prevenient divine initiative is the 
condition of the possibility (posse) or both willing (intending)(velle) and 
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Purcell goes on to read the basic texts in St. Thomas‘ on prevenient grace, ST I-II 
Q111,
391
 and apply them to his notion of Levinasian anteriority. In ―The Prevenience and 
Phenomenality of Grace‖ Purcell goes through the question of the division of grace 
focusing on the provenience and all that flows from that aspect especially looking into the 
cooperative and operative sides of grace. His analysis does not touch upon the division 
between sanctifying and charismatic grace. As such, Fr. Purcell treats almost every aspect 
of grace except the notion that there is a grace received specifically for the other. He does 
not mention charismatic grace nor does he use it in his analysis of grace as constituting 
the subject.  
392
 
Many of the issues that coincide with St. Thomas in Levinas also find affinities in 
Derrida but Derrida has some differences with Levinas that will add complexity into the 
dialogue. The key elements that St. Thomas and Derrida can speak to in relation to this 
dissertation are the two areas of responsibility and the Wholly Other. Their ideas of 
responsibility can come into contact and enhance each other quite well while I see a 
connection between Derrida‘s idea of the Wholly Other in St. Thomas‘ idea of God. The 
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latter will be addressed first as it is the shortest to address and factors into the 
understanding of the former. 
For Derrida the Wholly Other is a God figure that is unapproachable and 
incomprehensible, ―inaccessible to me,‖
393
 a God that is transcendent to the point of 
invisible, as Levinas would put it. Derrida‘s idea of the transcendent other takes on a 
Divine character when he speaks of the Wholly Other. This moniker is somewhat 
misleading in its use here and elsewhere in Derrida since a truly wholly other would have 
no way of making contact with any other while in Derrida there is a trace. It would be 
more correct to speak of an Almost Wholly Other. The idea he is trying to convey, 
though, has resonance with St. Thomas. 
For St. Thomas, God is nothing we can ―know.‖ We have no way of knowing 
God in any sense of comprehension but we can see the effects of God and from that 
connection we can know some aspects of God. Josef Pieper has demonstrated quite well 




God as an unknown is said to be the terminus of our knowledge in the following 
respect: that the mind is found to be most perfectly in possession of knowledge of 
God when it is recognized that His essence is above everything that the mind is 
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capable of apprehending in this life; and thus, although what He is remains 
unknown, yet it is known that He is.
395
 
God can only be recognized as God when the mind realizes that it cannot comprehend 
God. Only in the realization that we cannot understand God do we understand God to the 
fullest extent of our abilities. St. Thomas keeps the hidden-ness of God intact through an 
appropriate understanding of the place of the human intellect. 
It is because human intelligence is not equal to the divine essence that this same 
divine essence surpasses our intelligence and is unknown to us: wherefore man 
reaches the highest point of his knowledge about God when he knows that he 
knows him not, inasmuch as he knows that that which is God transcends 
whatsoever he conceives of him.
396
 
Here we see the affinities with Derrida who could have used St. Thomas as a source for 
this aspect of his analysis as much as Kierkegaard or Patočka. The human person cannot 
know what God is but only that God is. 
 The concept that responsibility is a relationship is something that Derrida 
develops in the Gift of Death but uses other places also has a close tie to St. Thomas in its 
development. The key concept is that responsibility is a relationship with the other and 
fundamentally the Wholly Other. We have seen that this relationship is one that opens the 
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self to the gaze of the other and that other is one that cannot be gazed upon. It is the gaze 
of the transcendent other, the Wholly Other Who cannot be reached and must be 
respected in secrecy.  
 To begin some kind of dialogue one must start fairly far afield in St. Thomas with 
the basic understanding that God is love and as such is essentially a relationship of 
Persons. Love dictates the distinction of Persons for St. Thomas as he describes the 
Trinitarian Persons as substantial relations.
397
 Relations for St. Thomas are rooted in love 
and especially Divine love, the same love that is described as grace, the love of God.  
We interact with God as a result of grace and this relationship builds up the 
human person, gives them life and sustains them. This love also carries with it all the 
things that make up Divine love such as its diffusive properties and its concern for the 
other. When we love, we love with the love of God and that love has a responsibility 
attached to it.  
Grace brings with it a tendency towards the virtues
398
 which will draw the person 
into relationships with others that are formed on the basis of love. The grace that brings 
charity is one that will play well into this understanding. Charity is that virtue by which 
one is rightly ordered towards the good, the ultimate Good, God. Grace brings this order 
and all have access to it which means all have the possibility of this kind of ordering in 
their lives.  Grace lets one love the lover by revealing the lover, God. This grace brings 
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Charity which makes one see, with the eyes of God, the things around and enables the 
seer to relate to them as God would. One sees and loves the other as a creation of God, 
loved as God loves them or at least as close as one can get to this love. We love things 
because the Beloved loves them. 
It is this love that closely approximates Derrida‘s linkage of every other as the 
Wholly Other. In every other we see the Wholly Other and love them as the Wholly 
Other. ―Charity which loves God for His own sake and loves fellow-men who are capable 
of attaining Beatitude as it loves itself.‖
399
 Charity helps us love the other in the same 
respect we love God since they are created by God and have God as their source of 
existence with us. Not only do we love through grace but that love also infuses charity in 
us which directs our actions towards others and for their good. 
Our responsibility, then, comes from the love we have for other human persons 
driven by the love of God and acted on through our charitable acts. These charitable acts 
are our ways of pointing ourselves and others to the ultimate human Good, God. Derrida 
sees in responsibility this drive as well due to our relationship with the Wholly Other, a 
God figure for Derrida. For St. Thomas the responsibility is driven by love, for Derrida 
this responsibility is driven by fear, a difference that will need further research. 
Further Dialogue 
Part of beginning a dialogue is finding the right partners with which to be in 
dialogue. So far we have seen both Levinas and Derrida brought into the dialogue 
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without much on their part to recommend the dialogue. There do seem to be a growing 
number of those willing to engage in this dialogue; one such person is Jean-Luc Marion. 
Not only has he proven himself an influential actor on the stage of postmodern 
theology/philosophy but he has also shown a keen interest in St. Thomas. In early his 
book God without Being
400
 Marion seems to take St. Thomas to task for being part of the 
onto-theo-logical system and therefore being stuck in the understanding of God as in the 
realm of Being. By the time the English language edition is published, he had added to 
the introduction a retraction of sorts and later penned a rather longer and more formal 
retraction of his views of St. Thomas.
401
 In this article Marion finds that St. Thomas does 
not inscribe God within the boundaries of Being and also finds that St. Thomas does have 
an apophatic trend in his understanding of God. 
Marion does an excellent job rooting out the problems inherent in this dialogue 
between the medieval and the postmodern. One of the most important contributions 
Marion makes is the ridding of the onto-theo-logical stigma that seems to plague any 
dialogue between the two. Marion will examine the charge and find it wanting in St. 
Thomas. He will also correctly point out that the troubles with Thomism began almost 
immediately after the death of St. Thomas himself with the imposition of univocal terms 
in theology when speaking of God.  
                                                 
400
 Jean-Luc Marion, Dieu sans l‟etre: Hors Texte (Paris: Fayard, 1982); ET God 
Without Being: Hors Texte (translated by Thomas A. Carlson, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991) 
401
 Jean-Luc Marion, ―Saint Thomas d‘Aquin et l‘onto-theo-logie,‖ Revue 
Thomist 95 (1995); an English translation with revision by the author is found in Michael 
Kessler and Christina Sheppard, eds. Mystics Presence and Aporia (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2003) 38-74. 
177 
 
The saturated Phenomenon 
One of the key areas that Marion‘s work contributes to this discussion is in the 
idea of the saturated phenomenon. In a personal discussion with Jean-Luc Marion, he 
expressed the idea that he is changing his thinking on the saturated phenomenon and is 
beginning to realize that all phenomenon can be seen as saturated. This may play into the 
idea that the grace that is in creation comes out as much bigger and more complex that 
initially thought. Marion may have the language to express this depth and it will be 
fruitful to look into the idea especially as it relates to grace. 
For Marion the concept of the saturated phenomenon begins with the 
phenomenological reduction to givenness. He makes this as an analysis using Husserl as 
the foundation especially his phenomenological principle ―so much reduction, so much 
givenness.‖
402
 He finds in Husserl an idea of givenness as universal.
403
  The phenomenon 
gives itself and, in doing so, it‘s intuition comes into contact with the subjects intention 
and it is there that the concept of the saturated phenomenon begins to take shape.  
For Marion the intuition can be poor compared to the intention or equal to, or 
greater than the intention receiving it. The intuition through which a phenomenon will 
show itself, gives itself, can be greater or lesser than the receiving intention. Marion 
addresses the poor and equal degrees of intuition rather quickly as they are fairly 
unexciting but the situation where the intuition exceeds the intention is what he will call a 
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saturated phenomenon; the phenomenon is saturated with intuition such that it 
overwhelms the intention.
404
   
To analyze the saturated phenomenon Marion will use Kant‘s categories of 
knowledge to help understand how to define a saturated phenomenon.
405
 The four 
categories are quantity, quality, relation and modality. Each of these, through an 
inversion done by Marion, will show the specific way of finding a phenomenon that is 
saturated. The first three lay out a horizon within which to know a phenomenon but 
Marion will invert these to show how the horizons are put into question.  
The category of quantity is the first he examines and with respect to quantity, the 
saturated phenomenon is invisible. In the classical sense of material extensiveness, the 
saturated phenomenon goes beyond the visible as being too visible. Conceptually, though 
the saturated phenomenon goes beyond the sense of visible; material extensiveness is 
judged by the summation of its parts while the saturated phenomenon cannot be. There 
can be no summation of its parts, there are too many of them; there is too much of the 
phenomenon. Marion uses the idea of the event as an example of this.
406
 Any event has 
too many past present and future possibilities that the event itself cannot be 
comprehended in its totality. All of the things that went into the creation of the event in 
the past, all of the thoughts that went into the planning, development, etc. of the event 
combined with the present, instantaneous, moment that is unique and totally unrepeatable 
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along with the unpredictable future, all go into the idea that the event is too saturated with 
intuition that gives itself over to the intention of anyone trying to conceptualize it. 
Quality is marked by Marion as unbearable in a saturated phenomenon.
407
 
Perception can anticipate a certain amount when looking at something. For Marion, 
excess in quality is marked by the gaze suffering bedazzlement. Art is the favorite 
example that Marion will use. The artist portrays real life but in that portrayal the image 
dazzles to the point of pushing the real into the background and making the portrayal 
more important and full of meanings that could be read into the represented item. 
Phenomenologically, the painting becomes the original and the original takes on a 
secondary status. 
The idol is the saturated phenomenon with respect to quality. The idol catches the 
gaze and holds it in bedazzlement to the point that the gaze cannot look any further. The 
representation becomes greater than the reality. The painting example is particularly 
useful in seeing that the real world has three dimensions and we, in our concept of things, 
realize that we cannot see the other side of an object without turning it around. This 
appresentation works along with presentation to get a fuller concept of the object. In a 
painting the artist does away with the appresentation and only gives what we need to see 
what the artist puts forward. This gives it a mysteriousness about it. This is one of the 
reasons that people return time after time to look at the same painting. There is so much 
that can be ―seen‖ in it that is left up to the imagination of the seer. Abstract art is 
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particularly good for this as well as representational art. In abstract art there is no 
framework or structure to even begin a conceptualization.  
With regard to quality, the phenomenon is unbearable there is too much there to 
take in and requires extended time in looking but even time will not help the situation. No 
amount of time will allow for the full conceptualization of the idol. Merold Westphal 
speaks to this in an article analyzing the transfiguration of Jesus as a saturated 
phenomenon, a bedazzlement takes place like that of Mary Magdelene‘s encounter when 
she saw an angel at the tomb,―[q]uite clearly what bedazzled, overwhelmed, and even 
scared her….‖
408
 Bedazzlement marks the halting of the gaze upon the phenomenon. 
In speaking of relation, Marion says the saturated phenomenon is absolute. There 
can be no relation to it either by a real relation or by analogy of experience.
409
 His best 
way of explaining this is by the examples form Kant where Marion will invert the 
situation. One of the ways in which we know things, according to Kant is through a 
network of concepts that give rise to our understanding of things. We can relate 
everything to something we have already encountered. Kant will require the analogies of 
experience to rule description.
410
 Kant also requires that all experience happen in the 
background of time. Marion quotes Kant from his Critique of the Power of Judgment by 
stating that ―all phenomena are in time.‖
411
 Kant is setting up horizons, however broad, 
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that will contain the phenomenon. Marion asks if phenomena could exceed their horizon. 
That is the place of the saturated phenomenon which reaches just beyond the limits of the 
horizons set up around it. The intuition exceeds the concept or signification that is 
supposed to see it, it fills the entire horizon, it can even over-fill the horizon. This can go 
on to the point where no single horizon can be filled up nor any combination of horizons 
can receive the intuition.
412
 
The saturated phenomenon gives itself as an absolute without any relation or 
analogy. In this way it exceeds any horizon and is unapproachable through any analogy 
or relationship. It is stand-alone without respect for either time or space. Marion also calls 
this an ―unconditioned phenomenon.‖
413
 
Finally with respect to modality which deals with phenomenal relationship to 
thought, we see the saturated phenomenon as irregardable.
414
 Building off the previous 
three categories, we know that the saturated phenomenon is invisible, unbearable and 
absolute so it should make sense that it is irregardable with respect to thought. When 
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considering the saturated phenomenon, the fact that it is invisible, unbearable and 
absolute leads to it not being objectified by the receiver. There is too much for the 
intention to take in to be able to objectify the phenomenon and constitute it in any way. 
This does not mean that it does not exist or is not a phenomenon, it just means that there 
are no avenues for the intention to objectify what it is receiving. In that way the 
phenomenon objectifies the receiver. The phenomenon constitutes the one to which the 
phenomenon arrives.  
Marion will use the icon as the paradigm for this situation. The icon cannot be 
gazed at but only gazes, it looks and draws one in. It is a phenomenon that is originary. 
The gaze regards the object but in a particular way. 
To gaze at the phenomenon is therefore equivalent to not seeing it, but indeed to 
transforming it into an object visible according to an always poor or common 
phenomenon – visible within the limits of a concept, therefore at the initiative of 
the gaze, enduring as long as possible in permanence, in short, visible in 
conformity with objects. 
We are unable to take in the saturated phenomenon, reduce it to the conditions of 
experience and are therefore taken by the icon and the gaze is directed away. The gaze 
can only take in so much but is overwhelmed with the excess. Marion will call the 
situation where the ―coming forward exceeds what comes forward‖ as paradox.
415
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The paradox not only suspends the phenomenon‘s subjection to the I; it inverts it. 




The paradox leaves in its wake a witness instead of an I. The witness to the 
phenomenon does not determine it, constitute it, and therefore can only offer partial 
objectifications of the phenomenon. The witness is also halted from drawing any 
meaning that can be considered complete. The limited ability to take in the phenomenon 
limits the meaning giving. As a receiver of the gaze from the phenomenon, the witness is 
left surprised and dazed. The witness also realizes that they cannot reduce the 
phenomenon to themselves, they lose the nominative sense of self. The witness can only 
register the fact of the phenomenon. Being constituted also implies a call put forward 
from the saturated phenomenon to the witness. 
[I]nsofar as I receive myself from the very givenness of the irregardable 
phenomenon, me insofar as I learn of myself from what the gaze of the Other says 
to me in silence. 
We have progressed to the point of understanding Marion‘s saturated 
phenomenon so that we can now use this idea and apply it to grace. Is there something 
new that can be gleaned from the idea of grace as a saturated phenomenon. I will apply 
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this format to the phenomenon of grace. I hope to show that grace is a saturated 
phenomenon by going through the various categories discussed above. 
The first question one could ask is whether or not grace is a phenomenon. 
According to Marion, grace would fit into the understanding of a phenomenon. Playing 
off of the phenomenality of the phenomenon, Marion finds that phenomena have the right 
and the power to show themselves on their terms.
417
 He says the phenomenon remains 
―inasmuch as it is an instance exterior to consciousness, completely unevident, since 
evidence is defined as a mode or state of consciousness alone, independent from and 
indifferent to a possible transcendence.‖
418
 Grace is not something thought up or 
originating in the consciousness, it is exterior. For our purposes here we will simply 
stipulate that grace is a phenomenon that can be encountered by a subject. 
Now we can look at each category and try to ascertain to what degree grace can 
be called a saturated phenomenon with respect to that category. Quantity will be the first 
category considered. Is grace invisible? Can grace be found to be the sum of its parts and 
can we calculate all the parts involved. From what we have seen above grace goes 
beyond measurement. As the love of God, grace takes up the all of existence and cannot 
be divided into parts, it is unforeseeable due to the fact that there is too much of it. 
Simply put, there is too much grace in the intuition for the intention to take in.  
With respect to quality, grace is unbearable. Again, as the love of God, grace is a 
maximum without measure – infinite. When one tries to comprehend grace one is 
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confronted with an insurmountable chasm between intuition and intention. There is no 
zero point in grace that the intention can use as a starting point. It overwhelms any 
attempts at conceptualization. Fr. Purcell‘s article on prevenient grace comes in very well 
here as it marks a time before the subject exists where grace is still. 
These two categories, quality and quantity find grace as saturated from the same 
infinite source viewed from different angles. Quantity runs up against the infinite love of 
God as does the quality where there is no maximum, grace is the maximum and therefore 
is not defined by anything else. God, given as infinite, directs a loving will on all of 
creation. 
Again, the will of God is directed to things other than Himself, as has been 
shown, in so far as, by willing and loving His own being and His own goodness, 
God wills it to be diffused as much as possible through the communication of 
likeness. This, then, is what God wills in other things, that there be in them the 
likeness of His goodness. But this is the good of each thing, namely, to participate 
in the likeness of God; for every other goodness is nothing other than a certain 
likeness of the first goodness. Therefore, God wills good to each thing.
419
 
With respect to relation we will find that there is nothing like God or the love of 
God. It has no analogy and is absolute. It is without horizon while creating the horizon of 
the subject. As limitless, since God is limitless and does not exist in degrees there is no 
horizon that contains grace from which the intuition can fully take in the phenomenon. 
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Grace is absolute and without relation. It is not measured by anything in order to give it 
over to something else. It is the measure. 
We can finish off this quick analysis by looking at modality. Is grace iconic? It 
does not let itself be comprehended but instead comprehends and constitutes the I of the 
intention that receives the phenomenon. Grace constitutes the subject, every subject for 
that matter, as the creative source and is incapable of being constituted. In relation to 
thought, grace is constituting due to the gaze being unable to settle on grace because of 
the infinitude of grace. The subject is constituted by initial creative grace, as we have 
seen above, and the grace that builds on the created nature of the human person. 
By these conclusions, admittedly brief in development, we can safely claim that 
grace is a saturated phenomenon.
420
 The next question to address is what to do with this 
idea now that it is established. I think that Marion‘s ideas about the call and radical 
givenness related to the saturated phenomenon will bring new insight into thinking about 
grace. Also, the analysis is somewhat superficial and would require much more in the 
way of development than what has been given here. Another avenue will be to apply this 
work to the sacraments since they present a more readily accessible phenomenon to deal 
with. 
In Marion‘s analysis of givenness and the saturated phenomenon he finds a call 
that comes forth from the phenomenon as it constitutes the subject. This constitution, in a 
sense creates the subject as something new, something in the image of the saturated 
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phenomenon giving itself over to the receiver. The subject turns into the receiver the 
subject is now a receptive subject if a subject at all.
421
  
Theologically this opens the saturated phenomenon, all saturated phenomena 
possibly, to the origins in God. The constituting Other that is behind the beyond, is God 
Who is creating through love. The subject is now a witness to this love as charismatic 
grace makes one a witness to grace.
422
 Near the end of book IV in Being Given, Marion 
begins to speak of the saturated phenomenon as it relates to possibility. 
Because it gives itself without condition or restraint, the saturated phenomenon 
would offer the paradigm of the phenomenon finally without reserve. In this way, 
following the guiding thread of the saturated phenomenon, phenomenology finds 
its final possibility: not only the possibility that surpasses actuality but the 
possibility that surpasses the very conditions of possibility, the possibility of 
unconditioned possibility – in other words, the possibility of the impossible…
423
 
To which St. Thomas may reply, 
aspiciens autem Iesus dixit illis apud homines hoc inpossibile est apud Deum 
autem omnia possibilia sunt. (Mt 19.26) 
Problems and Conflicts 
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As I stated above, on one plane these ideas work together but on another they 
have many issues to resolve. One of these areas, the understanding of metaphysics, looms 
the largest in the background. Levinasian scholars will immediately recognize the 
problems Levinas will have with the metaphysical concepts used by St. Thomas in 
defining the nature of the person. Derrida, too, will have similar problems. But even 
before that, there will be a recognition that much of the foundation for this, even in a 
more basic form, comes from the two differing approaches to the question of the Other, 
one phenomenological in focus and the other ontological in focus.  
Levinas in a later article ―Transcendence and Intelligibility‖
424
 but also earlier in 
―Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity‖
425
 as well as ―Transcendence and Height‖
426
 we see 
that Levinas is heavily critiquing the idea of the intelligibility of being. 
Ontology, "authentic" ontology, coincides with the facticity of temporal existence. 
To understand being as being is to exist in this world. Not that this world, through 
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the hardships it inflicts on us, elevates and purifies the soul, enabling it to acquire 
a receptivity to being.
427
 
For Levinas the idea of ontology cannot start until there is conceptualization but when 
conceptualization has begun, otherness is destroyed. Ontology lives, for Levinas and to a 
degree in St. Thomas, in the realm of knowledge. St. Thomas agrees with Aristotle that 
metaphysics is the science of being as being. Levinas thinks that respect for or 
responsibility for the other cannot take place in the realm of ontology. For Levinas, the 
process of conceptualizing involves the absorption of the other into the self. This is very 
similar and probably foundational to what was discussed in chapter one regarding Derrida 
and the distinction between the saying and the said. Once one thinks and conceptualizes, 
the self negates the other and absorbs the other into the self by taking control of the other 
in ―knowing‖ the other.
428
 The challenge is to overcome this hurdle in bringing the two 
together and, at present, there does not seem to be much progress.  
 With respect to the question of being, Marion finds that St. Thomas is something 
of an outlier in the scholastic field. In his ―retraction‖ in the Revue Thomist
429
 Marion 
brings out the mystical side of St. Thomas as well as the idea that the Heideggerian 
understanding of Beings and being does not apply to St. Thomas who keeps a distance 
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between God and creation. Much of the critique of St. Thomas will come through other‘s 
understanding of ―Thomism‖ through others besides St. Thomas. Marion is one of the 
few, along with John Caputo
430
, who have delved into the work of St. Thomas himself. 
Slowly more scholars are going into the original works of St. Thomas but many are still 
reading him as an isolated historical system instead of a dynamic philosophy and 
theology that still has some application for today.
431
   
In sum, most of the problems that one will encounter in this project come from the 
idea of nature in St. Thomas. Each of the thinkers presented from postmodernity will 
have some of the same problems. Most, with the notable exception of Jean-Luc Marion 
will not deal with the concept of grace and may have trouble with Marion‘s interpretation 
of Husserl that allows talk of grace or God. This traces its roots back to the problem of 
the theological turn in phenomenology that was chronicled by Dominique Janicaud in the 
collection of essays Phenomenology and the Theological Turn: the French Debate
432
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where this debate, not only about whether theology belongs in phenomenology but 
whether phenomenology belongs in theology, comes to the fore. 
Conclusion 
As the previous chapters have attempted to show, there is much to recommend the 
continuation of this dialogue between the postmodern theologian/philosopher and St. 
Thomas. I believe that the dialogue can be fruitful and bring out certain nuances that may 
go unnoticed otherwise. From what we have seen so far, grace is also a good starting 
point. In the postmodern work one finds an interest in the mystical and the hidden which 
also finds interest in the Tradition of the Roman Catholic Church, still very much 
influenced by St. Thomas. As we can see from the previous analysis, grace can benefit 
from the ideas of ―the other‖ found in Levinas and Derrida as well as the concept of the 
saturated phenomenon in its understanding. I have hopefully shown that these ideas work 
to advance a better understanding of the mysteries of the faith. 
The ideas of ―the Other‖ and ―concern for the Other‖ have been in the tradition 
but may have been obscured by other concerns or other attempts to develop ideas in a 
different direction. I think that using the contemporary philosophical language, one can 
present the ideas of the faith in a more relevant way for today‘s postmodern believer. 
This present generation of believers has grown up steeped in the postmodern milieu and 
has an ear for the language. Placing grace and other concepts in this language may help 
the next generation grapple with the perennial problems in contemporary ways all the 
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while remaining true to the received Tradition. The Church should have no problem 
finding new yet proper formulations for ancient truths.
433
  
Linking grace and the concern for the other may open the way for further work on 
grace to penetrate the contemporary language and become something spoken of in 
common parlance unlike today‘s light discussions of grace limited to radio talk shows or 
one line expressions of ―grace‖ found in daily planners.
434
 Grace, in its full theological 
import, has much to offer the layman as well as the religious, academic and scholar and 
this dialogue should help move grace back onto the theological radar. I think also that the 
theological understanding of grace has much to offer the postmodern 
philosopher/theologian as a new avenue to pursue in research. The affinities found in 
Levinas and Derrida as well as Purcell and Marion have shown that there is much mining 
to do and can produce some excellent work. Marion‘s work in particular seems to be 
bearing great results. 
The work I have done here is, to the best of my knowledge, the only one of its 
kind linking St. Thomas‘ nature as substance-in-relation with a theology of grace that fits 
that same pattern. I think this new view of the human person offers much to those doing a 
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theological anthropology for today. To find that the human person is made to relate and 
love the other in both its natural and supernatural structure opens up many opportunities 
for development. The understanding of the human person as other-oriented supports ideas 
surrounding social justice, moral theology, interpersonal ethics and many other areas as 
well. It would seem that this paradigm would eliminate any possible ideas of the self 
enclosed in the self who ignores the other without doing detriment to the self. I also see 
that this theology is balanced between the self and the other. Some of the philosophies 
seen above push the concern for the other too far to the extreme and lose site of the self, a 
self that is intuitively obvious and cannot go away. 
I find the work of Marion to be very helpful in developing a theology of grace 
and, as seen above, can answer many issues that are brought out in the contemporary 
mind regarding the hidden-ness of grace. The work on the saturated phenomenon can be 
developed in this direction as it becomes apparent that the grace of God is a saturated 
phenomenon possibly in the second order. Marion would say that revelation or epiphany 
is the ultimate expression of the saturated phenomenon but that revelation can be seen as 
the love of God revealed. There is much work to be done in this area. My analysis 
stemmed from the origins of the saturated phenomenon but another avenue for this is 
most definitely Marion‘s work on Love as found in texts dealing with the erotic 
especially Prolegomena to Charity
435
 and The Erotic Phenomenon
436
 and other 
occasional articles dealing with the flesh and love. 
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Bridging the gap between medieval and postmodern, I think this work has much 
to offer scholars of both eras and my hope is that this contribution will spark some 
interest and further research by myself as well as others. Many of the contemporary 
scholars have work that has great potential to be the bridge between the two eras 
especially in the areas of the hiddneness of God. Whatever the area, only good can come 
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